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 This chapter is partly based on Cracco, E., Bardi, L., Desmet, C., Genschow, O., Rigoni, D., De Coster, L., 
Radkova, I., Deschrijver, E., & Brass, M. (in press). Automatic Imitation: A meta-analysis. Psychological 
Bulletin. 
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The Perception-Action Link 
 
To understand social interaction, a fundamental question is how the actions of others 
are processed in the brain. Inspired by the neuroanatomical segregation of visual and motor 
functions (Power et al., 2011), traditional views have emphasized the dissociable nature of 
perception and action (Hurley, 2001). However, the past two decades have been characterized 
by a surge of research suggesting that both processes may be more closely connected than 
originally thought. In particular, there is now converging evidence from various domains that 
action observation recruits not only visual processes but also motor processes (Chartrand & 
Lakin, 2013; Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009; Cracco, Bardi, et al., 2018; Heyes, 2011; 
Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010, 2016). In other words, it appears from the literature that 
perception and action, rather than being two separate coins, are more like two sides of the 
same coin (Brass & Heyes, 2005). In this literature, there are currently three research lines 
supporting a relation between perception and action, namely research on motor mimicry 
(Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009), research on automatic imitation 
(Cracco, Bardi, et al., 2018; Heyes, 2011), and research on the mirror neuron system 
(Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010, 2016). Therefore, in the first part of this introduction, these 
three research bodies will be discussed. 
 
Motor Mimicry 
 
The first line of evidence that perception and action are connected comes from social 
psychological research on motor mimicry. Motor mimicry is the observation that individuals 
tend to imitate each other during social encounters (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Chartrand & 
van Baaren, 2009). The first demonstration of motor mimicry can be traced back to Hull 
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(1933), who found that subjects inadvertently copied an experimenter reaching forward and 
backward during a series of psychological tests. However, the most well-known paradigm to 
study motor mimicry was conceived by Chartrand and Bargh (1999). These authors asked 
participants to take turns in describing photographs with a confederate who was, unbeknownst 
to the participant, instructed to either rub his face or shake his foot and to either smile or not 
smile throughout the interaction. Participants were found to shake their foot more often and 
rub their face less often when they were paired with a foot-shaking confederate than when 
they were paired with a face-rubbing participant. Likewise, participants smiled more often in 
the presence of a smiling confederate than in the presence of a non-smiling confederate. 
Critically, a subsequent debriefing revealed that participants had not noticed the mannerisms 
of the confederate, indicating that mimicry occurred without awareness. 
The presence of motor mimicry in this paradigm has now been replicated across a 
multitude of studies (e.g., Castelli, Pavan, Ferrari, & Kashima, 2009; Genschow et al., 2017; 
Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; Marielle Stel et al., 2010; van Baaren, Maddux, Chartrand, de 
Bouter, & van Knippenberg, 2003; Yabar, Johnston, Miles, & Peace, 2006), which have been 
summarized in at least two major review papers (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Chartrand & van 
Baaren, 2009). Interestingly, these studies have argued that motor mimicry serves an 
important social function in the sense that it increases interpersonal rapport (Chartrand & 
Bargh, 1999; Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & Chartrand, 2003; Mariëlle Stel, van Dijk, & van 
Baaren, 2016; Wang & Hamilton, 2012). For example, Chartrand and Bargh (1999) showed in 
a second experiment that participants who were being imitated by a confederate liked the 
confederate more and rated the interaction as smoother than participants who were not being 
imitated, and these results have been replicated in subsequent work (Lakin & Chartrand, 
2003; Mariëlle Stel & Vonk, 2010) as well as extended to prosocial behavior such as 
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helpfulness (van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, & van Knippenberg, 2004) and generosity (van 
Baaren et al., 2004; van Baaren, Holland, Steenaert, & van Knippenberg, 2003). 
In sum, research on motor mimicry has revealed that people unconsciously imitate 
their interaction partner, and that this behavior acts as a social glue (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; 
Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009). This indicates that seeing someone else perform an action 
triggers an involuntary imitative response, which, in turn, implies that perception and action 
are closely intertwined (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). 
 
Automatic Imitation 
 
However, the finding that motor mimicry can occur without awareness does not 
necessarily imply that it is an involuntary process (Moors & De Houwer, 2006). For example, 
it has been argued in social reward theories that motor mimicry is used – be it consciously or 
unconsciously – as a means to obtain positive social consequences (Lakin et al., 2003; 
Mariëlle Stel et al., 2016; Wang & Hamilton, 2012). Instead, a process can be deemed 
involuntary if it cannot be controlled (Moors & De Houwer, 2006). Evidence that imitative 
tendencies are beyond voluntary control comes from research on automatic imitation. More 
specifically, this research has shown with stimulus-response compatibility tasks that observed 
actions are imitated even when imitation impairs task performance (Cracco, Bardi, et al., 
2018; Heyes, 2011). For instance, in a seminal study, Brass et al. (2000) instructed 
participants to lift their index finger in response to the number “1” and their middle finger in 
response to the number “2”. At the same time, a hand on the screen also lifted its index finger, 
also lifted its middle finger, or did not move (Figure 1a). The results showed that, compared 
to when the hand did not move (neutral trial), responses were faster and more accurate when 
the observed action matched the instructed response (congruent trial), but slower and less 
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accurate when the observed action did not match the instructed response (incongruent trial). 
The difference in reaction times and accuracy between incongruent and congruent trials is 
now widely used as a measure of automatic imitation (Cracco, Bardi, et al., 2018). 
Following its initial demonstration (Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001; Brass, 
Bekkering, Wohlschlager, & Prinz, 2000; Sturmer, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2000), automatic 
imitation has been studied extensively in the literature. This research has revealed that 
automatic imitation is a robust effect. For example, a recent meta-analysis identified 226 
experiments conducted between 2000 and 2016, summing up strong average effect size of gz 
= 0.95 (Cracco, Bardi, et al., 2018). Indeed, in addition to finger actions (Brass, Bekkering, 
Wohlschlager, Prinz, et al., 2000; Catmur & Heyes, 2011), automatic imitation has now been 
replicated across a wide range of effectors, including hand actions (Cracco, Genschow, 
Radkova, & Brass, 2018; Stürmer, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2000), feet actions (Gillmeister, 
Catmur, Liepelt, Brass, & Heyes, 2008; Wiggett, Downing, & Tipper, 2013), arm actions 
(Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003; Stanley, Gowen, & Miall, 2007), and facial actions 
(Leighton & Heyes, 2010; Press, Richardson, & Bird, 2010).  
However, an important question is also what causes automatic imitation. A critical 
view is that automatic imitation is merely an artefact of spatial compatibility (Aicken, Wilson, 
Williams, & Mon-Williams, 2007; Jansson, Wilson, Williams, & Mon-Williams, 2007). 
Spatial compatibility is the tendency to respond faster when the location of the stimulus 
corresponds to the location of the response (Hommel, 2011). In the Brass et al. (2000) study, 
spatial compatibility was confounded with imitative compatibility because the stimulus hand 
was a left hand mirroring participants’ right response hand (Figure 1a). In other words, index 
finger stimulus movements were not only congruent with index finger responses in terms of 
imitation (i.e., see index finger, move index finger) but also in terms of location (i.e., see left 
finger, move left finger). A fundamental question is therefore whether automatic imitation 
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(i.e., imitative compatibility) can be explained as a mere byproduct of spatial processing (i.e., 
spatial compatibility). 
 
 
Figure 1. Examples of the stimuli used to study automatic imitation. In all three panels, participants have to lift 
their right index finger when the number 1 is presented and their right middle finger when the number 2 is 
presented. The first panel presents a case where imitative compatibility is confounded with spatial compatibility. 
The second panel presents a case where imitative compatibility is orthogonal to spatial compatibility. The third 
panel presents a case where the average performance across both trials provides a measure of imitative 
compatibility that is independent of spatial compatibility. See text for additional detail. 
 
Two methods have been developed to rule out the confounding influence of spatial 
compatibility. In the first method, the stimulus hand is positioned orthogonal to the response 
hand (e.g., J. Cook & Bird, 2011, 2012). For example, in the Brass et al. (2000) study, spatial 
processes can be neutralized by rotating the stimulus hand 90° counterclockwise so that its 
fingers point to the right instead of downwards (Figure 1b). In this case, index finger stimulus 
movements are still compatible with index finger responses in terms of imitation (i.e., see 
index finger, move index finger), but no longer in terms of location (i.e., see lower finger, 
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move left finger). However, a potential issue with this method is that there is a documented 
tendency to associate “down” with “left” and “up” with “right” (Weeks & Proctor, 1990). As 
a result, this method confounds automatic imitation with orthogonal spatial compatibility 
(Cracco, Bardi, et al., 2018; Heyes, 2011). 
The second method solves this orthogonal spatial confound by independently 
manipulating imitative and spatial compatibility (Bertenthal, Longo, & Kosobud, 2006; 
Catmur & Heyes, 2011). For instance, using the stimuli of Brass et al. (2000), this means that 
a left stimulus hand is presented in one half of the trials and a right stimulus hand in the other 
half of the trials. This setup results in a positive relation between imitative and spatial 
compatibility in left hand trials and a negative relation in right hand trials, which makes it 
possible to calculate a main effect of imitative compatibility that is independent of spatial 
compatibility (Figure 1c). In a meta-analysis, we found that spatial compatibility inflates but 
cannot explain automatic imitation. More specifically, the results revealed that automatic 
imitation was robust even when both simple and orthogonal spatial compatibility were 
controlled (Cracco, Bardi, et al., 2018). 
However, if automatic imitation is not spatial compatibility, then what is it? According 
to Heyes (2011), it is a combination of effector compatibility and movement compatibility. 
Given that effector is used as a synonym of body part in this context, effector compatibility is 
the overlap between the body part moved by the model and the body part that has to be moved 
by the participant (e.g., index or middle finger). In contrast, movement compatibility is the 
overlap between the type of movement made by the model and the type of movement that has 
to be made by the participant (e.g., lifting or tapping). Studies on effector compatibility 
manipulate effector overlap while keeping the movement constant (e.g., lift index finger or 
middle finger), whereas studies on movement compatibility manipulate movement overlap 
while keeping the effector constant (e.g., lift or tap index finger). Automatic imitation has 
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been found in effector compatibility (e.g., Brass et al., 2000; Catmur & Heyes, 2011) as well 
as in movement compatibility tasks (e.g., Brass et al., 2001; Stürmer et al., 2000), and this has 
been confirmed by meta-analytic evidence of automatic imitation in both tasks (Cracco, 
Bardi, et al., 2018). 
Like motor mimicry, automatic imitation has often been related to social processes 
(Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 2009; Wang & Hamilton, 2012). For example, an important 
modulator of automatic imitation is the similarity between the actor and the imitator (Cracco, 
Bardi, et al., 2018; Press, 2011). That is, automatic imitation has shown to be stronger for 
humans than for robots (Kilner et al., 2003; Press, Bird, Flach, & Heyes, 2005; Press, 
Gillmeister, & Heyes, 2006) and more recently also for romantic partners than for close 
friends (Maister & Tsakiris, 2016). Nevertheless, in contrast to previous work (e.g., Gowen, 
Bolton, & Poliakoff, 2017; Liepelt & Brass, 2010), a recent meta-analysis found no evidence 
that automatic imitation is influenced by top-down beliefs about whether or not the actor is 
human (Cracco, Bardi, et al., 2018). Overall, the evidence thus shows that automatic imitation 
is tuned towards agents that are “like me”. This indicates that, similar to motor mimicry, 
automatic imitation is an inherently social process (Wang & Hamilton, 2012). 
However, surprisingly, a recent study with 196 participants found no correlation 
between automatic imitation and motor mimicry (Genschow et al., 2017). Therefore, an 
important question is whether they share the same underlying mechanism, as has previously 
been suggested (Heyes, 2011). Although it is too early to tell, there is a striking overlap 
between the factors that modulate automatic imitation and the factors that modulate motor 
mimicry, suggesting that they tap into similar processes (Heyes, 2011). From this perspective, 
the absence of a correlation shows how methodological differences can blur the relation 
between two related concepts (Genschow et al., 2017). Whatever the reason, it is clear that 
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care should be taken when equating automatic imitation with motor mimicry until further 
evidence has either confirmed or refuted the claim that they rely on similar mechanisms. 
To conclude, research on automatic imitation has shown that imitative tendencies 
occur even when they impair task performance, demonstrating that imitation can occur even 
without intention. In line with the perception-action hypothesis, this indicates that action 
observation triggers not only the visual representation of the observed action, but also its 
motor representation, leading to an urge to imitate (Cracco, Bardi, et al., 2018). 
 
The Mirror Neuron System 
  
Nevertheless, perhaps the strongest evidence that perception is linked to action comes 
from research showing that observed actions are processed not only in the visual but also in 
the motor system of the brain (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010, 2016). For example, single cell 
studies in the monkeys have revealed a subset of neurons in the ventral premotor cortex 
(Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996), the inferior parietal lobe (Rozzi, Ferrari, 
Bonini, Rizzolatti, & Fogassi, 2008), and the intraparietal sulcus (Fujii, Hihara, & Iriki, 2007) 
that fire both when an action is executed and when the same action is observed (Kilner & 
Lemon, 2013). These neurons were famously coined mirror neurons, indicating that they 
“mirror” observed actions in the motor system (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; 
Rizzolatti et al., 1996). 
The discovery of mirror neurons in monkeys was quickly followed by studies 
investigating whether similar neurons exist in humans as well. Supporting this hypothesis, 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) research has revealed that action observation 
and action execution recruit an overlapping neural network (Caspers, Zilles, Laird, & 
Eickhoff, 2010; Molenberghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 2012). Similar to monkeys, this 
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network extends the ventral premotor and inferior parietal cortex, as well as additional regions 
such as the superior parietal cortex and the cerebellum (Molenberghs et al., 2012). Yet, shared 
activation at the group level is not the same as shared activation at the individual level. For 
example, brain regions responding to action observation in some participants and to action 
execution in other participants would also appear to “share activation” across participants. 
However, while possible, there is now strong evidence that shared activation exists at the 
individual level as well (Gazzola & Keysers, 2009). 
Nevertheless, fMRI still aggregates brain activation across several hundred thousand 
neurons. As a consequence, shared regions do not necessarily contain mirror neurons but 
could also contain a mixture of action observation and action execution neurons. Therefore, to 
demonstrate that mirror neurons exist, it has to be shown that observing and executing a 
specific action recruits the same neuronal population (Dinstein, 2008; Dinstein, Hasson, 
Rubin, & Heeger, 2007; Dinstein & Thomas, 2008). This can be done with cross-modal 
repetition suppression, which investigates whether brain activation during action observation 
is weaker when it is preceded by the execution of the same, as opposed to a different, action 
(and vice versa during action execution). Repetition suppression capitalizes on the fact that 
repeatedly presenting the same stimulus selectively suppresses neuronal firing in the neurons 
that code the presented stimulus (Malach, 2012). In other words, neuronal populations that 
show cross-modal repetition suppression can be considered to have mirror properties because 
they are responsive not only to observing but also to executing a specific action (Dinstein, 
2008; Dinstein et al., 2007; Dinstein & Thomas, 2008). In line with a human mirror neuron 
system, cross-modal repetition suppression has now been reported across three studies in two 
key mirror regions, namely the inferior frontal gyrus (Kilner, Neal, Weiskopf, Friston, & 
Frith, 2009; Press, Weiskopf, & Kilner, 2012) and the inferior parietal lobe (Chong, 
Cunnington, Williams, Kanwisher, & Mattingley, 2008). 
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In addition to fMRI, a second technique to measure the human mirror neuron system is 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). TMS is a non-invasive technique to stimulate the 
human brain that works by passing an electric current through a magnetic coil. This current 
then generates a magnetic field perpendicular to the surface of the coil, which in turn causes 
an electric field perpendicular to the magnetic field that excites the neurons in the brain 
surface below the coil (Hallett, 2007). When the primary motor cortex (M1) is stimulated, a 
volley is sent down the corticospinal tract, resulting in a contraction of the muscles 
represented in the stimulated area. For example, stimulation of the M1 hand area will cause 
the contralateral hand muscles to contract. These TMS-induced muscle contractions are 
named motor evoked potentials (MEPs) and can be detected using electromyography (EMG). 
Mirror activation can be measured by applying TMS to M1 during action observation (Fadiga, 
Craighero, & Olivier, 2005; Naish, Houston-Price, Bremner, & Holmes, 2014). This was 
initially demonstrated by Fadiga et al. (1995) who found increased MEPs in two hand and two 
forearm muscles when participants observed an experimenter grasping an object but not when 
they observed an object that was not being grasped. 
However, the strongest TMS evidence for mirror activation comes from studies 
showing a double dissociation between two muscles both during the observation and during 
the execution of two different actions (Naish et al., 2014). For example, two studies have now 
found that the first dorsal interosseous (FDI) and the abductor digiti minimi (ADM) muscles, 
which are respectively involved in index and little finger abduction, are differentially 
modulated during the execution and observation of index and little finger movements 
(Romani, Cesari, Urgesi, Facchini, & Aglioti, 2005; Urgesi, Candidi, Fabbro, Romani, & 
Aglioti, 2006). That is, MEPs were found to be stronger in the FDI than in the ADM during 
the execution and observation of index finger movements but weaker in the FDI than in the 
ADM during the execution and observation of little finger movements. 
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Nevertheless, the question remains whether increases in corticospinal excitability 
during action observation are indeed driven by activity in the mirror neuron system, as is 
typically assumed (Fadiga et al., 2005; Naish et al., 2014). Supporting this view, research has 
revealed that MEPs during action observation are decreased when a virtual lesion is applied to 
the ventral premotor cortex (Avenanti, Bolognini, Maravita, & Aglioti, 2007; Enticott et al., 
2012) or to the inferior parietal cortex (Avenanti, Annella, Candidi, Urgesi, & Aglioti, 2013) 
using repetitive TMS or transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS). Similarly, studies 
using a paired-pulse procedure have found stronger corticospinal excitability during action 
observation when the M1 pulse was preceded by a conditioning pulse to the premotor 
(Catmur, Mars, Rushworth, & Heyes, 2011; Koch et al., 2010) or anterior intraparietal cortex 
(Koch et al., 2010), indicating task-related facilitation of the connections between these two 
mirror regions and M1 (Koch et al., 2010). 
Finally, a third method to investigate the human mirror neuron system is 
electroencephalography (EEG). More specifically, EEG research has focused on the mu 
rhythm, which is an alpha band (i.e., 8-13 Hz) brain oscillation thought to reflect sensorimotor 
processing (Fox et al., 2016). Indeed, it is well established that action execution leads to 
reduced power in the mu rhythm over central electrodes (Fox et al., 2016; Lepage & Théoret, 
2006; Muthukumaraswamy & Johnson, 2004; Muthukumaraswamy, Johnson, & McNair, 
2004). Interestingly, however, similar mu suppression has also been found during action 
observation (Fox et al., 2016; Lepage & Théoret, 2006; Muthukumaraswamy & Johnson, 
2004; Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2004), and this has been taken as evidence for a human 
mirror neuron system (Fox et al., 2016). In line with this view, combined fMRI-EEG 
measurements have shown that mu-suppression is correlated with BOLD activity in the mirror 
neuron system both during action observation and during action execution (Arnstein, Cui, 
Keysers, Maurits, & Gazzola, 2011). Nevertheless, it has recently also been argued that 
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methodological problems in the mu-suppression literature make it difficult to draw firm 
conclusions (Cuevas, Cannon, Yoo, & Fox, 2014; Hobson & Bishop, 2017). For example, the 
largest study to date that concluded that the presence of observation-induced mu-suppression 
critically depends on the baseline being used and can easily be confounded with alpha 
suppression (Hobson & Bishop, 2016). Similarly, a recent study revealed that mu-suppression 
during action observation reflects somatosensory rather than motor processes (Coll, Press, 
Hobson, Catmur, & Bird, 2017). 
With regard to the function of the mirror neuron system, it has been argued that 
mirroring helps us to understand the behavior of others by making it possible to simulate 
observed actions in our own motor system (Gallese, 2007; Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 
2004; Keysers & Gazzola, 2006). In support of this view, research has shown that mirror 
activation is not only sensitive to action kinematics (Maeda, Kleiner-Fisman, & Pascual-
Leone, 2002), but also action goals (Cattaneo, Caruana, Jezzini, & Rizzolatti, 2009; Hamilton 
& Grafton, 2006), action intentions (Cattaneo et al., 2007; Iacoboni, Molnar-Szakacs, Gallese, 
Buccino, & Mazziotta, 2005), and action outcomes (Aglioti, Cesari, Romani, & Urgesi, 2008; 
Hamilton & Grafton, 2008). Similarly, it has been found that virtual lesions to the inferior 
frontal gyrus disrupt performance on tasks requiring participants to infer the intention behind 
observed actions (Pobric & Hamilton, 2006; Tidoni, Borgomaneri, di Pellegrino, & Avenanti, 
2013). Taken together, this work thus suggests that, similar to motor mimicry and automatic 
imitation, mirroring is an important social process. 
In conclusion, there is now converging evidence from fMRI, TMS, and, to a lesser 
extent, EEG research that observed and executed actions are processed in shared neural 
networks. This mechanism is widely considered to be the neurophysiological basis of motor 
mimicry and automatic imitation (Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 2009; Cracco, Bardi, et al., 2018; 
Heyes, 2011) and as such makes it possible to develop a biologically plausible account of the 
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relation between perception and action. Interestingly, research on the mirror neuron system 
has also extended beyond action observation. For example, it has been shown that action-
related sounds likewise produce mirror activation (Etzel, Gazzola, & Keysers, 2008; Gazzola, 
Aziz-Zadeh, & Keysers, 2006) and that observing someone being touched (Keysers et al., 
2004), someone in pain (Singer et al., 2004), or someone expressing an emotion (Wicker et 
al., 2003) activates the same brain regions as being touched, being in pain, or expressing the 
same emotion ourselves. This suggests, in other words, that mirroring is a general 
mechanisms that helps us to understand not only what other people do but also what they feel 
and think (Gallese, 2007; Gallese et al., 2004; Keysers & Gazzola, 2006). 
  
Theories of Perception and Action 
 
Having established that there is a connection between perception and action, an 
important question is also what causes this connection. Broadly speaking, theories on the 
perception-action link can be divided into specialist and generalist theories (Brass & Heyes, 
2005). Specialist theories assume the presence of a special purpose mechanism that is 
uniquely dedicated to matching observed actions to motor representations (Gallese & 
Goldman, 1998; Simpson, Murray, Paukner, & Ferrari, 2014). Importantly, this mechanism is 
often held to be inborn (e.g., Meltzoff & Moore, 1983, 1989), consistent with evidence that 
imitation occurs already at birth (e.g., Meltzoff & Moore, 1983, 1989). However, recent work 
has called the evidence supporting neonatal imitation into question (Oostenbroek et al., 2016). 
Together with evidence that both mirror activation (Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 2007; Heyes, 
2010) and automatic imitation (Cracco, Bardi, et al., 2018; Heyes, Bird, Johnson, & Haggard, 
2005) are sensitive to sensorimotor learning, this supports the view that connections between 
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perception and action might be acquired rather than inborn (R. Cook, Bird, Catmur, Press, & 
Heyes, 2014; Heyes, 2010, 2016; Keysers & Perrett, 2004). 
The notion that perception-action links develop through domain-general learning 
mechanisms is at the core of two related yet distinct generalist theories (Brass & Heyes, 
2005). The first theory is the associative sequence learning (ASL) theory (Brass & Heyes, 
2005; R. Cook et al., 2014; Heyes, 2010; Ray & Heyes, 2011). This theory argues that the 
visual representation of an action is initially unconnected to its motor representations. Instead, 
it assumes that motor commands gradually become connected to their sensory consequences 
as a result of contingent co-activation. For example, when we grasp an object, we typically 
see how our hand grasps the object. Likewise, when we express an emotion, we tend to see 
the same emotion expressed on the face of others. These experiences lead to bidirectional 
connections between action perception and action execution. This, in turn, causes mirror 
activation (R. Cook et al., 2014; Heyes, 2010) and therefore also imitation (Cracco, Bardi, et 
al., 2018; Heyes, 2011). 
The second theory, ideomotor theory (IM), extends ASL by assuming an additional 
mechanism (Brass & Heyes, 2005; Greenwald, 1970; Prinz, 1997; Shin, Proctor, & Capaldi, 
2010). Like ASL, IM posits that associative learning leads to connections between visual and 
motor representations. However, IM also predicts that this learning process culminates in the 
development of ideomotor representations that code actions in terms of their anticipated 
sensory consequences (Greenwald, 1970). Given that the visual image of an action is part of 
its sensory consequences, seeing an action primes the ideomotor representation controlling 
that action. Thus, according to IM, mirror neurons are the neurophysiological manifestations 
of ideomotor representations (Brass & Muhle-Karbe, 2014), and priming these representations 
leads to imitation (Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschlager, & Prinz, 2000; Cracco, Bardi, et al., 
2018). In other words, IM and ASL differ in whether or not they assume ideomotor 
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representations, but agree in their emphasis on the role of motor learning (Brass & Heyes, 
2005).  
 
The Perception-Action Link in Multi-Agent Settings 
 
While there is a large literature on the perception-action link in situations where a 
single person watches a single agent, virtually nothing is known about the perception-action 
link in multi-agent settings. In contrast, social interaction often exceeds a dyadic structure. 
Therefore, to understand social interaction, it is imperative to not only understand how others’ 
actions are processed in single-agent but also in multi-agent settings. In particular, an 
interesting hypothesis is that observers can simultaneously represent the actions of multiple 
agents in their motor system. Indeed, considering the social function of the perception-action 
link, this could provide important insights into currently understudied social processes such as 
interaction representation (Quadflieg & Koldewyn, 2017; Quadflieg & Penton-Voak, 2017), 
group interactions (Ramenzoni, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2014; Tsai, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2011), 
and social contagion (Gallup et al., 2012; Hortensius & De Gelder, 2014; Latane, 1981; 
Milgram, Bickman, & Berkowitz, 1969).  
 
Interaction Representation 
 
A first process that could benefit from mirroring multiple agents is interaction 
representation. That is, in social life, we have to represent not only the actions but also the 
interactions of others. For instance, how do we decide whether two persons wrapping their 
arms around each other are hugging or wrestling? Recently, it has been argued that, in 
addition to high-level processes like mentalizing, interaction representation may also rely on 
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low-level processes like motor simulation (Quadflieg & Koldewyn, 2017; Quadflieg & 
Penton-Voak, 2017). However, to simulate interactions, the actions of multiple agents have to 
be represented at the same time in the motor system. 
Preliminary evidence that this is possible comes from research on interaction 
observation. In one relevant study, participants watched short video clips comprising two 
consecutive phases (Iacoboni et al., 2004). First, in the “alone phase”, a single actor appeared 
on the scene. Second, in the “relational phase”, this actor then started to interact with a second 
actor. In one of the videos, for instance, the actors played a couple looking at family photos. 
The results revealed that brain activation in two mirror neuron regions, namely the right 
premotor cortex and the right inferior frontal gyrus, was stronger in the relational phase than 
in the alone phase. In the same vein, a number of TMS studies have now demonstrated that 
corticospinal excitability is increased during interactive action observation compared with 
individual action observation (Aihara, Yamamoto, Mori, Kushiro, & Uehara, 2015; 
Bucchioni, Cavallo, Ippolito, Marton, & Castiello, 2013). For example, this research has 
shown that MEPs are stronger when participants see someone throwing a ball towards another 
person than when they see someone throwing a ball against a wall (Bucchioni et al., 2013). 
Finally, in two fMRI studies, observing two interacting persons was found to produce stronger 
motor activation than observing two independently acting persons (Centelles, Assaiante, 
Nazarian, Anton, & Schmitz, 2011; Georgescu et al., 2014). 
Thus, taken together, these studies demonstrate that the motor system is activated 
more strongly during interaction observation than during action observation. However, it does 
not necessarily follow from an unspecific increase in motor activation that multiple observed 
actions were represented at the same time in the motor system. Instead, for this, it has to be 
shown that the corresponding motor representations were simultaneously activated. 
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Joint Action 
 
In addition to interaction representation, the ability to mirror multiple observed actions 
might also play an important role in joint action. More specifically, joint actions are social 
interactions where two or more individuals coordinate their actions in space and time to 
achieve a common goal (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006). Importantly, this ranges 
from complex interactions such as dancing or playing football to simple interactions such as 
shaking hands or clinking glasses. However, to understand joint action, a key question is how 
individuals manage to synchronize their own actions with the actions of others (Sebanz et al., 
2006), and previous work suggests that this relies in large part on mirror processes (Colling, 
Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2013; Hadley, Novembre, Keller, & Pickering, 2015; Kourtis, Sebanz, 
& Knoblich, 2013). 
For example, Kourtis et al. (2013) developed a joint action task in which participants 
had to pick up and pass an object to another participant who then had to put it back to its 
original position. The results showed an increase in action coordination over time, and this 
increase was correlated with the degree to which receivers co-represented the actions of the 
givers in their motor system. Similarly, Hadley et al. (2015) found that disturbing the dorsal 
premotor cortex with repetitive TMS impaired interpersonal coordination in a musical duet 
task, suggesting that musical coordination relies at least in part on the mirror neuron system. 
However, joint action is not restricted to social interactions involving a single co-actor. For 
example, musicians in musical ensembles have to synchronize their actions not with one 
musician but with several musicians at the same time (Volpe, D’Ausilio, Badino, Camurri, & 
Fadiga, 2016). Therefore, considering past work, an interesting hypothesis is that this relies on 
the ability to simultaneously represent the actions of multiple co-actors in the motor system. 
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Indirect evidence supporting this possibility can be found in research on inter-group 
imitation. For instance, Tsai and colleagues (2011) investigated how overlap between the 
number of actors and the number of imitators influenced imitation. To this end, they presented 
two hands of which the left hand, the right hand, or both hands made an index finger 
movement. Participants sat on the left or right side of the screen and had to imitate the 
ipsilateral hand. Importantly, however, the task was performed together with a confederate 
who was sitting on the other side of the screen. In the compatible condition, the confederate 
also had to imitate the ipsilateral hand. In contrast, in the incompatible condition, the 
confederate had to imitate when one hand on either side of the screen made a movement but 
not when both hands made a movement.  
In other words, there was a match between the number of actors and the number of 
imitators in the compatible condition but a mismatch in the incompatible condition. To give 
an example, when two hands made a movement, both the participant and confederate had to 
respond in the compatible condition, whereas only the participant had to respond in the 
incompatible condition. The results revealed that participants were slower on incompatible 
trials than on compatible trials. However, this was only true if the hands belonged to two 
different persons (“group condition”). Instead, if the hands belonged to the same person 
(“individual condition”), there was no compatibility effect. Overall, these results thus indicate 
that imitation was facilitated when the number of actors matched the number of imitators, 
namely in the compatible group condition. 
In a follow-up study, using a continuous tapping paradigm, this finding was extended 
to synchrony (Ramenzoni et al., 2014). More specifically, in this study, two stimulus hands 
alternately tapped their index finger in a gradually increasing tempo, and participants had to 
imitate one of those hands either with (“joint condition”) or without (“solo condition”) 
another participant imitating the second hand. The results revealed that responses in the joint 
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condition were more synchronized with the stimulus movements when the hands belonged to 
two different persons (i.e., group condition) than when they belonged to a single person (i.e., 
individual condition). In contrast, the opposite pattern was found in the solo condition. Taken 
together, research on inter-group imitation thus shows that imitation is facilitated when the 
number of actors matches the number of imitators. However, as with interaction observation, 
this does not necessarily mean that multiple observed actions were represented simultaneously 
in the motor system. 
  
Social Contagion 
 
Finally, the ability to simultaneously represent multiple observed actions in the motor 
system may have important implications for the social contagion literature. For example, in a 
seminal study, Milgram et al. (1969) monitored the behavior of pedestrians in a busy city 
street while they passed by a group of one to fifteen confederates looking at a sixth floor 
window. The results revealed that the likelihood that passers-by would also look up increased 
as the group of confederates grew in size. In other words, the probability of imitation 
depended on the number of actors, and this finding has since been replicated (Gallup et al., 
2012; Knowles & Bassett, 1976), as well as extended to other behaviors such as applause 
contagion (Freedman & Birsky, 1980), queue formation (Mann, 1977), helping behavior 
(Darley & Latané, 1968), and action sequence imitation (Herrmann, Legare, Harris, & 
Whitehouse, 2013). However, these findings have mainly been explained in terms of 
interpretative processes. For instance, Milgram et al (1969) argued that imitation increased 
with group size because larger groups are more likely to be looking at something of interest. 
In contrast, an alternative explanation could also be that imitation increased with group size 
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because the relevant motor representation was triggered more strongly when the action was 
executed by multiple persons. 
Initial evidence that sensorimotor processes contribute to social group contagion was 
recently obtained in an fMRI study on the bystander effect (Hortensius & De Gelder, 2014). 
In this study, participants watched video clips showing zero to four bystanders walking past a 
person in need without intervening. The results showed that motor activation decreased as the 
number of bystanders increased, indicating that participants automatically embodied the 
bystanders’ passive behavior, causing them to inhibit motor responses. These results suggest 
that social contagion phenomena such as bystander apathy might have a sensorimotor basis 
(Hortensius & De Gelder, 2014). However, despite the high degree of experimental control, it 
might still be argued that the relation between the number of bystanders and motor activation 
was driven by interpretative processes. For instance, it cannot be ruled out that participants 
inferred from the number of bystanders whether or not the victim was in need, and that this 
explains the relation with motor activation. 
In sum, although previous research has already hinted towards the possibility of a 
multi-actor mirror mechanism, direct evidence is currently lacking. Therefore, the goal of the 
current PhD dissertation is to test whether multiple observed actions can be represented at the 
same time in the motor system. To this end, I will use a multi-method approach in which 
behavioral studies on automatic imitation are combined with TMS and fMRI studies on action 
observation so that informed conclusions can be reached on the basis of converging evidence 
from various sources. Together, this work offers an important contribution to the literature 
because it allows the role of perception-action processes to be extended beyond the dyad. 
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Outline of the Current Thesis 
 
The overarching research question addressed in the current thesis is whether 
individuals can represent multiple identical and multiple different observed actions at the 
same time in their motor system. Chapter 2 presents two automatic imitation experiments 
exploring both cases. That is, using automatic imitation (see Figure 1), this chapter 
investigates whether seeing two congruent or two incongruent actions produces a stronger 
motor trigger than seeing one congruent or incongruent action (i.e., identical actions) and 
whether seeing one congruent and one incongruent action produces concurrent facilitation and 
interference effects that cancel out each other (i.e., different actions). Furthermore, it also 
investigates whether these two effects are specific to human agents, or can be obtained with 
non-human agents as well. Indeed, research has shown that automatic imitation is stronger for 
human than for nonhuman agents (Cracco, Bardi, et al., 2018; Press, 2011). Therefore, if the 
hypothesized effects are caused by perception-action processes rather than by attentional or 
spatial processes, they should be sensitive to animacy. 
In Chapter 3, I then use TMS to investigate motor co-representation of two identical 
observed actions during passive observation. More specifically, similar to Chapter 2, I 
investigate whether two identical observed actions produce stronger motor responses than a 
single observed action. As explained earlier, motor TMS can be used to measure mirror 
activation in the motor system (Naish et al., 2014). As such, Chapter 3 critically extends 
Chapter 2 by providing a more direct measure of mirror neuron activation. 
The goal of Chapter 4 is to address a confound present in the previous two chapters. 
That is, it could be argued that participants in Chapters 2 and 3 might randomly represent one 
hand on each trial. Indeed, this account also predicts stronger motor responses when seeing 
two identical actions because the probability to represent a moving hand would then be 100% 
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when both hands make a movement but only 50% when one hand makes a movement. In 
other words, the effects predicted in Chapters 2 and 3 do not necessarily arise within trials but 
could also arise across trials as a consequence of random sampling. Therefore, to address this 
issue, Chapter 4 investigates across four experiments whether the effects observed in Chapter 
2 can be replicated when task requirements ensure that at least one action is represented on 
every trial. 
In Chapter 5, I set out to investigate the hypothesis that sensorimotor processes 
contribute to social group contagion. That is, across seven experiments, I explore the relation 
between group size and automatic imitation while minimizing the role of interpretative 
processes. Specifically, I address the hypothesis that automatic imitation becomes stronger as 
the number of observed movements increases from one to four. Moreover, I explore whether 
this relation follows an asymptotic curve, in line with previous research on social contagion 
(Bond, 2005).  
Chapter 6 provides a more direct test of the hypothesis that not only two identical but 
also two different observed actions can be represented in the motor system. In particular, 
Chapter 6 tests this hypothesis across three automatic imitation experiments including four 
stimulus hands. More specifically, in this chapter, I compare automatic imitation in a 
condition where three or four hands perform the same action with automatic imitation in a 
condition where three hands perform one action and the fourth hand performs a different 
action. If the actions of all four hands are represented in the motor system, automatic imitation 
should be weaker in the third condition, where the fourth hand counteracts the other two 
hands, than in the remaining two conditions. Furthermore, in this chapter, I also investigate if 
the ability to simultaneously represent two different observed actions in the motor system 
depends on whether or not these actions can be executed in parallel 
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Finally, in Chapter 7, I investigate the case of multiple different observed actions 
using fMRI instead of automatic imitation. More specifically, participants in this study 
passively observe two right hands performing sign language gestures. This allows me to 
address three questions. First, I can investigate whether two different observed actions 
produce stronger motor activation than a single observed action. Second, I can investigate 
whether it is possible to decode two observed actions at the same time from activation in the 
motor system using multivariate analysis techniques. Third, I can investigate whether seeing 
two different actions leads to motor conflict. Indeed, if participants represent two sign 
language gestures in their motor system, this should produce activation in brain areas 
associated with motor conflict because it is not possible to simultaneously execute two such 
gestures with a single hand. 
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Motor Simulation Beyond the Dyad: Automatic 
Imitation of Multiple Actors
1
 
 
 
A large body of research has provided evidence for the idea that individuals simulate the 
actions of others in their motor system. However, this research has focused almost exclusively 
on dyadic situations, hence ignoring the fact that social situations often require that the actions 
of multiple persons are simulated simultaneously. In the current study, we addressed this issue 
by means of a widely used automatic imitation task. In Experiment 1, it is shown that 
individuals automatically imitate the actions of two agents at the same time. More 
specifically, the results indicate that two identical observed movements produce a stronger 
imitation effect, whereas two different observed movements produce two opposite imitation 
effects that cancel out each other. In Experiment 2, it is shown that the effects obtained in 
Experiment 1 cannot be explained in terms of attentional capture. Instead, the results point 
toward an explanation in terms of ideomotor theory. The finding that observers 
simultaneously represent the actions of multiple agents in their motor system allows for a 
better understanding of social interaction beyond the dyad. 
 
  
                                                     
1
Cracco, E., De Coster, L., Andres, M., & Brass, M. (2015). Motor Simulation Beyond the Dyad: Automatic 
Imitation of Multiple Actors. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 41(6), 
1488-1501. 
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Introduction 
 
Motor Simulation 
  
 Social interaction often requires that individuals take into account the actions of the 
people they interact with. When two persons reach out to shake each other’s hand, for 
example, the handshake will only succeed if they manage to coordinate their movements. To 
understand the mechanisms behind social interaction, it is therefore important to know how 
the actions of others are processed in the brain. According to ideomotor theory, action 
execution and action observation share a representational format (Greenwald, 1970; Hommel, 
2009; Prinz, 1997). In particular, it is assumed that actions are represented in the motor 
system in the form of their anticipated sensory consequences. Because individuals often see 
the actions they perform, this implies that the visual image of an action is part of its motor 
representation. As a result, an important prediction of ideomotor theory is that observed 
actions should not only trigger the visual system but also the motor system. 
 Supporting the idea that observed actions trigger the motor system, research has 
revealed that individuals tend to automatically imitate the movements of others (reviewed in 
Heyes, 2011). Stimulus-response compatibility studies, for instance, have consistently shown 
that responses to a symbolic stimulus are facilitated by a compatible observed movement and 
impeded by an incompatible observed movement (e.g., Bertenthal, Longo, & Kosobud, 2006; 
Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000; Catmur & Heyes, 2011; Liepelt, Cramon, & 
Brass, 2008; Stürmer, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2000). Similarly, research on social imitation 
has demonstrated that individuals often unintentionally copy the behavior, facial expression, 
and posture of their interaction partner (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Chartrand & van 
Baaren, 2009). Finally, patient studies have found that impaired inhibition due to frontal lobe 
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damage can result in an irresistible urge to imitate the actions of others (Brass et al., 2003; De 
Renzi, Cavalleri, & Facchini, 1996; Lhermitte, Pillon, & Serdaru, 1986; Luria, 1966). 
In addition to research on automatic imitation, ideomotor theory has recently gained 
support from neurophysiological data (reviewed in Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti & 
Sinigaglia, 2010). Imaging studies, for instance, have identified brain areas within the motor 
system that are recruited both when individuals execute an action and when they observe the 
same action (e.g., Dinstein, Hasson, Rubin, & Heeger, 2007; Gazzola & Keysers, 2009; 
Kilner, Neal, Weiskopf, Friston, & Frith, 2009). This is supported by EEG (e.g., Lepage & 
Théoret, 2006; Zhu, Sun, & Wang, 2013) and TMS (e.g., Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & 
Rizzolatti, 1995; Maeda, Kleiner-Fisman, & Pascual-Leone, 2002) research in which action 
observation was equally found to produce motor activation. 
In summary, research from different sources has supported the idea that observed 
actions are simulated in the motor system. Interestingly, studies suggest that this intimate 
connection between action observation and action execution may play an important role in 
social interaction. Motor simulation has, for instance, been related to a variety of social skills 
such as empathy (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Gazzola, Aziz-Zadeh, & Keysers, 2006; Kaplan 
& Iacoboni, 2006), action goal inference (Cattaneo, Caruana, Jezzini, & Rizzolatti, 2009; 
Hamilton & Grafton, 2006), and intention inference (Iacoboni, Molnar-Szakacs, Gallese, 
Buccino, & Mazziotta, 2005; Kaplan & Iacoboni, 2006). Furthermore, it has been argued that 
social problems in autism spectrum disorder are caused by a deficit in the motor simulation 
mechanism (Williams, Whiten, Suddendorf, & Perrett, 2001) or by a deficit in the regulation 
of the motor simulation mechanism (Hamilton, 2013; Spengler, Bird, & Brass, 2010). Finally, 
motor simulation is assumed to be important for the execution of actions that require two or 
more individuals to coordinate their movements (Colling, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2013; 
Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006). Specifically, it is thought that motor simulation enables 
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individuals to anticipate the actions of their co-actor in joint action situations (Atmaca, 
Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2011; Kourtis, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2013; Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 
2003; Sebanz, Knoblich, Prinz, & Wascher, 2006), hence facilitating movement coordination 
(Kourtis et al., 2013). 
 
Multi-Actor Motor Simulation 
 
 Despite the large body of research on motor simulation, however, most research has 
focused on how individuals process the actions of a single agent. This stands in contrast with 
the fact that individuals often engage in social interactions that involve multiple agents. When 
a large and heavy object has to be moved, for example, this may require the cooperation of 
more than two persons. To complete this task without accidents, it is imperative that the 
involved persons are able to coordinate their actions. This, in turn, requires that each of these 
persons is able to monitor and anticipate the actions of all the different co-actors. One 
possibility is that the latter relies on the ability to simulate the movements of multiple persons 
in the motor system.  
 Indirect evidence for the existence of a multi-actor motor simulation mechanism can 
be found in three earlier studies. In one study, Tsai and colleagues (Tsai, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 
2011) investigated imitative behavior at the inter-group level. More specifically, these authors 
examined how imitative responses were influenced by the overlap between the number of 
actors and the number of imitators. The results revealed that participants were faster to imitate 
when the number of imitators matched the number of actors (e.g., two actors and two 
imitators) compared to when they did not match (e.g., two actors and one imitator). This was 
interpreted as evidence for the idea that motor simulation is sensitive to the number of co-
actors. 
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 In two other studies, the relation between the number of observed actors and the 
probability of imitation was investigated. In an early study, Milgram, Bickman, and 
Berkowitz (1969) registered the behavior of pedestrians as they passed by one to fifteen 
people looking at a sixth floor window. The results showed that pedestrians were more likely 
to copy this behavior when the sample of window watchers grew in number. Similarly, in a 
more recent study (Herrmann, Legare, Harris, & Whitehouse, 2013) it was shown that 
children are more likely to imitate observed behavior when it is demonstrated by two models 
at the same time compared to a single model or two consecutive models. Both studies show, 
in other words, that the probability of imitation is larger when the observed behavior is 
executed by multiple persons at the same time. However, these results were interpreted in 
terms of interpretive processes rather than in terms of a multi-actor motor simulation 
mechanism. For example, the tendency to look up may increase with the number of window 
watchers because the odds that something interesting is happening also increase with the 
number of window watchers. Nevertheless, an alternative explanation for the increased 
probability of imitation could be that the relevant motor representation was triggered more 
strongly when the action was executed by multiple persons. 
 To summarize, previous studies have shown that imitative tendencies can be 
modulated by the number of observed actors. While this suggests that motor simulation is 
sensitive to the number of actors, it is not yet known whether this also means that the actions 
of multiple observed actors can be simulated in the motor system at the same time. In the 
current study, we aimed to address this question by measuring automatic imitation in a 
situation where two observed actors are moving simultaneously. If the movements of both 
actors are indeed represented in the motor system at the same time, the automatic imitation 
effects should reflect a combination of these movements. 
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Experiment 1 
 
In order to test the above prediction, we adapted a well-known automatic imitation 
paradigm in which individuals are required to make a finger movement in response to a 
symbolic cue while a hand on the screen makes a compatible or an incompatible movement 
(Bertenthal et al., 2006; Brass et al., 2000; Catmur & Heyes, 2011; Liepelt et al., 2008). In 
contrast to the original paradigm, in which a single hand appears on the screen, the current 
adaptation included two different hands next to each other making a congruent (C), an 
incongruent (IC), or no (N) abduction movement with respect to the imperative cue (figure 1). 
Consequently, this paradigm allows us to look at the congruency effect of both the hand on 
the left side (LC, LN, LIC) and the hand on the right side (RC, RN, RIC) of the screen. 
First, we can investigate if the movements of both hands are represented in the motor 
system of the observer by testing if a congruency effect is present for each of the two hands. 
Importantly, a congruency effect should be present for both hands irrespective of what the 
other hand is doing. That is, if the motor system is able to incorporate the movements of 
multiple actors simultaneously, the movements of each actor should result in an automatic 
imitation effect regardless of whether the other actor makes a movement and regardless of 
which movement the other actor makes. 
Next, if we manage to confirm that individuals are influenced by the actions of both 
hands at the same time, we can use this paradigm to investigate how the movements of the 
two hands are represented in the motor system. More precisely, we can examine how 
individuals are influenced by two identical observed movements and how they are influenced 
by two different observed movements. When the two hands perform an identical movement, it 
can be expected that both hand movements are mapped onto the same motor representation. 
This should lead to increased activation of the corresponding motor representation and 
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consequently to a larger congruency effect. Importantly, a larger congruency effect in the 
current study cannot be explained in terms of interpretive processes due to the fact that the 
observed movements are simple, meaningless movements that are irrelevant for the task at 
hand. When the two hands perform a different movement, the hand movements should trigger 
different motor representations. In terms of the automatic imitation task, this means that one 
hand movement should activate a congruent motor representation, while the other hand 
movement should activate an incongruent motor representation. As a result, a facilitation and 
an interference effect should be present at the same time. Because these effects are opposite 
forces, they should subsequently cancel each other out. 
 
 
Figure 1. The design of experiment 1. Each cell contains an example stimulus for the corresponding condition. 
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Method 
 
Participants. 38 participants took part in the experiment (Mage = 22.18, SDage = 2.36). 
All of them were right-handed females with good or corrected vision. Participants were paid 5 
euro and signed an informed consent beforehand. The study was approved by the local Ethical 
Committee and all procedures were performed in accordance with the ethical standards laid 
down in the 1964 Helsinki Declaration. 
Stimuli and Apparatus. The experiment was programmed in C with Tscope (Stevens, 
Lammertyn, Verbruggen, & Vandierendonck, 2006). Stimuli consisted of frames that were 
extracted from video clips (figure 1). These frames (1010 x 544 pixels) depicted two different 
female right hands (hand A and hand B), positioned next to each other on a blue background. 
The hands were positioned so they created mirror images of the participant’s right hand (i.e., 
the response hand). To produce an illusion of movement, the hands were first presented in 
their neutral posture and were subsequently overwritten by a second picture of the hands in 
their final posture. Both hands moved independently of one another and could either not move 
or perform an abduction movement of the index or little finger. Two types of video clips were 
created: one with hand A on the left side of the screen and hand B on the right side of the 
screen, and one the other way around. To record responses, we used an optical response box 
that detects when a finger leaves a sensor. 
Procedure. The experiment took about 30 minutes and consisted of two phases. To 
explore a possible influence of the imperative cue position, the cue was positioned at the top 
of the screen in one phase and at the bottom of the screen in the other phase. Each phase 
comprised a practice phase of 10 trials with feedback, followed by three blocks of each 90 
trials without feedback. All of these blocks contained 10 trials of each condition within the 
left-side congruency (LC, LN, LIC) x right-side congruency (RC, RN, RIC) design, 5 of 
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which were presented with W and 5 with P as imperative cue. After each block, participants 
had the opportunity to take a break. Trials were presented randomly, with the restriction that 
the same imperative cue could not appear on more than four consecutive trials. The position 
of the hands (left/right) and the order of the phases (cue bottom/cue top) was counterbalanced.  
Before the experiment, instructions appeared on the screen. The instructions requested 
participants to make an abduction movement with their right hand index finger when they saw 
W (‘wijsvinger’) and to make an abduction movement with their right hand little finger when 
they saw P (‘pink’). Participants were asked to respond as fast as possible, but without making 
errors. Each trial started with a picture of both hands in their neutral posture and a fixation 
cross for 500 ms. This was followed by the simultaneous presentation of the imperative 
stimulus and the hands in their final posture for a maximum of 2000 ms or until the response. 
After an inter-trial interval of 1000 ms, the next trial started.  
Data Analysis. All analyses were performed in R (R Development Core Team, 2013). 
Trials in which no response was given before the response deadline (0.34%) were excluded 
from all analyses. Additionally, trials with a reaction time (RT) faster than 100 ms (0.05%) 
were considered as action slips and excluded as well. Finally, for the RT analyses, erroneous 
trials (3.17%) and trials with a RT slower than 1000 ms (0.92%) were also excluded. 
Correlation coefficients represent Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients. T tests 
represent two-tailed paired samples t tests. P-values of post-hoc tests were corrected for 
multiple testing (pc) according to Holm’s procedure (Holm, 1979) separately for each set of 
tests. When necessary, ANOVA degrees of freedom were corrected for violation of sphericity 
by applying the Greenhouse-Geisser correction. Partial eta squared (ηp²) and Cohen’s d are 
reported as measures of effect size. 
To reduce the complexity of the data pattern, we will present three separate analyses 
that test our three main hypotheses. First, we test whether the left- and the right-side hand 
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each have an independent influence. Second, we test whether two identical observed 
movements produce a stronger congruency effect than a single observed movement. Finally, 
we investigate whether two different observed movements elicit opposing forces that cancel 
each other out. 
 
Results 
 
 Motor simulation of two simultaneous observed movements. To determine whether 
a congruency effect was present for both hands, RTs and error rates were subjected to a 3 
(left-side congruency: LC, LN, or LIC) x 3 (right-side congruency: RC, RN, or RIC) x 2 
(imperative cue position: bottom or top) repeated measures ANOVA. The analysis of the 
reaction times (figure 2a) revealed a main effect of left-side congruency, F(1.47, 54.38) = 
46.63, p < 0.001, ηp² = 0.56, with faster RTs in LC (439 ms) than in LN (448 ms), t(37) = -
4.84, pc < 0.001, d = 0.79, and faster RTs in LN than in LIC (459 ms), t(37) = -6.85, pc < 
0.001, d = 1.11. Similarly, there was also a main effect of right-side congruency, F(1.62, 
59.86) = 31.59, p < 0.001, ηp² = 0.46, with faster RTs in RC (438 ms) than in RN (450 ms), 
t(37) = -5.83, pc < 0.001, d = 0.95, and faster RTs in RN than in RIC (457 ms), t(37) = -3.39, 
pc = 0.002, d = 0.55. No main effect of imperative cue position was observed, F(1, 37) = 2.38, 
p = 0.131.  
The analysis also revealed an interaction between left-side congruency and right-side 
congruency, F(3.34, 123.76) = 3.36, p = 0.017, ηp² = 0.08. This seems at odds with the 
hypothesis that a congruency effect should be present for both hands regardless of the action 
performed by the other hand. However, a left-side congruency x right-side congruency 
interaction does not necessarily imply that the presence of a left-side (right-side) congruency 
effect depended on right-side (left-side) congruency. It could, for instance, also indicate that 
Chapter 2 
53 
 
the left-side (right-side) congruency effect was present for all levels of right-side (left-side) 
congruency but not with the same strength. To ensure that this was the case, we computed the 
left-side (right-side) congruency effect (IC – C) for the different levels of right-side (left-side) 
congruency. This confirmed that the congruency effect was present for both the left-side hand, 
all t(37) ≥ 4.15, all pc < 0.001, all d ≥ 0.67, and the right-side hand, all t(37) ≥ 5.00, all pc < 
0.001, all d ≥ 0.81, regardless of the action (C, N, IC) performed by the other hand2. No other 
two- or three-way interactions were observed, all p ≥ 0.307. 
The analysis of the error rates (figure 2b) revealed a similar pattern with a main effect 
of left-side congruency, F(1.61, 59.50) = 18.60, p < 0.001, ηp² = 0.33, and right-side 
congruency, F(1.87, 69.15) = 26.78, p < 0.001, ηp² = 0.42. Post-hoc analyses revealed that the 
main effect of left-side congruency was due to lower error rates in LC (2.23%) than in LN 
(2.92%), t(37) = -2.36, pc = 0.024, d = 0.38, and lower error rates in LN than in LIC (4.39%), 
t(37) = -4.35, pc < 0.001, d = 0.71. Similarly, post-hoc analyses for the main effect of right-
side congruency revealed lower error rates in RC (2.17%) than in RN (2.97%), t(37) = -3.06, 
pc = 0.004, d = 0.50, and lower error rates in RN than in RIC (4.39%), t(37) = -4.30, pc < 
0.001, d = 0.70. There was no main effect of imperative cue position, F < 1.  
The interaction between left-side and right-side congruency was near significance, 
F(3.46, 127.99) = 2.55, p = 0.051, ηp² = 0.06. To ensure that the left-side (right-side) 
congruency effect was present for all levels of right-side (left-side) congruency, we again 
computed the left-side (right-side) congruency effect (IC – C) separately for the different 
levels of right-side (left-side) congruency. This confirmed that the congruency effect was 
present for both the left-side hand, all t(37) ≥ 2.25, all pc ≤ 0.031, all d ≥ 0.37, and the right-
side hand, all t(37) ≥ 2.75, all pc ≤ 0.009, all d ≥ 0.45, irrespective of what the other hand was 
doing (C, N, IC)
2
. No other two- or three-way interactions were observed, all p ≥ 0.203. 
                                                     
2
 The precise pattern of the interaction is not further explored here because it is complex and not relevant to the 
research questions. A detailed description and interpretation of the interaction pattern can be found in appendix. 
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Figure 2. Reaction times in ms (a) and error rates in % (b) of the left-side congruency x right-side congruency 
analysis. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean (SEMs) corrected for within-subject designs according 
to Morey (2008). 
 
 Motor Simulation of two identical observed movements. Next, to determine 
whether two identical observed movements produced a stronger congruency effect, we took 
the relevant conditions (IC/IC, C/C, IC/N, N/IC, C/N, and N/C)
3
 and submitted the RTs and 
error rates to a 2 (number of hand movements: one vs. two) x 2 (congruency: IC vs. C) 
repeated measures ANOVA. Because the effect of imperative cue position failed to reach 
significance in the previous analysis, this variable was no longer considered in this analysis or 
in further analyses. The reaction time analysis (figure 3a) revealed a main effect of 
congruency, F(1, 37) = 65.67, p < 0.001, d = 1.32, with RTs in IC (463 ms) being slower than 
RTs in C (434 ms), but no main effect of number of hand movements, F < 1. As predicted, the 
analysis also revealed an interaction between number of hand movements and congruency, 
F(1, 37) = 6.91, p = 0.012, d = 0.43. Follow-up tests showed that the congruency effect was 
present regardless of the number of hand movements, both t(37) ≥ 6.97, both pc < 0.001, both 
                                                     
3
 These codes represent the following: MovementLeftSideHand/MovementRightSideHand. For example, IC/N 
means that the left-side hand performed an incongruent action while the right-side hand did not move. 
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d ≥ 1.13, but the effect was stronger for two identical observed movements (34 ms) than for a 
single observed movement (24 ms). 
 
 
Figure 3. Reaction times in ms (a) and error rates in % (b) of the number of hand movements x congruency 
analysis. Error bars depict SEMs corrected for within-subject designs according to Morey (2008). 
 
 The analysis of the errors rates (figure 3b) again showed a main effect of congruency, 
F(1, 37) = 41.89, p < 0.001, d = 1.05, with more errors in IC (5.16%) than in C (1.87%), but 
also a main effect of number of hand movements, F(1, 37) = 6.22, p = 0.017, d = 0.41, with 
more errors when two hands made a movement (3.96%) instead of one (3.07%). Importantly, 
the interaction between number of hand movements and congruency was significant as well, 
F(1, 37) = 14.02, p < 0.001, d = 0.61. Follow-up tests showed that there was a congruency 
effect regardless of the number of hand movements, both t(37) ≥ 4.69, both pc < 0.001, both d 
≥ 0.76, but the effect was again stronger for two identical observed movements (4.39%) than 
for a single observed movement (2.19%). 
 Motor simulation of two different observed movements. Finally, we investigated 
the effect of seeing two different movements. We reasoned that this should result in 
facilitation from the congruent hand movement and interference from the incongruent hand 
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movement. Because these effects are opposing forces, we hypothesized that they should 
cancel each other out. To investigate this, we examined whether the RTs and error rates were 
different when participants observed two different movements (MEAN C/IC)
4
 compared to 
when participants observed no movement (N/N). Both for RTs (MEAN C/IC: 447 ms vs. 
N/N: 450 ms), t < 1, and error rates (MEAN C/IC: 2.85% vs. N/N: 2.69%), t < 1, no 
difference was observed between MEAN C/IC and N/N, suggesting that the facilitation and 
interference effects cancelled each other out. 
 However, an alternative explanation for this null effect could be that it reflects an 
inability to process two different movements simultaneously. In order to exclude this 
possibility, we capitalized on the observation that some subjects were influenced more by 
congruent than by incongruent movements (facilitation bias), whereas other subjects were 
influenced more by incongruent than by congruent movements (interference bias). To rule out 
the alternative hypotheses that neither movement or only one movement was processed when 
the two hands acted differently, we then computed the correlation between the facilitation bias 
in the C/IC condition (N/N – C/IC) and the facilitation bias in the IC/C condition (N/N – 
IC/C). If neither of the two movements was processed, no correlation should be observed 
between the two facilitation biases. This is due to the fact that the movements of at least one 
hand have to be processed in order for a facilitation (or interference) bias to occur. 
Alternatively, if only the movements of a single hand were processed, the facilitation biases 
should be correlated negatively. For example, if a certain participant processed only the 
movements of the left-side hand, a facilitation effect should be apparent in the C/IC condition 
(N/N – C/IC > 0), but an interference effect should be apparent in the IC/C condition (N/N – 
IC/C < 0). Finally, if the movements of both hands were processed, a positive relation should 
emerge because a facilitation bias in the C/IC condition should still be present in the IC/C 
                                                     
4
 This code represents the fact that the C/IC and IC/C conditions were aggregated. 
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condition. The correlation analysis (figure 4) between the two facilitation biases revealed a 
positive correlation, r = 0.48, p = 0.002, suggesting that the movements of both hands were 
represented in the motor system even when they acted differently. 
 
 
Figure 4. Correlation between the C/IC and IC/C facilitation bias in ms. The line represents a linear regression 
fit line. 
 
Discussion 
 
In the current experiment it was explored whether individuals automatically simulate 
the movements of multiple persons at the same time in their motor system. To this end, we 
investigated imitative tendencies in a situation where individuals saw two different hands 
making movements that were either congruent or incongruent with respect to the required 
response. It was hypothesized that automatic imitation should occur for both hands regardless 
of the action that was performed by the other hand. The results indicated that both hands 
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produced a congruency effect, but also that these congruency effects were not independent of 
one another. Further analyses revealed that, despite the interaction, the congruency effect was 
always present for both hands irrespective of what the other hand did. This suggests that the 
actions of each hand influenced how the actions of the other hand were processed in the motor 
system, but not if the actions of the other hand were processed in the motor system. 
Next, it was investigated how the motor system processes two simultaneously 
observed movements by zooming in on two specific situations, namely the situation in which 
the two hands made an identical movement and the situation in which the two hands made a 
different movement. When the two hands made an identical movement, a larger congruency 
effect was found as compared to when a single hand made a movement. This suggests that the 
movements of the two hands were mapped onto the same motor representation, causing the 
motor representation to be activated more strongly. When the two hands made a different 
movement, one congruent and one incongruent, the results indicated the presence of a 
concurrent facilitation and interference effect. Specifically, the results suggested that these 
two opposite effects cancelled each other out. Additional analyses further corroborated this 
idea by excluding the alternative explanations that neither of the two movements was 
processed or that only one movement was processed when the two hands acted differently. It 
thus appears that the actions of both hands were represented in the motor system even when 
they made different movements. 
To summarize, the results of the current study suggest that the actions of multiple 
observed actors are automatically simulated in the motor system. Importantly, the results of 
the current study cannot be explained in terms of social facilitation (Zajonc, 1965), which is 
the phenomenon that individuals perform a task better or worse in the presence of others. That 
is, a social facilitation account would have predicted an influence of the number of observed 
actions independent of the content of these actions. The results of the current study, however, 
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clearly showed that seeing two identical actions had a different effect than seeing two 
different actions. Moreover, a social facilitation account is not able to explain why the 
influence of seeing two identical actions was dependent on the congruency of these actions 
with the required response. It is, in other words, unlikely that social facilitation caused the 
effects described above. 
 Similarly, it is unlikely that the results of the current experiment can be reduced to 
general features of visual processing. For example, previous research has shown that reactions 
to bilateral redundant targets are faster than reactions to unilateral targets (e.g., Mooshagian, 
Kaplan, Zaidel, & Iacoboni, 2008). A crucial difference between these studies and the current 
study, however, is that these previous studies have investigated the influence of redundant 
task-relevant stimuli, whereas the current study investigated the influence of redundant task-
irrelevant stimuli. That is, in the present study it was found that perceiving two identical 
movements facilitates motor responses even though the perceived movements were neither 
relevant nor informative for response selection. For these movements to influence the 
response selection process, it is necessary to assume a mechanism that automatically links 
perceived movements to motor responses. In line with previous work (Brass, Bekkering, & 
Prinz, 2001; Brass et al., 2000), we assume that this mechanism is the ideomotor mechanism. 
It can, however, be argued that part of the results are due to the fact that two 
simultaneous observed movements are more salient than a single observed movement. Since 
earlier research has suggested that attention is an important modulator of automatic imitation 
(Aicken, Wilson, Williams, & Mon-Williams, 2007; Bach, Peatfield, & Tipper, 2007; 
Jansson, Wilson, Williams, & Mon-Williams, 2007), it is possible that the stronger 
congruency effect for two identical observed movements was caused by increased attentional 
orienting towards the hand stimuli rather than both hand movements activating the same 
motor representation. 
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Experiment 2 
 
 To rule out the possibility that the stronger congruency effect for two identical 
observed movements was caused by increased attentional orienting, experiment 2 tested if this 
effect depended on whether the hands belonged to a human agent or to a non-human agent. 
According to ideomotor theory, the connection between perception and action depends on the 
degree to which the observed agent is similar to oneself (Brass et al., 2001, 2000; Greenwald, 
1972). In line with this idea, a number of studies have reported that automatic imitation is 
stronger for human agents than for non-human agents (Brass et al., 2001; Kilner, Paulignan, 
& Blakemore, 2003; Press, Bird, Flach, & Heyes, 2005; Press, Gillmeister, & Heyes, 2006, 
2007) and for intentional agents than for non-intentional agents (Liepelt et al., 2008). 
Consequently, if the additive effect for two identical observed movements is the result of both 
movements activating the same motor representation, then this effect should be stronger for 
human agents than for non-human agents. On the other hand, if this effect is the result of 
increased attentional orienting, then it should not be different for human and non-human 
agents. Importantly, this is only the case if the movements of the human and non-human 
agents are matched on saliency. To account for this, we compared automatic imitation of 
human hands with automatic imitation of wooden hands (figure 5). Because the human and 
wooden hands were highly similar, differences between the two stimulus types cannot be 
explained in terms of attentional capture. 
 However, apart from the possibility that either motor simulation or attentional capture 
explains the additive effect of seeing two identical movements, it is also conceivable that both 
mechanisms play a role. To address this third option, we additionally examined whether the 
congruency effects produced by human and wooden hands followed the same time course. 
Because attentional capture is likely to operate at early time points (e.g., Klein, 2000) and 
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motor simulation is known to operate primarily at later time points (e.g., Boyer, Longo, & 
Bertenthal, 2012; Brass et al., 2001; Catmur & Heyes, 2011; Cooper, Catmur, & Heyes, 
2013), this analysis allows us to better understand their contribution in construing the 
obtained effects. 
 
 
Figure 5. Example stimuli of experiment 2. 
 
Method 
 
Participants. 40 persons participated in the experiment (Mage = 24.52, SDage = 6.36). 
All of them were right-handed females with good or corrected vision. Participants were paid 5 
euro and signed an informed consent beforehand. The study was approved by the local Ethical 
Committee and all procedures were performed in accordance with the ethical standards laid 
down in the 1964 Helsinki Declaration. 
Stimuli and Apparatus. The experiment was programmed in C with Tscope (Stevens 
et al., 2006). In order to ensure that the human and the wooden hands were filmed from the 
same angle and with the same light exposure, we created new stimuli (1010 x 544 pixels) 
according to the procedure of experiment 1 (figure 5). An illusion of movement was again 
induced by overwriting a picture of the hands in their neutral posture with a picture of the 
hands in their final posture. Because the abduction movement was mechanically not possible 
for the wooden hands, they were manipulated digitally. Note that the wooden hands were 
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manipulated in such a way that the abduction movements were of similar magnitude as the 
abduction movements of the human hands. 
In contrast to experiment 1, we did not use the stimuli in which the two hands made a 
different movement and the stimuli in which neither of the two hands made a movement. The 
experiment thus included six possible final hand postures, namely C/N, N/C, IC/N, N/IC, C/C, 
IC/IC. In order to record responses, we used an optical response box that detects when a 
finger leaves a sensor. 
Procedure. The experiment took about 20 minutes and consisted of two phases. In one 
phase the stimuli depicted two human hands and in the other phase the stimuli depicted two 
wooden hands. Each phase started with 10 practice trials with feedback, followed by three 
blocks of each 60 trials without feedback. Each final hand posture was shown 10 times per 
block, 5 times with W as imperative cue and 5 times with P as imperative cue. After each 
block, participants had the opportunity to take a break. Trials were presented at random, with 
the restriction that the same imperative cue could not appear on more than four consecutive 
trials. The position of the human hands (left/right), the position of the wooden hands 
(left/right), and the order of the phases (human hands first/wooden hands first) were 
counterbalanced. 
Before the experiment, instructions appeared on the screen. The instructions differed 
slightly for the two phases. In the human hands phase, the participants were told that they 
would see two female hands and that these hands would make finger movements. In the 
wooden hands phase, the participants were told that they would see two wooden hands and 
that these hands were manipulated digitally to make it seem as if they made finger 
movements. The instructions further requested to make an abduction movement with the right 
hand index finger when W (‘wijsvinger’) appeared on the screen and to make an abduction 
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movement with the right hand little finger when P (‘pink’) appeared on the screen. 
Participants were asked to respond as fast as possible, but without making errors.  
Each trial started with a picture of both hands in their neutral posture and a fixation 
cross at the bottom of the screen for 500 ms. This was followed by the simultaneous 
presentation of the imperative stimulus and the hands in their final posture for a maximum of 
2000 ms or until the response. After an inter-trial interval of 1000 ms, the next trial started.  
Data Analysis. All analyses were performed in R (R Development Core Team, 2013). 
Trials in which the response deadline was exceeded (0.24%) were excluded from all analyses. 
Furthermore, trials with a RT faster than 100 ms (0.11%) were seen as action slips and were 
excluded as well. Finally, erroneous trials (4.62%) and trials with a RT slower than 1000 ms 
(0.59%) were excluded from the RT analysis. P-values of post-hoc tests were corrected for 
multiple testing (pc) according to Holm’s procedure (Holm, 1979) separately for each set of 
tests. T tests correspond to two-tailed paired samples t tests. When necessary, ANOVA 
degrees of freedom were corrected for violation of sphericity by applying the Greenhouse-
Geisser correction. Partial eta squared (ηp²) and Cohen’s d are reported as measures of effect 
size. 
 
Results 
 
The RTs and error rates were subjected to a 2 (stimulus type: human vs. wooden 
hands) x 2 (number of hand movements: one vs. two) x 2 (congruency: C vs. IC) repeated 
measures ANOVA. The reaction time analysis (figure 6a, 6b) revealed a main effect of 
congruency, F(1, 39) = 95.10, p < 0.001, d = 1.54, with slower responses in IC (452 ms) than 
in C (419 ms). It also indicated a main effect of stimulus type, F(1, 39) = 6.80, p = 0.013, d = 
0.41, with slower RTs for the wooden hands (440 ms) than for the human hands (431 ms). 
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The main effect of number of hand movements, however, had no effect on the RTs, F < 1. 
The interaction of stimulus type x number of hand movements was not significant, F(1, 39) = 
1.10, p = 0.309. Furthermore, no interaction of stimulus type x congruency was found, F < 1, 
indicating no difference between the congruency effects produced by the human (35 ms) and 
the wooden hands (32 ms). In line with experiment 1, the interaction between number of hand 
movements and congruency was significant, F(1, 39) = 19.10, p < 0.001, d = 0.69. Follow-up 
tests indicated that the congruency effect was present regardless of the number of movements, 
both t(39) ≥ 7.94, both pc < 0.001, both d ≥ 1.26, but the effect was stronger for two identical 
observed movements (40 ms) than for a single observed movement (27 ms). Importantly, the 
three-way interaction stimulus type x number of hand movements x congruency was also 
significant, F(1, 39) = 5.50, p = 0.024, d = 0.37. To further explore this three-way interaction, 
we analyzed the number of hand movements x congruency interaction separately for the two 
hand types. For the human hands, a significant interaction was observed, F(1, 39) = 28.49, pc 
< 0.001, d = 0.84. Follow-up tests showed that there was a congruency effect regardless of the 
number of movements, both t(39) ≥ 6.53, both pc < 0.001, both d ≥ 1.03, but the effect was 
stronger for two identical observed movements (45 ms) than for a single observed movement 
(25 ms). The same interaction did not reach significance for the wooden hands, F(1, 39) = 
2.84, pc = 0.100, d = 0.27, although there was a trend towards a stronger congruency effect for 
two identical observed movements (36 ms) than for a single observed movement (29 ms). 
The error analysis (figure 6c, 6d) indicated a main effect of congruency, F(1, 39) = 
45.67, p < 0.001, d = 1.07, with more errors in IC (7.19%) than in C (2.24%). The main effect 
of stimulus type and the main effect of number of hand movements, on the other hand, did not 
reach significance, both F(1, 39) ≤ 1.83, both p ≥ 0.184. The interaction between stimulus 
type and number of hand movements was not significant, F(1, 39) = 2.16, p = 0.150. In 
addition, the interaction between stimulus type and congruency did not show a difference 
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between the congruency effect produced by the human hands (5.39%) and the wooden hands 
(4.52%), F < 1. The interaction between number of hand movements and congruency was 
again significant, F(1, 39) = 15.01, p < 0.001, d = 0.61. Follow-up analyses revealed the 
presence of a congruency effect independent of the number of movements, both t(39) ≥ 5.09, 
both pc < 0.001, both d ≥ 0.80, but the effect was stronger for two identical observed 
movements (6.30%) than for a single observed movement (3.60%). The three-way interaction 
stimulus type x number of hand movements x congruency was, however, not significant, F < 
1, indicating that two identical observed movements increased the congruency effect to the 
same extent for human and wooden hands. 
 
 
Figure 6. Reaction times in ms for the human (a) and wooden hands (b) and error rates in % for the human (c) 
and wooden hands (d). Error bars depict SEMs corrected for within-subject designs according to Morey (2008). 
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Finally, to better understand the obtained effects, we examined their time course by 
means of a quintile analysis (Ratcliff, 1979) on the RTs (figure 7). In this analysis, RTs are 
evenly divided into five bins ranging from fastest to slowest separately for each condition and 
for each participant. The congruency effects (IC – C) that resulted from this procedure were 
subjected to a 2 (stimulus type) x 2 (number of hand movements) x 5 (time bin) repeated 
measures ANOVA (table 1). Note that we will only report the results that relate to time bin 
because the remaining results were already discussed above. The main effect of time bin was 
significant, F(1.60, 62.31) = 45.67, p < 0.001, ηp² = 0.54, indicating that the congruency effect 
increased with each bin. The interaction between stimulus type and time bin was also 
significant, F(1.83, 71.22) = 6.81, p = 0.003, ηp² = 0.15, showing that the congruency effect 
increased more strongly with time bin for the human than for the wooden hands. The number 
of hand movements x time bin interaction was not significant, F < 1.  
 
 
Figure 7. Reaction time congruency effects (IC – C) in ms for the human (a) and wooden hands (b) separately 
for each time bin. Error bars depict SEMs corrected for within-subject designs according to Morey (2008). 
 
Interestingly, a near-significant stimulus type x number of hand movements x time bin 
three-way interaction was observed, F(1.35, 52.66) = 3.41, p = 0.058, ηp² = 0.08. To further 
explore this effect, we examined the stimulus type x time bin interaction separately for the 
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condition in which a single movement was observed and the condition in which two identical 
movements were observed. This revealed that a stimulus type x time bin interaction was 
absent when a single movement was seen, F < 1, but present when two identical movements 
were seen, F(1.53, 59.76) = 7.02, pc = 0.008, ηp² = 0.15. Additional analyses showed that the 
congruency effect increased with time bin both for human and wooden hands when a single 
hand made a movement, but not when both hands made an identical movement. Instead, when 
both hands made an identical movement, the congruency effect still increased with time bin 
for the human hands, but stabilized after the first three bins for the wooden hands. As a result 
of this pattern, the additive effect produced by two identical observed movements relative to a 
single observed movement was present in all but the first time bin when participants saw 
human hands, but only in the first three time bins when participants saw wooden hands. 
 
Table 1. 
Results of the quintile analysis. 
 Bin 1  Bin 2  Bin 3  Bin 4  Bin 5 
Human Hands  
One 7.78 † 12.27 *** 21.69 ** 30.41 ** 47.79 
   **  **  **  ** 
Two 15.12 ** 26.50
 
** 38.68
 
** 48.32
 
*** 81.64
 
Wooden Hands  
One 11.10 ** 19.51 * 25.50 *** 34.53 * 50.55 
 †  *  *     
Two 20.94 * 31.28 ** 39.10  39.34  42.53 
Note. Each cell displays the mean congruency effect (IC – C) in ms. In between the cells is shown whether the 
respective conditions differ significantly after applying Holm’s correction for multiple testing (Holm, 1979) 
separately for each set of tests. Significance is denoted as follows: †p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 
0.001. 
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Discussion 
  
 Experiment 1 revealed a stronger congruency effect when individuals saw two 
identical movements compared to when they saw a single movement. It was argued that two 
identical observed movements trigger the same motor representation and therefore produce a 
stronger automatic imitation effect. However, an alternative explanation is that two 
simultaneous observed movements are more salient than a single observed movement and 
hence attract more attention. To exclude the latter possibility, we conducted a second 
experiment in which the additive effect of seeing two identical movements was compared for 
human and wooden hands. Specifically, it was reasoned that human and wooden hands are 
highly similar and that their movements should therefore not differ with respect to attentional 
capture. Following this line of reasoning, it was argued that the specified additive effect 
should be equally strong for the two hand types if it is driven by saliency. If it is driven by 
motor simulation, however, it should be stronger for human hands. That is, ideomotor theory 
states that the influence of perception on action depends on the degree to which the observed 
agent resembles the observer. Because wooden hands are non-intentional (e.g., Liepelt et al., 
2008) and non-biological (e.g., Press et al., 2006, 2007) agents, they are expected to produce 
less automatic imitation than human hands (Brass et al., 2001, 2000; Greenwald, 1972). The 
results of experiment 2 replicated the finding that two identical observed movements produce 
a stronger congruency effect than a single observed movement. Importantly, the RT additive 
effect was found to be present for human hands, but not for wooden hands. This finding 
speaks against the saliency account and instead suggests that two identical observed 
movements activate the corresponding motor representation more strongly than a single 
observed movement. 
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 However, we were not able to replicate previous reports of an overall weaker 
congruency effect for non-biological agents (e.g., Brass et al., 2001; Kilner et al., 2003; Press 
et al., 2005, 2006, 2007). Furthermore, a discrepancy was observed between the RT additive 
effect and the error rate additive effect. That is, whereas the RT additive effect distinguished 
between human and wooden hands, this was not the case for the error rate additive effect. To 
better understand the obtained pattern, we therefore studied the time course of the congruency 
effect separately for human and wooden hands by means of a time bin analysis (Ratcliff, 
1979). This analysis revealed that the time course was similar when a single movement was 
observed, but not when two simultaneous movements were observed. While the congruency 
effect evoked by seeing a single movement increased with response time for both human and 
wooden hands, the congruency effect evoked by seeing two identical movements increased 
consistently only for human hands. For wooden hands, the congruency effect first increased 
with response time but then stabilized. As a consequence of this pattern, the additive effect of 
seeing two identical movements was observed regardless of response time when the hands 
were human, but only at early response times when the hands were wooden. To summarize, 
the results of the time bin analysis suggest that human and wooden hand movements were 
processed differently when two simultaneous movements were observed. As a result, the 
additive effect of seeing two identical movements followed a different pattern for the two 
hand types. Specifically, the time course suggests that the additive effect was driven by 
saliency for the wooden hands, but by automatic imitation for the human hands. Indeed, 
previous work has shown that the deployment of attention to salient stimuli occurs very 
rapidly and decreases over time (e.g., Klein, 2000). Automatic imitation, on the other hand, is 
known to be weak at early response times and to build up over time (e.g., Boyer et al., 2012; 
Brass et al., 2001; Catmur & Heyes, 2011; Cooper et al., 2013). 
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 In contrast to the congruency effect produced by multiple agents, however, the 
congruency effect produced by a single agent appeared to be driven by the same mechanism 
for human and wooden hands. Specifically, the finding that the congruency effect increased in 
strength with response time is consistent with the idea that it reflected automatic imitation 
(e.g., Boyer et al., 2012; Brass et al., 2001; Catmur & Heyes, 2011; Cooper et al., 2013). In 
conclusion, Experiment 2 shows that human hand movements were simulated regardless of 
the number of observed movements, whereas wooden hand movements were only simulated 
when a single movement was observed. The fact that automatic imitation of a single wooden 
hand was unimpaired is in line with a number of previous studies in which reduced automatic 
imitation for humanlike non-biological agents was also not found. Press and colleagues (Press 
et al., 2006), for example, compared automatic imitation of human hand movements with 
automatic imitation of robot hand movements. When the robot hand was constructed as a 
human hand with a metal wire wrist, no difference in automatic imitation was found. When 
the robot hand was constructed as a gripper, however, automatic imitation was stronger for 
the human hand. Similarly, Longo and Bertenthal (2009) found no difference in automatic 
imitation of human and computer-generated hand movements unless attention was directed 
towards the non-biological character of the computer-generated hand. Finally, in a study by 
Liepelt, Prinz, and Brass (2010) automatic imitation was only stronger for human hand 
movements than for wooden hand movements when the hands performed communicative 
gestures. Adding to these findings, the results of the current study suggest that differences in 
motor simulation between biological and humanlike non-biological agents might only become 
visible in complex social situations where the actions of multiple agents have to be integrated. 
 The question still remains, however, why the error rate additive effect was not 
different for human and wooden hands. A likely explanation is that this is due to differences 
in response time between error and correct responses. That is, errors are known to coincide 
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with early responses (e.g., Rabbitt, 1966) as they often reflect impulsive responses delivered 
before the relevant stimulus was completely processed (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & 
Cohen, 2001; Gratton, Coles, Sirevaag, Eriksen, & Donchin, 1988). In the current study, RTs 
of erroneous responses (398 ms) were indeed significantly faster than RTs of correct 
responses (439 ms), t(39) = -5.16, p < 0.001. Given that the additive effect of seeing two 
identical movements only differentiated between human and wooden hands for later 
responses, it is probable that the error rate analysis was unable to detect this difference. 
 To conclude, the findings of experiment 2 replicate the findings of experiment 1 and 
show that the stronger congruency effect for two identical observed movements is possibly 
driven by saliency on fast responses but by automatic imitation on late responses. As such, 
experiment 2 further supports the idea that the movements of multiple agents are 
automatically simulated in the motor system of the observer. 
 
General Discussion 
 
 The aim of the current study was to investigate whether individuals automatically 
simulate the actions of multiple agents in their motor system. In order to address this question, 
we adapted a well-known automatic imitation paradigm to include two observed hands 
instead of one. In experiment 1, it was found that individuals automatically imitated the 
movements of both hands. In addition, it was found that two identical observed movements 
produced a stronger automatic imitation effect than a single observed movement and that two 
different observed movements produced a concurrent facilitation and interference effect that 
cancelled each other out. 
 However, an alternative explanation for the finding that two identical observed 
movements produced a stronger automatic imitation effect is that two simultaneous observed 
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movements attract more attention than a single observed movement. To exclude an 
explanation in terms of salience, experiment 2 examined if the additive effect of seeing two 
identical movements differed between human and wooden hands. It was reasoned that the 
effect should be equally large if it was driven by saliency, but smaller for the wooden hands if 
it was driven by motor simulation. In line with the motor simulation explanation, the results 
demonstrated that the additive effect of seeing two identical movements was stronger for 
human than for wooden hands. This supports the idea that two identical observed movements 
are mapped onto the same motor representation and therefore activate this representation 
more strongly. 
 
Parameters of Multi-Actor Motor Simulation 
 
 While the current study provides support for the idea that the actions of multiple 
individuals are simulated automatically in the motor system, important questions remain with 
respect to the different parameters that influence the involvement of the motor system in 
multi-actor situations. For example, one important question is whether the motor system 
differentiates between two observed actions performed by different individuals and two 
observed actions performed by the same individual (e.g., bimanual actions). While this is the 
first study to investigate how the actions of multiple actors are processed in the motor system, 
two studies have already investigated the involvement of the motor system in bimanual action 
observation. In one study, it was compared how the brain responds to unimanual and 
bimanual observed actions (Heitger, Mace, Jastorff, Swinnen, & Orban, 2012). It was found 
that bimanual observed actions activate the motor system with the same strength as unimanual 
observed actions, but do so more bilaterally. In another study, weak bilateral motor activation 
was observed when the involvement of the motor system was measured with TMS while 
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participants observed symmetrical bimanual language signs (Möttönen, Farmer, & Watkins, 
2010). These studies thus suggest that the observation of bimanual actions affects the 
lateralization of the motor response rather than its strength. Given the different methods and 
paradigms, it is not evident to compare these results with the results of the current study. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the current study revealed an influence of the number of observed 
agents on the strength of the motor response may point towards differences in processing 
multiple simultaneous actions of the same individual and multiple simultaneous actions of 
different individuals. Further research should directly compare these two situations to better 
understand if and how the brain distinguishes between them. 
 Another parameter that may influence the activation in the motor system is the 
synchronicity of the observed movements. Herrmann and colleagues (2013), for example, 
observed that children have an increased tendency to imitate behavior when the behavior is 
demonstrated by two models compared to a single model. Interestingly, two models increased 
imitative tendencies both when the models performed the behavior in synchrony and when 
they performed the behavior consecutively, but the effect was stronger for two synchronous 
models. This suggests that identical actions trigger the motor system more strongly when they 
are performed without delay.  
 Finally, the activation of the motor system may depend on the number of observed 
actors. In the study of Milgram and colleagues (1969), for example, it was shown that the 
probability of imitation increased with the number of observed actors. However, the degree to 
which an additional actor increased the probability of imitation decreased when the group of 
observed actors became larger. This suggests that a saturating curvilinear relation may exist 
between the number of observed actors that perform an identical movement and the activation 
in the motor system. 
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Implications of Multi-Actor Motor Simulation 
 
 The finding that individuals simultaneously simulate the actions of multiple agents in 
their motor system may have important implications for the understanding of the 
neurocognitive mechanisms that support social interaction. That is, while previous work has 
ascribed an important role to motor simulation in social interaction (e.g., Knoblich & Sebanz, 
2006), its social function has so far only been investigated in dyadic situations. The findings 
of the current study allow us to extend the social function of motor simulation to multi-actor 
social situations. 
 An important social skill that relies on motor simulation, for instance, is the ability to 
execute joint actions (e.g., Colling et al., 2013; Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006). In joint action 
tasks, it is imperative that individuals are able to adapt their behavior to the actions of others. 
In a tennis game, for example, a player can anticipate the end location of the ball by 
combining information about the kinematics and the strength of his opponent’s shot. An 
efficient way to do this is to simulate the actions of the opponent in the motor system. 
However, a tennis game can also be played in teams. In such games, each player has to take 
into account the actions of three other players, namely one team member and two opponents. 
To decide where to run when an opponent hits the ball, it is now not only important to 
monitor the kinematics and strength of the opponent’s shot, but also to monitor the behavior 
of the team member. The current study opens up the possibility that multi-actor joint action 
tasks, such as doubles tennis games, depend on the ability to simulate the movements of 
multiple agents simultaneously in the motor system. An interesting avenue for further 
research is therefore to explore the involvement of the motor system in joint action tasks that 
exceed a dyadic structure. 
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In addition to the field of joint action, the current study may also have implications for 
imitation research. While most research on imitation has examined imitation in a context 
where one imitator copies the actions of one agent, some studies have now also investigated 
imitation in a context with multiple agents (Herrmann et al., 2013; Milgram et al., 1969; Tsai 
et al., 2011). In two of these studies, it was found that that the probability of imitation is 
related to the number of observed actors (Herrmann et al., 2013; Milgram et al., 1969). As an 
explanation, these studies argued that interpretive processes mediate the effect of the number 
of observed actors on imitative tendencies. The current study, on the other hand, suggests that 
these effects are not mediated by interpretive processes but by the degree to which the 
relevant motor representation is activated. That is, in the current study the relation between 
the number of agents and imitative tendencies was explored in a situation where interpretive 
processes are unlikely to have played a role. Nevertheless, automatic imitation was found to 
depend on the number of agents that performed a certain movement. The current study thus 
suggests that an action performed by multiple people is imitated more often because this 
activates the corresponding motor representation more strongly. This mere motor activation 
could then trigger interpretive processes (e.g., “does the behavior make sense?”) that 
determine whether the evoked action is eventually executed or inhibited. However, in this 
view, interpretive processes are not the antecedent but the consequence of imitative 
tendencies. 
To conclude, the current study provides evidence for the idea that individuals 
automatically simulate the actions of multiple agents in their motor system. Given the fact that 
motor simulation is deeply rooted in social cognition (Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006), this finding 
may increase our understanding of the neurocognitive mechanisms that support multi-agent 
social interactions. 
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Appendix 
 
In this appendix, we will explore the left-side congruency x right-side congruency 
effect reported in experiment 1 separately for RTs and error rates. In addition, we will provide 
an interpretation for the obtained pattern. 
 
Reaction Times 
 
 With regard to the RTs, it appears from figure 2a that the interaction was driven by a 
stronger left-side congruency effect under RN than under RC or RIC. This was supported by 
post-hoc analyses that confirmed the presence of a stronger left-side congruency effect (LIC – 
LC) under RN (28 ms) than under RC (14 ms), t(37) = 3.58, pc = 0.003, d = 0.58, and a trend 
towards a stronger left-side congruency effect under RN than under RIC (17 ms), t(37) = 2.14, 
pc = 0.078, d = 0.35, but no difference between the left-side congruency effect under RC and 
under RIC, t < 1. 
 
Error Rates 
  
 With regard to the error rates, figure 2b suggests that the left-side congruency effect 
was stronger under RIC than under RC or RN and that the right-side congruency effect was 
stronger under LIC than under LC or LN. Follow-up tests for the left-side congruency effect 
partially supported this visual analysis by showing a stronger left-side congruency effect (LIC 
– LC) under RIC (3.33%) than under RC (1.11%), t(37) = 3.34, pc = 0.006, d = 0.54. 
However, no stronger left-side congruency effect was found under RIC than under RN 
(2.03%), t(37) = 1.93, pc = 0.122, d = 0.31. Likewise, the left-side congruency effect did not 
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differ between RC and RN, t(37) = 1.24, pc = 0.225, d = 0.20. Similar to pattern for left-side 
congruency, exploration of the right-side congruency effect revealed that it (RIC – RC) was 
stronger under LIC (3.27%) than under LC (1.06%), t(37) = 3.34, pc = 0.006, d = 0.54, but not 
stronger under LIC than under LN (2.34%), t(37) = 1.23, pc = 0.226, d = 0.20. No difference 
was observed between the right-side congruency effect under LC and under LN, t(37) = -1.87, 
pc = 0.139, d = 0.30. 
 
Interpretation 
 
 A possible explanation for the RT interaction pattern could be that there was a 
processing bias for the right-side hand. That is, it was found that the left-side congruency 
effect was strongest when the right-side hand did not move. This suggests that the actions of 
the right-side hand hindered the processing of the left-side hand. One reason for such a right-
side hand bias could be that the right-side hand was more similar to the response hand (i.e., 
the right hand). This could have caused the actions of the right-side hand to attract more 
attention than the actions of the left-side hand, leading to a reduced left-side congruency 
effect when the right-side hand moved. 
 This interpretation can, however, not easily explain the interaction pattern for the error 
rates. That is, for the error rates we found a stronger congruency effect when the other hand 
performed an incongruent action compared to when the other hand performed a congruent 
action. A look at figure 2b suggests that this was mainly driven by an imbalance in the 
additive effect produced by seeing two identical movements (see also figure 3b). That is, 
while there was a strong additive effect for two identical incongruent movements (IC/IC) 
compared to a single incongruent movement (IC/N or N/IC), t(37) = 3.60, p < 0.001, d = 0.58, 
there was virtually no additive effect for two identical congruent movements (C/C) compared 
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with a single congruent movement (C/N or N/C), t < 1. A likely explanation for this finding is 
that there was a floor effect: two congruent movements may not have decreased the error rate 
because it was already very low for a single congruent movement. 
 The interaction thus appears to have a different cause for RTs and error rates. While 
the RT interaction seems to reflect a right-side hand bias, the error rate interaction seems to 
reflect an imbalance in the additive effect produced by two identical observed movements. 
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Mirroring Multiple Agents: Motor Resonance 
During Action Observation is Modulated by the 
Number of Agents
1
 
 
 
Although social situations regularly involve multiple persons acting together, research on the 
mirror neuron system has focused on situations in which a single agent is observed. 
Therefore, the goal of the current study was to explore the role of the mirror mechanism in 
situations involving multiple agents. Specifically, we used transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS) to investigate whether mirror activation is modulated by the number of observed 
agents. Based on group contagion research, we hypothesized that multiple agents would 
provide a stronger trigger to the motor system and would therefore produce a stronger mirror 
response than a single agent. Participants observed movements performed by a single hand or 
by two hands while TMS was applied to the primary motor cortex. The results confirmed that 
activation in the motor system was stronger for two hands. This suggests that input to the 
motor system increases as the number of agents grows. Relating back to group contagion, our 
study suggests that groups may be more contagious simply because their actions resonate 
louder. Given that the mirror mechanism has been linked to a variety of social skills, our 
findings additionally have important implications for the understanding of social interaction at 
the group level. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
Cracco, E., De Coster, L., Andres, M., & Brass, M. (2016). Mirroring multiple agents: motor resonance during 
action observation is modulated by the number of agents. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 11(9), 
1422-1427. 
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Introduction 
 
Since their discovery in the monkey brain (Gallese et al. 1996; Rizzolatti et al. 1996), 
mirror neurons have been studied extensively in the literature. As a result of this research, it is 
now well established that a shared system for perception and action does not only exist in 
monkeys but can be found in humans as well (Molenberghs et al. 2012; Rizzolatti & 
Sinigaglia 2010). A useful technique to study the human mirror neuron system is transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS). Numerous studies have now shown that the application of TMS 
to the primary motor cortex increases corticospinal excitability of the muscles involved in 
executing the observed movement (Fadiga et al. 1995, 2005; Maeda et al. 2002; Naish et al. 
2014). Furthermore, it has been shown that these effects rely on input from regions within the 
frontoparietal mirror neuron network such as the premotor and intraparietal cortex (Avenanti 
et al. 2007, 2013; Catmur et al. 2011; Enticott et al. 2012; Koch et al. 2010). Interestingly, it 
has been argued that this mirror mechanism facilitates social interaction because it allows 
individuals to obtain first-person knowledge on the actions of others (Rizzolatti & Fabbri-
Destro 2008). In line with this argument, studies have shown that motor resonance does not 
only reflect the kinematics (Maeda et al. 2002), but also the intention (Cattaneo et al. 2007; 
Tidoni et al. 2013), the goal (Cattaneo et al. 2009), and the outcome (Aglioti et al. 2008) of an 
observed action. This is further supported by evidence suggesting that motor activation is 
facilitated when an observed action is produced by another person but suppressed when it is 
produced by oneself (Schütz-Bosbach et al. 2006). 
However, research on the mirror neuron system has so far mainly focused on 
situations in which a single agent is observed. It is therefore largely unknown how this system 
behaves in situations that include multiple agents. If the mirror system is involved in multi-
agent interactions, activation in this system should be sensitive to the number of observed 
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agents. In support of this idea, research in social psychology has shown that the behavior of 
groups is more contagious than that of a singleton. For example, Milgram et al. (1969) 
monitored the behavior of pedestrians as they passed by one or multiple confederates looking 
at a sixth floor window. It was shown that the tendency of passers-by to copy this behavior 
was stronger when the confederates formed a group (see also: Gallup et al. 2012; Knowles & 
Bassett 1976). In other work, similar effects were also obtained in the context of applause 
contagion (Freedman & Birsky 1980), queue formation (Mann 1977), helping behavior 
(Latané & Darley 1968), and action imitation (Herrmann et al. 2013). However, these findings 
have mainly been explained in terms of high-level interpretive processes. In the study of 
Milgram et al. (1969), for instance, it was argued that the gaze of a group is followed more 
often because groups are more likely to be attending something of interest. In contrast to this 
idea, we have recently shown that imitative tendencies increase for multiple agents in a simple 
movement paradigm where interpretive processes are unlikely to contribute (Cracco et al. 
2015). Given that motor resonance is considered to be at the basis of automatic imitation 
(Bien et al. 2009; Catmur et al. 2009; Heyes 2011), this suggests that activation in the mirror 
neuron system might be sensitive to the number of observed agents. Specifically, multiple 
agents may provide a stronger trigger to the mirror system and hence produce a stronger 
motor response. As a result, groups could be more contagious simply because their actions 
resonate louder (Raafat et al. 2009). 
To test the hypothesis that multiple agents evoke a stronger mirror response, the 
current study measured corticospinal excitability by means of TMS while participants 
passively observed two agents of whom a single agent or both agents performed a movement. 
To eliminate the influence of interpretive processes, the social context was minimized by 
reducing the agents to two hands making an index or little finger abduction movement 
(Cracco et al. 2015). Based on previous TMS research, we expected that action observation 
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would enhance corticospinal excitability of the action relevant muscles but not of the action 
irrelevant muscles (Fadiga et al. 2005; Naish et al. 2014). In addition, we expected this effect 
to be stronger when the observed action was performed by two agents instead of a single 
agent. 
 
Materials and Methods 
 
Participants 
 
 Thirty-six right handed males (Mage = 22.25, SDage = 3.06) participated in the study in 
exchange for 25 euros. However, as described below, two participants were excluded from 
analysis. This resulted in a sample of thirty-four participants (Mage = 22.27, SDage = 3.14). All 
subjects had good or corrected vision, had no history of neurological or psychiatric disorder, 
and complied to the TMS safety precautions (Rossi et al. 2009). Written informed consent 
was given before the start of the experiment. The study was approved by the Medical Ethic 
Review Board of the Ghent University Hospital and was conducted in accordance with the 
1964 Helsinki Declaration. 
 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
 
 The experiment was programmed with Tscope (Stevens et al. 2006). Stimuli consisted 
of frames that were extracted from video clips (figure 1). The stimuli (1010 x 568 pixels) 
depicted two different male right hands. The hands were presented next to each other on a 
blue background from a first person perspective. The position (left/right) of the hands on the 
screen was counterbalanced. To produce an illusion of movement, a picture of the hands in 
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their end posture was superimposed on a picture of the hands in their starting posture (see 
also: Catmur et al. 2007, 2011). The hands could either not move or abduct the index or little 
finger. Importantly, when both hands made a movement they always performed the same 
movement. As a result, the experiment included seven possible end postures: Static-Static, 
IndexFinger-Static, Static-IndexFinger, LittleFinger-Static, Static-LittleFinger, IndexFinger-
IndexFinger, and LittleFinger-LittleFinger. 
 
Task and Procedure 
 
 The experiment took about 45 minutes and consisted of four blocks of 105 trials each. 
All end postures were presented an equal number of times in each block in a random order. 
The experimental task required participants to monitor a cue (N, W, or P) appearing at the top 
of the screen simultaneously with the presentation of the end posture. Participants were 
instructed to abduct the index finger when W (10%) was presented and to abduct the little 
finger when P (10%) was presented. When N (80%) was presented, no action was required. 
The movement (W or P) and no-movement (N) trials were distributed equally among the 
seven possible end postures. On the movement trials, the cue was chosen randomly so that W 
and P appeared an equal number of times. This resulted in 14% neutral movement trials, 44% 
congruent movement trials, and 42% incongruent movement trials. The rationale behind the 
task was twofold. First, we wanted to maintain the attention of the participants. Second, we 
wanted to ensure that the relevant motor representations remained active throughout the 
experiment. Note that analyses were restricted to the N trials. As a result, motor execution 
processes could not influence the results. 
Each trial started with a picture of the hands in their starting posture and a fixation 
cross at the top of the screen for 500 ms. The hands were then presented in their end posture 
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for a duration of 1000 ms together with the cue. A TMS pulse was delivered on every trial. 
The pulse was delivered randomly at 300, 400, or 500 ms after the presentation of the end 
posture. The pulses were distributed equally among the three stimulation moments. The trial 
ended with the presentation of a black screen for a jittered duration of 4000, 5000, or 6000 
ms. 
 
TMS and Electromyography 
 
Single pulse TMS stimulation was applied with a biphasic magnetic stimulator 
(Rapid2 Magstim, Whitland, UK) that was connected to a polyurethane-coated figure-of-eight 
coil (5.4-cm inner diameter windings). The coil was positioned tangentially over the hand area 
of the left primary motor cortex. The handle of the coil pointed backwards and formed an 
angle of 45 degrees with respect to the sagittal plane. Electromyographical (EMG) activity 
was recorded from the first dorsal interosseous (FDI) and the abductor digiti minimi (ADM) 
of the right hand with the ActiveTwo system (BioSemi, Amsterdam, The Netherlands) using 
sintered 11 x 17-mm active Ag–AgCl electrodes. The FDI is involved in abducting the index 
finger and the ADM is involved in abducting the little finger. 
Before the start of the experiment, the hotspot within the left primary motor cortex 
hand area was determined as the stimulation site that produced the largest motor evoked 
potentials (MEP) in both the FDI and ADM. When the hotspot was found, the motor threshold 
was determined as the minimal stimulation intensity that produced a peak-to-peak MEP of 
50μV or more in both muscles in 50% of the pulses. The stimulation intensity was set at 
110% of the motor threshold during the experiment. 
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Data Analysis 
 
 The MEP peak-to-peak amplitude was computed in MATLAB. All statistical analyses 
were performed in R (R Development Core Team 2013). Two participants were excluded 
because their accuracy rate on the movement trials (75% and 80%) was more than 2.5 median 
absolute deviations (MADs) away from the median (Leys et al. 2013). Note, however, that 
including these two participants did not have an influence on the results. 
For the remaining participants, only trials in which no movement was required were 
included in the analysis. Trials in which a movement was nonetheless produced were 
excluded (1.48%). To account for noise, we additionally removed trials in which the root 
mean square of the EMG signal was above 50μV in the 100 ms before the pulse (0.49%) and 
trials in which the MEP was below 50μV (4.13%). Finally, we excluded trials in which the 
MEP was more than 2.5 MADs away from the median (6.56%) to remove outliers (Leys et al. 
2013). In total, 12.17% of the no-movement trials were excluded. 
Data analysis was performed on the percentage of change in the MEPs with respect to 
the Static-Static baseline condition. The obtained change scores were subjected to a 2 
(muscle: action relevant or action irrelevant) x 2 (number: one or two) x 3 (pulse moment: 
300, 400, or 500 ms) repeated measures MANOVA. On each trial, the action relevant muscle 
was defined as the muscle involved in executing the observed movement and the action 
irrelevant muscle as the muscle not involved in executing the observed movement. For 
example, the FDI was defined as action relevant when an index finger abduction movement 
was observed but as action irrelevant when a little finger abduction movement was observed 
(and vice versa for the ADM). 
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Figure 1. Design of the experiment. TMS was applied over the left primary motor cortex while participants 
observed two hands. Either a single hand made a movement or both hands made an identical movement. Two 
static hands were used as a baseline condition. 
 
Results 
 
The behavioral data revealed a mean response time of 632 ms (SD = 127 ms) and an 
accuracy rate of 95% (SD = 4%) on the movement trials. As can be seen in figure 2, the TMS 
results on the no-movement trials confirmed that MEPs in the action relevant muscle were 
stronger than MEPs in the action irrelevant muscle, F(1, 33) = 22.80, p < 0.001, ηp² = 0.41, d 
= 0.82. As expected, this effect was modulated by the number of observed movements, F(1, 
33) = 8.25, p = 0.007, ηp² = 0.20, d = 0.49, with a larger difference between the action 
relevant and action irrelevant muscle when two movements were observed, t(33) = 4.87, p < 
0.001, d = 0.84, compared with when a single movement was observed, t(33) = 2.70, p = 
0.011, d = 0.46. Importantly, follow-up two-tailed t tests revealed that seeing two identical 
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movements compared with a single movement increased MEPs in the action relevant muscle, 
t(33) = 2.50, p = 0.018, d = 0.43, but did not modulate MEPs in the action irrelevant muscle 
t(33) = -1.37, p = 0.181, d = -0.24. The analysis additionally revealed a significant Muscle x 
Pulse interaction, F(2, 32) = 3.37, p = 0.047, ηp² = 0.17, indicating that the difference between 
the action relevant and action irrelevant muscle was stronger when the pulse was delivered at 
400 ms, t(33) = 5.18, p < 0.001, d = 0.89, than at 300 ms, t(33) = 2.53, p = 0.016, d = 0.44, or 
at 500 ms, t(33) = 2.15, p = 0.039, d = 0.37 (table S1).  None of the other main or interaction 
effects reached significance, all F ≤ 0.70, all p ≥ 0.503. 
 
Discussion 
 
 The goal of the current study was to study the role of the mirror neuron system in 
situations that involve multiple agents acting at the same time. Based on group contagion 
research in social psychology (e.g., Milgram et al., 1969; Knowles and Bassett, 1976; Gallup 
et al., 2012), it was hypothesized that multiple agents would provide a stronger trigger to the 
mirror system and would therefore produce a stronger mirror response. To test this 
hypothesis, we conducted a TMS study in which participants passively observed two hands of 
which a single hand made a movement or both hands made an identical movement. As 
predicted, a stronger mirror response was found when two identical movements were 
observed. This finding extends previous TMS research on the mirror neuron system (Fadiga et 
al. 1995, 2005; Naish et al. 2014) by showing that the mirror mechanism does not only play a 
role in dyadic interactions but also in multi-agent interactions (Raafat et al. 2009). 
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Figure 2. TMS results of the experiment. The two lines depict the MEP amplitude relative to the static hands 
condition in the action relevant muscle and in the action irrelevant muscle. The action relevant muscle was 
defined as the muscle involved in executing the observed movement and the action irrelevant muscle as the 
muscle not involved in executing the observed movement. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean 
corrected for within-subject designs according to Morey (2008). The TMS results for the two separate muscles 
are available in supplementary material (fig S1). 
 
 Importantly, the obtained results cannot easily be explained in terms of attentional 
facilitation or motor inhibition. With regard to attentional facilitation, it could be argued that 
two simultaneous movements attracted more attention and therefore produced a stronger 
mirror response. However, orienting responses are known to be fast and transient. That is, 
studies on inhibition of return have consistently shown that attention does not remain at the 
location where it has previously been drawn by a salient stimulus (Klein 2000). In particular, 
these studies have demonstrated that the facilitatory influence of attention on both sensory and 
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motor processes (Tian et al. 2008, 2011) disappears around 250-300 ms (Klein 2000; Samuel 
& Kat 2003). Because TMS was applied at 300, 400, or 500 ms following movement 
observation, attentional influences were likely to have tapered off at the time of stimulation. 
Instead, research suggests that TMS at these time points is optimal to study muscle-specific 
modulations of motor resonance (Naish et al. 2014). 
 With regard to motor inhibition, it could be argued that the static hand triggered an 
inhibition response when there was only one hand making a movement. According to this 
account, the results of the current study should not be interpreted as an increase in MEPs in 
the two movement condition but as a decrease in MEPs in the one movement condition. 
However, previous work has shown that the observation of passive body parts results in 
excitation rather than inhibition of corticospinal excitability (Borgomaneri et al. 2012; 
Mattiassi et al. 2014; Schütz-Bosbach et al. 2006). Moreover, because a static hand is not 
linked to a particular movement, inhibition of this hand should target both the FDI and ADM. 
As a result, the motor inhibition account predicts that MEPs in the one movement condition 
should be smaller than MEPs in the two movement condition both for the action relevant and 
action irrelevant muscle. Because the number of observed movements only influenced MEPs 
in the action relevant muscle, it is unlikely that inhibition of the static hand can explain the 
obtained results. 
 By showing that the mirror neuron system is sensitive to the number of observed 
agents, the current study sheds light on the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying multi-
agent interactions. While it is broadly accepted that the mirror system supports social 
interaction (Keysers & Gazzola 2006; Knoblich & Sebanz 2006; Rizzolatti & Fabbri-Destro 
2008), previous work has mainly focused on situations in which a single agent is observed. 
The finding that motor resonance is sensitive to the number of observed agents opens up the 
possibility that the mirror system is also involved in social situations involving multiple 
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agents. In particular, it provides an alternative explanation for the phenomenon that groups are 
more contagious than individuals (e.g. Gallup et al. 2012; Knowles & Bassett 1976; Milgram 
et al. 1969). While previous studies on this phenomenon have mostly explained their findings 
in terms of high-level interpretive processes, our results indicate that groups may instead be 
more contagious simply because they trigger the motor system more strongly. This 
sensorimotor interpretation fits well with recent work in which we showed that imitative 
tendencies are stronger for multiple agents even when the influence of interpretive processes 
is minimized (Cracco et al., 2015). Adding to this work, the current study identifies the mirror 
mechanism as a possible neural mechanism behind these effects. 
 Nevertheless, it should be noted that the account outlined above does not necessarily 
exclude an influence of interpretive processes at later stages of processing. When motor 
resonance produces the urge to imitate, interpretive processes could for instance be recruited 
to decide if the evoked behavior is reasonable given the context. Such an evaluative process 
could then determine whether the prepared action is eventually executed or inhibited. 
However, in this view, interpretive processes are not the antecedent but the consequence of 
imitative tendencies. In support of this proposition, research has shown that the conscious 
decision to imitate is driven by the gating of mirror activation (Bien et al. 2009). Similarly, 
interpretive processes could serve as a gating mechanism to regulate imitative tendencies in 
social group situations (Freedman & Birsky 1980; Gallup et al. 2012; Herrmann et al. 2013; 
Knowles & Bassett 1976; Latané & Darley 1968; Mann 1977; Milgram et al. 1969). 
To conclude, the finding that motor resonance is modulated by the number of observed 
agents suggests that the mirror system is involved in social interactions that go beyond a 
dyadic structure. In particular, it opens up the possibility that groups are more contagious not 
because of interpretive processes (Freedman & Birsky 1980; Gallup et al. 2012; Herrmann et 
al. 2013; Knowles & Bassett 1976; Latané & Darley 1968; Mann 1977; Milgram et al. 1969) 
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but because they produce a stronger mirror response. Given that the mirror mechanism has 
been linked to a variety of social skills, among which theory of mind (Keysers & Gazzola 
2006) and empathy (Carr et al. 2003; Gazzola et al. 2006), our findings may additionally have 
important implications for the understanding of social interaction at the group level. 
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Supplementary Material 
 
Table S1.  
Relative MEPs (M ± SD) for the different conditions of the experiment. 
 Relevant Irrelevant 
 One Two One Two 
300 ms 
1.00  
(0.10) 
1.02  
(0.11) 
0.98  
(0.10) 
0.95  
(0.15) 
400 ms 
1.04  
(0.15) 
1.07  
(0.15) 
0.99  
(0.14) 
0.96  
(0.18) 
500 ms 
1.01  
(0.14) 
1.05  
(0.22) 
0.99  
(0.19) 
1.00  
(0.16) 
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Fig S1. TMS results separately for the FDI and the ADM. A Muscle (FDI or ADM) x Number (one or two) x 
Observed Movement (index finger or little finger) x Pulse (300, 400, or 500 ms) repeated measures MANOVA 
indicated a Muscle x Number x Observed Movement interaction, F(1, 33) = 8.25, p = 0.007. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Automatic Imitation of Multiple Agents: 
Simultaneous or Random Representation?
1
 
 
 
Research has shown that the observation of another's movement activates the corresponding 
motor representation in the observer. However, it is largely unknown how activation of these 
shared representations is influenced by the number of observed agents. In recent work, we 
have studied automatic imitation while participants saw two hands of which either one hand 
or both hands made a movement. These studies found that two hands produced a stronger 
imitative response than a single hand when the hands made an identical movement but not 
when they made different movements. It was argued that identical movements were mapped 
onto the same motor representation and therefore produced a stronger motor response. 
Nevertheless, an alternative explanation is that participants randomly represented 1 hand on 
each trial. The goal of the current study was to disentangle these two hypotheses. In 
Experiments 1 and 2, we replicate our results using a stimulus setup that made random 
sampling unlikely. In Experiment 3, we show that an additive effect was still present when 
attention was directed to 1 hand that always made a movement. Finally, in Experiment 4, we 
show that intentional imitation of 1 hand did not preclude automatic imitation of a second 
hand. Together, these findings support the hypothesis that the actions of multiple persons can 
be represented together in the motor system. 
  
                                                 
1
Cracco, E., & Brass, M. (2017). Automatic Imitation of Multiple Agents: Simultaneous or Random 
Representation? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, Advance online 
publication. 
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Introduction 
 
There is strong evidence from cognitive and social psychology that people sometimes 
inadvertently imitate the behavior of others (Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009; Heyes, 2011). 
For example, it has often been shown that responses to symbolic stimuli such as numbers are 
facilitated when a hand on the screen makes a compatible movement and impeded when it 
makes an incompatible movement (Bertenthal, Longo, & Kosobud, 2006; Brass, Bekkering, 
& Prinz, 2001; Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschlager, & Prinz, 2000; Catmur & Heyes, 2011; 
Heyes, 2011; Heyes, Bird, Johnson, & Haggard, 2005). Moreover, studies in naturalistic 
settings have demonstrated that interaction partners tend to copy each other’s mannerisms, 
postures, and speech patterns (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009; Stel 
& Vonk, 2010). According to a dominant theoretical view, automatic imitation is the result of 
learned associations between visual and motor representations that develop as a consequence 
of self-observation (Brass & Heyes, 2005; Heyes, 2011). In particular, it is assumed that 
actions have perceivable consequences that over time become associated with the motor 
command that produced them. As individuals often look at the actions they perform, this 
mechanism leads to a connection between the visual image of an action and its motor 
program, which in turn leads to automatic imitation. In line with this view, brain imaging 
studies have uncovered a network of motor regions that are not only activated when an action 
is executed but also when the same action is observed (Caspers, Zilles, Laird, & Eickhoff, 
2010; Cook, Bird, Catmur, Press, & Heyes, 2014; Heyes, 2010; Molenberghs, Cunnington, & 
Mattingley, 2012; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). Together, this research has been interpreted 
as evidence that people use their own motor system to simulate the behavior of others via 
shared representations for action observation and action execution (Brass & Heyes, 2005; 
Jeannerod, 2001; Keysers & Gazzola, 2006). 
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 As motor simulation allows observed behavior to be translated into motor programs 
(Brass & Heyes, 2005), it is widely regarded as an important social process (Colling, 
Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2013; Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006; Rizzolatti & Fabbri-Destro, 2008; 
Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006). In accordance with this view, studies have shown that 
shared action representations support interpersonal coordination in joint action tasks (Colling 
et al., 2013; Kourtis, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2013) by enabling co-actors to anticipate each 
other’s movements (Aglioti, Cesari, Romani, & Urgesi, 2008; Colling, Thompson, & Sutton, 
2014; Kourtis, Knoblich, Woźniak, & Sebanz, 2014; Kourtis et al., 2013). However, research 
in this domain has focused mainly on interactions between two persons even though 
naturalistic social interactions often require individuals to coordinate their movements with 
multiple persons at the same time. For example, the outcome of a tug-of-war game strongly 
depends on how well the players of each team are able to synchronize their movements. 
Likewise, the creation of a harmonious sound in musical ensembles requires a high degree of 
coordination among the different musicians (Volpe, D’Ausilio, Badino, Camurri, & Fadiga, 
2016). A focus on the neurocognitive mechanisms of social group interaction is furthermore 
relevant considering that synchronous group behavior is known to foster social bonds (Cohen, 
Ejsmond-Frey, Knight, & Dunbar, 2010; Tarr, Launay, Cohen, & Dunbar, 2015), cooperation 
(Davis, Taylor, & Cohen, 2015; Reddish, Fischer, & Bulbulia, 2013; Wiltermuth & Heath, 
2008), interpersonal memory (Woolhouse, Tidhar, & Cross, 2016), and trust (Launay, Dean, 
& Bailes, 2013). In other words, in order to comprehend the social behavior that emerges 
from group dynamics, it is important to understand how the sensorimotor processes involved 
in social interaction can be extended from dyads to triads, tetrads, or even pentads. 
 To address this question, recent work has explored the hypothesis that the actions of 
multiple persons can be represented together in the motor system of the observer (Cracco, De 
Coster, Andres, & Brass, 2015, 2016; Ramenzoni, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2014; Tsai, Sebanz, 
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& Knoblich, 2011). For example, research on joint action has looked at inter-group imitation 
and found that it is facilitated when the number of imitators matches the number of agents 
(Ramenzoni et al., 2014; Tsai et al., 2011). In addition, as a more direct test, we measured 
automatic imitation with a stimulus-response compatibility task while participants observed 
two hands of which neither hand made a movement, one hand made a movement, both hands 
made identical movements, or both hands made different movements (Cracco et al., 2015). 
The results revealed that automatic imitation was stronger when two identical movements 
were observed compared to when a single movement was observed, and subsequent work 
confirmed that this was due to an increase in corticospinal excitability (Cracco et al., 2016). In 
contrast, no imitation was found when two different movements, one congruent and one 
incongruent, were observed. These findings support the simultaneous representation 
hypothesis. In particular, they suggest that identical movements triggered the same motor 
representation and therefore produced a stronger imitative response, whereas different 
movements triggered a distinct congruent and incongruent motor representation whose output 
cancelled each other out (Cracco et al., 2015). 
 Nevertheless, an alternative hypothesis is that the above effects did not arise within the 
context of a single trial but instead developed over the course of many trials. For example, it 
could be argued that participants did not represent both hands at the same time but rather 
represented one hand at random. According to this hypothesis, the likelihood that participants 
represented a moving hand on a particular trial depended on the number of hands that made a 
movement. That is, if both hands made a movement, then there was a 100% probability to 
represent a moving hand. However, if just one hand made a movement, then there was a 50% 
probability to represent a moving hand. This difference in the likelihood to represent a 
movement leads to a difference in the likelihood to imitate and as such to more automatic 
imitation on average in the condition where both hands made an identical movement. The 
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same mechanism can then also explain why automatic imitation disappeared when two 
different movements were observed because a random sampling mechanism assumes that in 
this condition participants imitated a congruent movement in one half of the trials and an 
incongruent movement in the other half of the trials. 
 In the current study, we aimed to distinguish between the simultaneous and random 
representation accounts of multi-actor imitation. In Experiments 1 and 2, we first attempted to 
replicate the finding of Cracco et al. (2015) that two identical observed movements produced 
stronger automatic imitation, using a stimulus setup that put the two stimulus hands close 
together in the center of the screen. This setup made it unlikely that participants sometimes 
did not represent the hand movement(s) and therefore that a random sampling mechanism 
could lead to an additive imitation effect. In Experiment 3, we further ensured that at least one 
hand movement was represented on each trial by directing attention to one particular hand 
that always made a movement (Bach, Peatfield, & Tipper, 2007; Chong, Cunnington, 
Williams, & Mattingley, 2009). Since the random representation account assumes that 
participants are unable to represent the movements of multiple hands simultaneously, it no 
longer predicts an additive imitation effect in this situation. The simultaneous representation 
account, on the other hand, predicts an additive imitation effect regardless of whether 
attention was cued to a particular hand or not. Finally, in Experiment 4, participants were 
instructed to imitate one of the two hands. Given that not only automatic but also intentional 
imitation relies on motor simulation (Bertenthal et al., 2006; Bien, Roebroeck, Goebel, & 
Sack, 2009; Brass et al., 2000; Caspers et al., 2010; Hamilton, 2015; Heyes, 2011; Iacoboni et 
al., 1999), the random representation account predicts that intentional imitation of one hand 
will preclude automatic imitation of a second hand. In contrast, the simultaneous 
representation account predicts that automatic imitation will persist because motor simulation 
is not restricted to a single agent. 
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Experiment 1 
 
Method 
 
Participants. In accordance with best practice guidelines, we will report for all 
experiments how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions (if any), all 
manipulations, and all measures (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011, 2012). The 
sampling goal of all experiments was to collect 50 participants in keeping with our recent 
research on automatic imitation (Cracco & Brass, submitted). A sample size of 50 participants 
results in 93% power to detect a medium-sized effect of dz = 0.50 (Cohen, 1988). Data from 
50 participants was collected for Experiment 1 (42 female, Mage = 19.28, SDage = 3.27). 
Participants were excluded if their overall reaction time (RT) or error rate (ER) exceeded the 
sample mean by more than 3 SD. This resulted in the exclusion of two participants with an ER 
of respectively 33.51% and 25.67%. As a consequence, the final sample consisted of 48 
participants (41 female, Mage = 19.33, SDage = 3.33). All participants were right-handed and 
had self-reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. An informed consent was signed 
before the experiment and partial course credit was provided in return for participation. The 
study was approved by the local ethical committee and all procedures were performed in 
accordance with the 1964 Helsinki Declaration. 
 Stimuli, Task, and Apparatus. The experiment was programmed in C with Tscope5 
(Stevens, Lammertyn, Verbruggen, & Vandierendonck, 2006). The stimuli (1379 x 776 
pixels) consisted of a left and right hand printed on a blue background in horizontal position 
with the fingers pointing towards each other (Figure 1). To ensure that the two hands were 
conceived as belonging to different persons, we used one male and one female hand. This was 
furthermore explicitly communicated to the participants in the instruction phase. The position 
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of the hands on the screen was counterbalanced across participants. The hands could lift the 
index finger, lift the middle finger, or not move. Importantly, when both hands moved, they 
always performed the same movement. As a result, the experiment consisted of six possible 
stimulus configurations: left index and right neutral, left neutral and right index, left middle 
and right neutral, left neutral and right middle, left index and right index, and left middle and 
right middle. Movements were presented as a sequence of two frames so that a picture of the 
hands in their neutral position was replaced with a picture of the hands in their final position. 
Together with the presentation of the stimulus movement(s), a letter appeared between 
the two hands in the center of the screen. Participants had to lift their right index finger when 
W (“wijsvinger”) was presented and their right middle finger when M (“middelvinger”) was 
presented. This letter will be referred to as the “imperative cue”. The instructed response 
could be congruent (C) or incongruent (IC) with respect to the imperative cue. That is, a 
congruent trial was a trial in which participants were instructed to lift the same finger as the 
stimulus hand(s) and an incongruent trial was a trial in which participants were instructed to 
lift the opposite finger as the stimulus hand(s). In accordance, automatic imitation was 
operationalized as faster and more accurate responses on congruent trials than on incongruent 
trials. However, a trial could not only be congruent or incongruent with respect to the 
observed movement (i.e., lift index or middle finger) but also with respect to the stimulus 
hand that made the movement (i.e., left or right hand). In this sense, for right-handed 
participants, a movement of the right stimulus hand was “hand congruent” and a movement of 
the left stimulus hand was “hand incongruent”. Importantly, this type of congruency was not 
confounded with movement congruency because each of the six possible stimulus 
configurations occurred equally often with both imperative cues. Together with the fact that 
we did not have specific hypotheses regarding hand congruency, we therefore decided to not 
analyze hand congruency but to instead restrict our analyses to movement congruency. As a 
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result, the term congruency will refer exclusively to movement congruency in what follows. 
Responses were recorded with an optical sensor box that contained four sensors organized 
from left to right. Participants were asked to put the index and middle finger of their dominant 
hand on the two middle sensors. A response was registered as soon as the finger moved away 
from the sensor. 
 Procedure. The total duration of the experiment was about 20 minutes and started 
with the instructions being presented on the computer monitor. The instructions explained that 
a letter would be presented in the center of the screen together with two hands of two different 
persons lifting either the index or middle finger. Participants were asked to respond to the 
letter as fast as possible but without making errors. After the instructions, 12 practice trials 
with performance feedback were performed. This was followed by four experimental blocks 
of 96 trials without feedback for a total of 384 trials. Participants were allowed to take a break 
after each block. All conditions occurred equally often per block and were presented in a 
random order with the restriction that the same imperative cue could not appear more than 
four times in a row. Trials started with a picture of the two hands in neutral position together 
with a fixation cross in the center of the screen. After 500 ms, the picture was overwritten by 
a picture of the hands in final position. At the same time, the fixation cross was replaced with 
the imperative cue (W or M). These stimuli remained on the screen until the response for a 
maximum of 2,000 ms and were followed by a black screen for 1,000 ms to signal the end of 
the trial. The experiment was concluded with a questionnaire measuring social susceptibility. 
The questionnaire was included for exploratory purposes and will not be reported here. 
 Data Analysis. All analyses were performed in R (2013). Trials without a response 
before the response deadline were excluded (0.05%). Furthermore, trials with a RT faster than 
100 ms were considered action slips and were excluded as well (0.04%). Finally, error trials 
(5.75%) and trials in which the RT deviated from the participant’s mean by more than 3 SD 
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(1.65%) were excluded from the RT analysis but not from the ER analysis. The latter criterion 
was applied to reduce the impact of RT outliers on the mean RT and for that reason was 
restricted to the RT analysis. The data was analyzed with a 2 x 2 repeated measures 
MANOVA with number (one vs. two) and congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) as within-
subject factors. Effect sizes and their 95% confidence interval (CI 95%) will be reported for 
all effects (Lakens, 2013). The stimuli, code, data, and analyses from all experiments are 
available at the Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/p3a6w/. 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of the stimuli used in Experiments 1 and 2. Participants had to respond to the letter in the 
center of the screen while either one hand or both hands made a congruent or incongruent movement. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
 The RT analysis revealed a significant main effect of congruency with faster responses 
on congruent than on incongruent trials, F(1, 47) = 23.53, p < .001, dz = 0.70, CI 95% = [0.38, 
1.01], but no main effect of number, F(1, 47) = 0.34, p = 0.563 dz = 0.08, CI 95% = [-0.20, 
0.37]. In contrast to our expectations, we did not find an interaction between number and 
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congruency, F(1, 47) = 1.93, p = .171, dz = 0.20, CI 95% = [-0.09, 0.49] (Figure 2a). Similar 
to the RT analysis, the ER analysis indicated a significant main effect of congruency with 
fewer errors on congruent than on incongruent trials, F(1, 47) = 18.62, p < .001, dz = 0.62, CI 
95% = [0.31, 0.93], and no main effect of number, F(1, 47) = 0.58, p = .451, dz = 0.11, CI 
95% = [-0.18, 0.39]. In addition, the ER analysis also found a number x congruency 
interaction, F(1, 47) = 6.52, p = .014, dz = 0.37, CI 95% = [0.07, 0.66], with a stronger 
congruency effect (IC - C) when two identical movements were observed, t(47) = 4.60, p < 
.001, dz = 0.66, CI 95% = [0.35, 0.97], than when a single movement was observed, t(47) = 
2.42, p = .020, dz = 0.35, CI 95% = [0.06, 0.64] (Figure 2b). 
 
 
Figure 2. Results of the number x congruency analysis of Experiment 1 for (a) reaction times, (b) error rates, and 
(c) inverse efficiency scores. Error bars are standard errors of the mean (SEMs) corrected for within-subject 
designs (Morey, 2008). 
 
 In summary, Experiment 1 found an additive imitation effect for ERs but not for RTs. 
However, an inspection of Figure 2 showed that RTs were in the same direction as ERs. We 
therefore combined RTs and ERs into the inverse efficiency score (IES). The IES is defined 
as 𝑅𝑇 (1 − 𝐸𝑅)⁄  and can be used as a compound measure of task performance (Bruyer & 
Brysbaert, 2011). The IES analysis confirmed the presence of a number x congruency 
interaction, F(1, 47) = 8.90, p = .005,  dz = 0.43, CI 95% = [0.13, 0.73], with a stronger 
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congruency effect when two identical movements were observed, t(47) = 5.11, p < .001, dz = 
0.74, CI 95% = [0.42, 1.05], than when a single movement was observed, t(47) = 3.81, p < 
.001, dz = 0.55, CI 95% = [0.24, 0.85] (Figure 2c). Taken together, the data thus indicated that 
two identical observed movements produced a stronger imitation effect than did a single 
observed movement. Nevertheless, we expected but did not find an additive imitation effect 
for RTs. We therefore decided to replicate Experiment 1 with Experiment 2. Experiment 2 
was identical to Experiment 1 in all respects, except that the size of the stimulus display was 
slightly reduced. 
 
Experiment 2 
 
Method 
 
Participants. A new sample of 50 participants was collected for Experiment 2 (40 
female, Mage = 20.78, SDage = 4.01). Participants were excluded if their overall RT or ER 
exceeded the sample mean by more than 3 SD. As a result, one participant with an ER of 
20.57% was removed and the final sample consisted of 49 participants (39 female, Mage = 
20.73, SDage = 4.04). All participants were right-handed and had self-reported normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. Subjects received partial course credit or a reward of 5 euro in 
return for participation. 
 Stimuli, Task, Apparatus, and Procedure. The method of Experiment 2 was 
identical to the method of Experiment 1. However, the size of the stimuli was reduced to 1226 
x 690 pixels. 
 Data Analysis. The data analysis of Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 
1. Trials without a response (0.09%) and trials with a RT faster than 100 ms (0.04%) were 
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excluded from both the RT and ER analysis. For the RT analysis, we additionally excluded 
error trials (6.50%) and trials with a RT exceeding the participant’s mean by more than 3 SD 
(1.51%). 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
 The RT analysis revealed a significant main effect of congruency with faster responses 
on congruent than on incongruent trials, F(1, 48) = 18.76, p < .001, dz = 0.62, CI 95% = [0.31, 
0.92], and a significant main effect of number with faster responses when one hand made a 
movement than when two hands made a movement, F(1, 48) = 12.23, p = .001, dz = 0.50, CI 
95% = [0.20, 0.79]. Importantly, we also found a significant number x congruency 
interaction, F(1, 48) = 10.51, p = .002, dz = 0.46, CI 95% = [0.17, 0.76], indicating a stronger 
congruency effect when two identical movements were observed, t(48) = 4.31, p < .001, dz = 
0.62, CI 95% = [0.31, 0.92], than when a single movement was observed, t(48) = 2.30, p = 
.026, dz = 0.33, CI 95% = [0.04, 0.62] (Figure 3a). The ER analysis also revealed a main 
effect of congruency with fewer errors on congruent than on incongruent trials, F(1, 48) = 
16.06, p < .001, dz = 0.57, CI 95% = [0.27, 0.87], and a main effect of number with more 
errors when one hand made a movement than when two hands made a movement, F(1, 48) = 
5.22, p = .027, dz = 0.33, CI 95% = [0.04, 0.61]. As predicted, the number x congruency 
interaction was significant as well, F(1, 48) = 4.75, p = .034, dz = 0.31, CI 95% = [0.02, 0.60]. 
In line with the RT data, the congruency effect was stronger when two identical movements 
were observed, t(48) = 3.63, p < .001, dz = 0.52, CI 95% = [0.22, 0.82], than when a single 
movement was observed, t(48) = 1.91, p = .062, dz = 0.27, CI 95% = [-0.01, 0.56] (Figure 3b). 
Finally, we also performed an IES analysis for comparison with Experiment 1. In line with 
RTs and ERs, this analysis revealed a significant number x congruency interaction, F(1, 48) = 
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11.97, p = .001, dz = 0.49, CI 95% = [0.20, 0.79], with a stronger congruency effect when two 
identical movements were observed, t(48) = 4.36, p < .001, dz = 0.62, CI 95% = [0.31, 0.93], 
than when a single movement was observed, t(48) = 3.10, p = .003, dz = 0.44, CI 95% = [0.15, 
0.73] (Figure 3c). 
 
 
Figure 3. Results of the number x congruency analysis of Experiment 2 for (a) reaction times, (b) error rates, and 
(c) inverse efficiency scores. Error bars are SEMs corrected for within-subject designs (Morey, 2008). 
 
 The results of Experiment 2 confirmed that automatic imitation was stronger in the 
condition with two identical observed movements than in the condition with a single observed 
movement. To explore potential differences between Experiment 1 and 2, we furthermore 
conducted a repeated measures MANOVA with number and congruency as within-subject 
factors and experiment as a between-subject factor. This revealed a significant number x 
congruency interaction for RTs, F(1, 95) = 10.67, p = .002, dz = 0.33, CI 95% = [0.13, 0.54], 
ERs, F(1, 95) = 10.47, p = .002, dz = 0.33, CI 95% = [0.13, 0.53], and IES, F(1, 95) = 20.36, p 
< .001, dz = 0.46, CI 95% = [0.25, 0.67]. Follow-up paired t tests further showed that the 
congruency effect was stronger when two identical movements were observed, t(96) ≥ 5.71, p 
< .001, dz ≥ 0.58, than when a single movement was observed, t(96) ≥ 3.08, p ≤ .003, dz ≥ 
0.31, for all three outcome measures (Figure 4). Finally, the experiment x number x 
congruency interaction did not reach significance for either RTs, F(1, 95) = 1.66, p = .201, ds 
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= 0.26, CI 95% = [-0.14, 0.66], ERs, F(1, 95) = 0.11, p = .741, ds = 0.07, CI 95% = [-0.33, 
0.47], or IES, F(1, 95) = 1.53, p = .219, ds = 0.25, CI 95% = [-0.15, 0.65], indicating that the 
strength of the additive imitation effect did not differ between the two experiments. 
 
 
Figure 4. Results of the number x congruency analysis of Experiments 1 and 2 combined for (a) reaction times, 
(b) error rates, and (c) inverse efficiency scores. Error bars are SEMs corrected for within-subject designs 
(Morey, 2008). 
 
 To conclude, Experiments 1 and 2 replicated the additive imitation effect reported in 
Cracco et al. (2015) with a different stimulus setup. The setup of the current experiments put 
the two hands close together in the center of the screen and therefore made it unlikely that 
participants sometimes did not represent at least one hand movement. As a result, these 
experiments speak against the hypothesis that participants randomly represented one hand on 
each trial. Instead, they suggest that both movements activated the same motor representation 
and therefore produced a stronger imitative response (Cracco et al., 2015, 2016). In 
Experiment 3, we further distinguished between the random and simultaneous representation 
account by putting the imperative cue either on the left hand or on the right hand. This 
manipulation directed attention to one particular hand and thus increased the likelihood that it 
was processed (Bach et al., 2007; Chong et al., 2009). Furthermore, the hand on which the cue 
was positioned always made a movement. Given that participants processed a moving 
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stimulus hand on each trial in this experiment, the random representation account predicts that 
participants should not be influenced by the movements of the non-cued hand. In contrast, the 
simultaneous representation account predicts stronger automatic imitation in the condition 
where both hands made a movement regardless of whether attention was directed to a 
particular hand or not. 
 
Experiment 3 
 
Method 
 
Participants. A new sample of 50 participants was collected for Experiment 3 (41 
female, Mage = 22.06, SDage = 3.94). Participants were excluded if their overall RT or ER 
exceeded the sample mean by more than 3 SD. This resulted in the exclusion of one 
participant with a mean RT of 708 ms and another participant with an ER of 21.62%. The 
final sample therefore consisted of 48 participants (39 female, Mage = 21.98, SDage = 3.98). All 
participants were right-handed, had self-reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and 
received 5 euro in return for participation. 
 Stimuli, Task, Apparatus, and Procedure. The method of Experiment 3 was 
identical to that of Experiment 2 except that the imperative cue was no longer positioned in 
the center of the screen but instead between the index and middle finger of either the left or 
right stimulus hand (Figure 5). The experiment consisted of 384 trials divided into two 
phases, each with two blocks of 96 trials in which all conditions were presented equally often 
in random order with the restriction that the same imperative cue could not appear more than 
four times in a row. The cue was positioned on the left stimulus hand in one phase and on the 
right stimulus hand in the other phase. The order of the two phases was counterbalanced 
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across participants. Both phases were preceded by 8 practice trials with performance 
feedback. Importantly, the hand on which the cue was placed always made a movement. The 
other hand either made no movement or made the same movement. As a result, the number of 
possible stimulus configurations was now four instead of six: cue index and non-cue neutral, 
cue middle and non-cue neutral, cue index and non-cue index, and cue middle and non-cue 
middle. 
 Data Analysis. The analysis of Experiment 3 was identical to that of Experiment 1. 
Trials without a response (0.02%) and trials with a RT faster than 100 ms (0.01%) were 
excluded from both the RT and ER analysis. For the RT analysis, we additionally excluded 
error trials (4.80%) and trials with an RT deviating from the participant’s mean by more than 
3 SD (1.39%). 
 
 
Figure 5. Example of the stimuli used in Experiments 3 and 4. In Experiment 3, participants had to respond to 
the letter. In Experiment 4, the letter was replaced with a fixation cross and participants had to imitate the hand 
on which the cross was located. The cued hand always made a movement. In Experiment 3, the non-cued hand 
either made no movement or the same movement. In Experiment 4, the non-cued hand made no movement, the 
same movement, or a different movement. 
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Results and Discussion 
 
 The RT analysis revealed a main effect of congruency with faster responses on 
congruent than on incongruent trials, F(1, 47) = 53.34, p < .001, dz = 1.05, CI 95% = [0.70, 
1.40], but no main effect of number, F(1, 47) = 0.15, p = .696, dz = 0.06, CI 95% = [-0.23, 
0.34]. As predicted by the simultaneous representation hypothesis, there was a significant 
number x congruency interaction, F(1, 47) = 5.83, p = .020, dz = 0.35, CI 95% = [0.06, 0.64], 
with a stronger congruency effect when two identical movements were observed, t(47) = 8.49, 
p < .001, dz = 1.23, CI 95% = [0.85, 1.60], than when a single movement was observed, t(47) 
= 5.34, p < .001, dz = 0.77, CI 95% = [0.45, 1.09] (Figure 6a). The ER analysis indicated a 
main of effect of congruency with fewer errors on congruent than on incongruent trials, F(1, 
47) = 26.83, p < .001, dz = 0.75, CI 95% = [0.42, 1.07], but no main effect of number, F(1, 
47) = 0.22, p = .639, dz = 0.07, CI 95% = [-0.22, 0.35]. The number x congruency interaction 
was again significant, F(1, 47) = 5.00, p = .030, dz = 0.32, CI 95% = [0.03, 0.61], indicating 
that the congruency effect was stronger when two identical movements were observed, t(47) = 
5.63, p < .001, dz = 0.81, CI 95% = [0.48, 1.14], compared with when a single movement was 
observed, t(47) = 3.70, p < .001, dz = 0.54, CI 95% = [0.23, 0.84] (Figure 6b). 
 To summarize, the results of Experiment 3 revealed stronger automatic imitation when 
both hands made an identical movement compared with when a single hand made a 
movement even though attention was cued to one hand that moved on each trial. This is 
consistent with the simultaneous representation account but not with the random 
representation account because only the former assumes that the movements of multiple 
agents can be represented together in the motor system (Cracco et al., 2015, 2016). According 
to the simultaneous representation account, the movements of both hands activated the same 
motor representation and therefore produced a stronger imitative response (Cracco et al., 
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2015, 2016). Nevertheless, it remains possible that a random sampling mechanism can explain 
part of the effects obtained in Experiments 1 and 2. This hypothesis predicts that the additive 
imitation effect should have been smaller in Experiment 3 than in Experiments 1 and 2.  
 
 
Figure 6. Results of the number x congruency analysis of Experiment 3 for (a) reaction times and (b) error rates. 
Error bars are SEMs corrected for within-subject designs (Morey, 2008).  
 
In contrast, visual inspection suggested that the number x congruency effect size did 
not differ between Experiments 1-2 (RT: 0.33; ER: 0.33) and Experiment 3 (RT: 0.35; ER: 
0.32). This was confirmed by an experiment x number x congruency repeated measures 
MANOVA on RTs in which experiment was a between-subject factor that distinguished 
between Experiments 1-2 and Experiment 3. That is, we found an experiment x congruency 
interaction, F(1, 143) = 10.12, p = .002, ds = 0.56, CI 95% = [0.21, 0.91], but no experiment x 
number x congruency interaction, F(1, 143) = 0.23, p = .634, ds = 0.08, CI 95% = [-0.26, 
0.43], which indicates that directing attention to the movements of one particular hand in 
Experiment 3 increased automatic imitation but did not increase the additive imitation effect 
with respect to Experiments 1-2. To investigate whether the absence of a significant 
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experiment x number x congruency interaction could be interpreted as evidence against the 
presence of a three-way interaction, we then performed a Bayesian repeated measures 
ANOVA that compared a model with and without a three-way interaction (Rouder, Morey, 
Speckman, & Province, 2012). This revealed a BF01 = 5.21, which suggests that the data was 
five times more likely under the model without a three-way interaction than under the model 
with a three-way interaction. As such, it is unlikely that random sampling could partially 
explain the additive imitation effect obtained in Experiments 1 and 2. 
Finally, in the fourth experiment, we further explored the mechanism of multi-actor 
imitation by asking participants to imitate one of the two hands. There is converging evidence 
that not only automatic but also intentional imitation relies on motor simulation (Bertenthal et 
al., 2006; Bien et al., 2009; Brass et al., 2000; Brass & Heyes, 2005; Caspers et al., 2010; 
Hamilton, 2015; Heyes, 2011; Iacoboni et al., 1999). For example, responses are known to be 
faster when the instruction is to imitate than when the instruction is to respond to a symbolic 
cue (e.g., Bertenthal et al., 2006; Brass et al., 2000), suggesting that imitation has direct 
access to the relevant motor code (Boyer, Longo, & Bertenthal, 2012; Brass, Bekkering, et al., 
2001; Brass et al., 2000; Sauser & Billard, 2006). Furthermore, neuroimaging studies have 
found that both automatic and intentional imitation activate the shared network for perception 
and action (Bien et al., 2009; Brass & Heyes, 2005; Caspers et al., 2010; Hamilton, 2015; 
Iacoboni et al., 1999). Since the random representation account assumes that only one 
movement can be simulated at a time, this account predicts that intentional imitation of the 
target hand will preclude automatic imitation of the non-target hand. In contrast, the 
simultaneous representation account assumes that multiple movements can be simulated 
together and therefore predicts that automatic imitation of the non-target hand will persist. 
 
Experiment 4 
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Method 
 
Participants. A new sample of 50 participants was recruited for Experiment 4 (33 
female, Mage = 19.66, SDage = 3.66). Participants were excluded if their overall RT or ER 
exceeded the sample mean by more than 3 SD. This resulted in the exclusion of one 
participant with a RT of 580 ms, another participant with an ER of 17.41%, and a final 
participant with an ER of 19.79%. The final sample therefore consisted of 47 participants (30 
female, Mage = 19.72, SDage = 3.76). Forty-one participants were right-handed and all 
participants had self-reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Subjects received partial 
course credit or 5 euro in return for participation. 
 Stimuli, Task, Apparatus, and Procedure. The method of Experiment 4 was 
identical to that of Experiment 3 except that participants were now required to imitate the left 
or right hand (Figure 5). The fixation cross was placed between the index and middle finger of 
the hand that had to be imitated. In contrast to Experiment 3, the fixation cross was not 
replaced with a symbolic cue but remained on the screen until the response. The experiment 
consisted of 384 trials divided into two phases that each contained two blocks of 96 trials. All 
conditions occurred equally often in each block in a randomized order with the restriction that 
the target hand was not allowed to lift the same finger more than four times in a row. 
Participants had to imitate the left hand in one phase and the right hand in the other phase. 
The order of the two phases was counterbalanced across participants. Both phases were 
preceded by 12 practice trials in which performance feedback was given. The hand that had to 
be imitated always made a movement. At the same time, the non-target hand either made no 
movement (i.e., neutral trial), an identical movement (i.e., congruent trial), or a different 
movement (i.e., incongruent trial). Participants used their dominant hand to respond. In line 
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with Experiments 1-3, automatic imitation was operationalized as faster and more accurate 
responses on congruent trials than on incongruent trials. 
 Data Analysis. The data was analyzed with a one-way repeated measures MANOVA 
that included congruency (congruent, neutral, or incongruent) as a within-subject factor. 
Trials without a response (0.06%) and trials with a RT faster than 100 ms (0.14%) were 
excluded from both the RT and ER analysis. For the RT analysis, we additionally excluded 
error trials (4.54%) and trials with an RT deviating from the participant’s mean by more than 
3 SD (1.45%). 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
 The RT analysis revealed a main effect of congruency, F(2, 45) = 18.41, p < .001, ηp
2
 
= 0.45, CI 95% = [0.25, 0.57]. Planned comparisons showed that responses were faster on 
congruent trials than on incongruent trials, t(46) = -4.17, p < .001, dz = 0.61, CI 95% = [0.29, 
0.92]. Moreover, responses on neutral trials were faster than responses on both congruent, 
t(46) = -2.03, p = .048, dz = 0.30, CI 95% = [0.00, 0.59], and incongruent trials, t(46) = -5.42, 
p < .001, dz = 0.79, CI 95% = [0.46, 1.12] (Figure 7a). The ER analysis likewise found a main 
effect of congruency, F(2, 45) = 3.21, p = .050, ηp
2
 = 0.13, CI 95% = [0.00, 0.26]. Planned 
comparisons indicated that participants made fewer errors on congruent trials than on 
incongruent trials, t(46) = -2.04, p = .047, dz = 0.30, CI 95% = [0.00, 0.59]. Furthermore, 
participants made fewer errors on neutral trials than on incongruent trials, t(46) = -2.25, p = 
.029, dz = 0.33, CI 95% = [0.03, 0.62], but not congruent trials, t(46) = -0.64, p = .527, dz = 
0.09, CI 95% = [-0.19, 0.38] (Figure 7b). 
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Figure 7. Results of the congruency analysis of Experiment 4 for (a) reaction times and (b) error rates. Error bars 
are SEMs corrected for within-subject designs (Morey, 2008). 
 
In sum, Experiment 4 found that intentional imitation of the target hand did not 
preclude automatic imitation of the non-target hand. Welch’s t test furthermore showed that 
the average response speed was substantially faster in Experiment 4 than in Experiments 1-3, 
t(98.97) = 11.41, p < .001, ds = 1.69, CI 95% = [1.32, 2.06]. This is in line with previous work 
on imitation (Bertenthal et al., 2006; Brass et al., 2000) and indicates that imitation operated 
via shared representations (Boyer et al., 2012; Brass, Bekkering, et al., 2001; Brass et al., 
2000; Sauser & Billard, 2006). As a result, these findings strongly suggest that the movements 
of both hands were represented together in the motor system and further support the 
simultaneous representation account of multi-actor imitation. However, it should be noted that 
we did not expect responses to be faster on neutral trials than on congruent trials. This 
suggests that participants were distracted by the non-target movements. For example, it could 
be argued that attention was drawn to the non-target hand when it made a movement. This 
would have required participants to reorient their attention to the target hand, which would in 
turn have resulted in slower responses. However, an explanation in terms of attentional 
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reorientation is inconsistent with Experiment 3 where we did not find slower responses when 
both the cued and non-cued hand made a movement. Therefore, another explanation is that 
response selection in Experiment 4 was delayed until both stimulus movements were 
processed. From this perspective, movements from the non-target hand interfered with 
performance because more information had to be processed before a response could be 
selected. The reason why a similar pattern was not found in Experiment 3 could then be that 
the observed movements were task-irrelevant in that experiment and could thus be processed 
in parallel with response selection. 
Finally, a third explanation could be that responses were slower when both hands 
made a movement because this resulted in the concurrent activation of a relevant and 
irrelevant motor representation between which participants had to differentiate in order to 
select the correct response. In other words, participants in Experiment 4 had to solve an other-
other distinction problem that could have interfered with response selection. The process of 
other-other distinction is similar to the process of self-other distinction that has been proposed 
in the literature on imitative control, but other-other distinction requires participants to make a 
distinction between two external action plans rather than between one internal and one 
external action plan (Bardi, Gheza, & Brass, 2017; Brass, Derrfuss, & von Cramon, 2005; 
Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 2009; Brass, Zysset, & von Cramon, 2001; Sowden & Catmur, 
2013). Participants in Experiment 3 did not have to imitate and therefore did not have to 
distinguish between two external motor representations to prepare a response. As a result, this 
could explain why Experiment 3 yielded a different pattern of results than Experiment 4. 
However, research has shown that self-other distinction does not usually cause 
responses on neutral trials to be faster than responses on congruent trials (e.g., Brass et al., 
2000; Cracco et al., 2015). An important question is therefore why other-other distinction but 
not self-other distinction would interfere with congruent responses. A first possibility is that 
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self-other distinction and other-other distinction recruit different processes. For example, it is 
conceivable that other-other distinction relies more than self-other distinction on attentional 
processes to facilitate the relevant and inhibit the irrelevant motor plan. From this perspective, 
attentional reallocation may have interfered solely with other-other distinction and would 
therefore have only been visible in Experiment 4. A second possibility is that responses were 
put on hold until self-other distinction or other-other distinction was completed regardless of 
whether congruent or incongruent movements were observed, but that other-other distinction 
was more difficult because two external action representations are more similar than one 
internal and one external action representation. Irrespective of why responses were faster on 
neutral trials than on congruent trials, the difference between congruent and incongruent trials 
clearly demonstrates that participants in Experiment 4 co-represented both the target and non-
target movements. As a result, this experiment provides strong support for the simultaneous 
representation account. 
 
General Discussion 
  
Research from various domains has pointed towards the existence of shared 
representations for perception and action (Brass & Heyes, 2005; Jeannerod, 2001; Keysers & 
Gazzola, 2006; Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006). These representations can be used to translate 
observed behavior into planned behavior and for that reason are thought to play an important 
role in social interaction (Colling et al., 2013; Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006; Rizzolatti & Fabbri-
Destro, 2008; Sebanz et al., 2006). However, research on shared processes has mainly focused 
on interactions between two persons. As a result, little is known about the role of these 
processes in social exchanges with more than two persons (Cracco et al., 2015, 2016; 
Ramenzoni et al., 2014; Tsai et al., 2011). In particular, an interesting hypothesis is that 
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shared representations can be extended to include the actions of multiple agents (Cracco et al., 
2015, 2016; Ramenzoni et al., 2014; Tsai et al., 2011). In line with this hypothesis, we have 
shown in recent work that automatic imitation is stronger when participants observe two 
hands that make an identical movement compared to two hands of which a single hand makes 
movement (Cracco et al., 2015, 2016). As an explanation, we argued that two identical 
movements produce a stronger imitative response because both movements activate the same 
motor representation at the same time (Cracco et al., 2015, 2016). However, an alternative 
explanation is that participants represented one hand on each trial as a result of a random 
sampling mechanism. This mechanism assumes that it is more likely that a moving hand is 
represented when two movements are shown and therefore predicts an additive imitation 
effect that develops over trials rather than within each trial.  
The goal of the current study was to distinguish between the simultaneous and random 
representation accounts of multi-actor imitation. In Experiments 1 and 2, we first replicated 
the additive imitation effect reported in Cracco et al. (2015) with a stimulus setup that made a 
random sampling account implausible. We then investigated whether the same effect was also 
present when the movements of one hand were cued in Experiment 3 and had to be imitated in 
Experiment 4. As these manipulations encouraged participants to process the movements of at 
least one hand, the random representation account no longer predicted automatic imitation of 
the other hand in these experiments. Nevertheless, the results of Experiment 3 revealed 
stronger automatic imitation when the cued and non-cued hand both made the same 
movement. This additive imitation effect was furthermore of similar size as in Experiments 1-
2. In the same vein, the results of Experiment 4 indicated that automatic imitation of the non-
target hand persisted even when the target hand was being imitated. As a consequence, these 
experiments are inconsistent with an explanation in terms of random sampling and instead 
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indicate that the actions of multiple persons were represented at the same time in the motor 
system of the observer (Cracco et al., 2015, 2016). 
However, responses on neutral trials in Experiment 4 were not situated between 
congruent and incongruent trials as was expected based on previous research (e.g., Brass et 
al., 2000; Cracco et al., 2015). Instead, reaction times were found to be faster on neutral trials 
than on congruent trials. Albeit speculative, this could indicate that action selection was put 
on hold until participants were able to separate the target motor plan from the distractor motor 
plan. That is, if the actions of multiple persons are represented together in the motor system, 
then imitation of the target hand requires a mechanism that can connect each action 
representation with its source. In more general terms, concurrent action simulation creates an 
other-other distinction problem similar to the self-other distinction problem that is 
experienced when imitation has to be inhibited in favor of an internal action plan (Bardi et al., 
2017; Brass et al., 2005, 2009; Brass, Zysset, et al., 2001; Sowden & Catmur, 2013). 
However, self-other distinction is known to operate on incongruent trials, whereas other-other 
distinction was visible on congruent trials as well (Bardi et al., 2017; Brass et al., 2009). An 
interesting question for future work is therefore whether other-other distinction was indeed 
what caused reaction times to be faster when no movement was observed and, if so, whether it 
relies on the same mechanisms as self-other distinction.  
It is also important to point out that the current study assumed a strong random 
representation hypothesis in the sense that it predicted motor simulation to be restricted to the 
actions of one person at a time. In contrast, a weak random representation hypothesis might 
argue that motor simulation of multiple agents is possible but restricted to a limited number of 
agents so that people simulate a random subset of the observed agents only when it is not 
possible to simulate the full set of agents. In line with this hypothesis, research has shown that 
working memory for observed actions relies on motor processes (Gao, Bentin, & Shen, 2015) 
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and is restricted to two or three actions (Wood, 2007). However, in contrast, research on face 
perception has demonstrated that observers do not process each individual face when they see 
a large group of people but instead compute an average of all faces (Haberman & Whitney, 
2007, 2009). It is therefore possible that observers do not represent a random subset of 
observed agents but instead compute the mean across all observed actions when there are too 
many agents to simulate in parallel. In any case, a weak random representation account agrees 
that people can represent the actions of multiple persons at the same time in their motor 
system and is for that reason compatible with the simultaneous representation account. 
A potential criticism on the current study could be that participants may have 
perceived the hands as the left and right hand of the same person. In this sense, a movement 
of both stimulus hands may have been interpreted as a bimanual movement instead of two 
individual movements. However, this seems unlikely considering that we used one male and 
one female hand and disclosed this information to the participants in the instruction phase. In 
addition, previous research has obtained similar results when the stimulus hands consisted of 
two left or right hands instead (Cracco et al., 2015, 2016). Finally, it is not clear how 
bimanual observed movements could produce an additive imitation effect as they should 
trigger a bimanual and not a unimanual imitative response (Heitger, Mace, Jastorff, Swinnen, 
& Orban, 2012). In other words, automatic imitation measured from one hand should not 
depend on whether a uni- or bimanual movement was observed. In support of this view, 
research has found that bimanual but not unimanual imitation of two tapping hands depended 
on whether the hands belonged to the same person or to two different persons (Ramenzoni et 
al., 2014). 
Another criticism could be that participants mapped the left stimulus hand onto their 
left hand and the right stimulus hand onto their right hand (or vice versa) regardless of 
whether one or two hands made a movement. This hypothesis assumes that participants 
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always imitated one hand and never imitated the other hand. As a result, it predicts an additive 
imitation effect that developed over trials rather than within trials because the probability that 
the preferred hand made a movement was 100% when both hands lifted a finger but only 50% 
when a single hand lifted a finger. However, such a mechanism cannot account for the 
findings of Experiment 4 where participants had to imitate a hand in order to respond. That is, 
the finding that irrelevant observed movements still influenced responses even when another 
movement was being imitated provides strong support for the hypothesis that the movements 
of multiple persons can be represented at the same time in the motor system of the observer.  
To conclude, the current study provides evidence for the hypothesis that individuals 
are able to simulate the actions of multiple persons at the same time in their motor system 
(Cracco et al., 2015, 2016). This may have important implications for our understanding of 
social interaction at the group level. For example, the present research opens up the possibility 
that motor simulation facilitates coordinated group behavior by allowing individuals to 
synchronize their movements with multiple persons simultaneously (Colling et al., 2013; 
Kourtis et al., 2013; Volpe et al., 2016). Furthermore, it could provide insight into the 
neurocognitive mechanisms behind the finding that synchronized group behavior elicits 
prosocial behavior (Cohen et al., 2010; Davis et al., 2015; Launay et al., 2013; Reddish et al., 
2013; Tarr et al., 2015; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2008; Woolhouse et al., 2016). That is, it is well 
known that people who are being imitated by their interaction partner experience the 
interaction to be smoother (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) and act in a more prosocial manner 
(van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, & van Knippenberg, 2004). If individuals mirror the 
actions of multiple co-actors, then increased motor activation might contribute to the social 
effects of synchronized group activity. 
In addition to performing synchronous behavior, our results also have important 
implications for studies on seeing synchronous behavior. That is, research in this domain has 
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shown that observing synchronous action is a rewarding experience (Eskenazi, 
Rueschemeyer, de Lange, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2015) that increases attributed rapport 
(Lakens & Stel, 2011), and adds to the aesthetic quality of both music (D’Ausilio et al., 2012) 
and dance (Hagen & Bryant, 2003; Vicary, Sperling, Zimmermann, Richardson, & Orgs, 
2017). However, an important distinction between watching a synchronous performance and 
producing it is that the production of synchronous behavior can be accomplished through 
imitation of a randomly selected co-actor, whereas its appreciation requires the simultaneous 
representation of at least two synchronized performers. In line with the current study, research 
on the observation of synchronous movements thus favors a simultaneous representation 
account over a random representation account. From this perspective, the ability to represent 
the actions of multiple observed agents in the motor system may provide a potential 
mechanism by which observed synchrony communicates the “coalition quality” of groups 
(Hagen & Bryant, 2003). 
Finally, our research may have implications for the study of social group phenomena 
such as social contagion and conformity (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Latane, 1981; Raafat, 
Chater, & Frith, 2009). That is, research has shown that social influence grows stronger when 
the number of sources increases (Bond, 2005; Gallup et al., 2012; Herrmann, Legare, Harris, 
& Whitehouse, 2013; Latane, 1981; Milgram, Bickman, & Berkowitz, 1969). Although these 
findings have mainly been interpreted in terms of interpretive processes, the current study 
suggests that sensorimotor processes might contribute as well. As a result, the ability to 
represent the actions of multiple persons together in the motor system may play an important 
role in social group dynamics. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
The role of sensorimotor processes in social group 
contagion
1
 
 
 
Although it is well known that action observation triggers an imitative response, not much is 
known about how these responses develop as a function of group size. Research on social 
contagion suggests that imitative tendencies initially increase but then stabilize as groups 
become larger. However, these findings have mainly been explained in terms of interpretative 
processes. Across seven experiments (N = 322), the current study investigated the 
contribution of sensorimotor processes to social group contagion by looking at the relation 
between group size and automatic imitation in a task that involved minimal interpretation. 
The results of Experiments 1-2 revealed that automatic imitation increased with group size 
according to an asymptotic curve on congruent trials but a linear curve on incongruent trials. 
The results of Experiments 3-7 showed that the asymptote on congruent trials disappeared 
when no control was needed, namely in the absence of incongruent trials. This suggests that 
the asymptote in the relation between group size and automatic imitation can be explained in 
terms of strategic control mechanisms that aim to prevent unintended imitative responses. The 
findings of the current study are in close correspondence with previous research in the social 
domain and as such support the hypothesis that sensorimotor processes contribute to the 
relation between group size and social contagion.  
                                                 
1
Cracco, E., & Brass, M. (in press). The role of sensorimotor processes in social group contagion. Cognitive 
Psychology. 
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Introduction 
  
There is now converging evidence that humans tend to imitate others (Cracco et al., 
2018; Heyes, 2011). For example, research on automatic imitation has shown that response 
selection is facilitated by congruent and impeded by incongruent observed actions (Brass et 
al., 2000; Catmur & Heyes, 2011; Cracco et al., 2018; Stürmer, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2000). 
Likewise, research on social imitation has revealed that individuals spontaneously imitate the 
behavior of the persons with whom they interact (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Chartrand & van 
Baaren, 2009). According to ideomotor theory, these imitative tendencies exist because action 
observation and action execution share a representational format (Greenwald, 1970; Prinz, 
1997). More precisely, this theory argues that the visual image of an action is part of its motor 
representation, and that this causes the motor representation to become activated during action 
observation (Brass et al., 2000; Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001; Cracco et al., 2018). 
Supporting this view, there is now strong evidence from neuroscience that action observation 
and action execution share activation in the motor system of the brain (Fox et al., 2016; 
Molenberghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 2012; Naish, Houston-Price, Bremner, & Holmes, 
2014). This mechanism is thought to translate observed actions into motor programs (Brass & 
Heyes, 2005), and is therefore often seen as the sensorimotor basis of social cognition 
(Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004; Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006; Rizzolatti & Fabbri-Destro, 
2008). 
However, most research has studied sensorimotor processes in the context of dyadic 
interactions. As a result, the role of these processes in social exchanges occurring at the group 
level is not yet known. This is crucial because important social phenomena such as social 
contagion or conformity emerge from social group dynamics (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; 
Latane, 1981; Raafat, Chater, & Frith, 2009). From this perspective, a deeper understanding 
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of the neurocognitive mechanisms behind group interactions may contribute to our knowledge 
of how these phenomena unfold (Raafat et al., 2009). A necessary condition for sensorimotor 
processes to play a role in social group processes is that the actions of multiple persons can be 
represented together in the motor system. In support of this view, we have shown in recent 
work that automatic imitation is modulated by the number of observed agents (Cracco & 
Brass, 2017; Cracco, De Coster, Andres, & Brass, 2015). Specifically, we found that imitative 
responses were stronger when participants saw two hands performing an identical action 
compared with one hand performing a single action. Furthermore, a subsequent transcranial 
magnetic stimulation study showed that this effect was due to an increase in corticospinal 
excitability (Cracco, De Coster, Andres, & Brass, 2016). Together, this indicates that motor 
activation during action observation reflects the combined input of the different observed 
actions. Moreover, related research has shown that imitative responses are not only sensitive 
the number of observed agents but also to its (mis)match with the number of imitators 
(Ramenzoni, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2014; Tsai, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2011). Collectively, the 
evidence thus suggests that the actions of multiple individuals can be represented together in 
the motor system (Cracco & Brass, 2017; Cracco et al., 2015, 2016) in the form of group 
representations (Ramenzoni et al., 2014; Tsai et al., 2011). 
Building on this evidence, an important question is whether sensorimotor processes 
contribute to social group phenomena. Supporting this view, research has shown that motor 
synchronization in groups leads to positive social consequences (Cohen, Ejsmond-Frey, 
Knight, & Dunbar, 2010; Reddish, Fischer, & Bulbulia, 2013; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2008). 
However, what is the role of sensorimotor processes in social group contagion? Social 
contagion is the propensity of persons to align their own behavior with the behavior of others 
(Raafat et al., 2009). Importantly, this propensity depends on the number of observed agents 
(Darley & Latané, 1968; Fischer et al., 2011; Freedman & Birsky, 1980; Gallup et al., 2012; 
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Herrmann, Legare, Harris, & Whitehouse, 2013; Knowles & Bassett, 1976; Mann, 1977; 
Milgram, Bickman, & Berkowitz, 1969). For example, in a seminal study, Milgram et al. 
(1969) measured how often pedestrians in a busy city street copied groups of one to fifteen 
confederates looking up at a sixth floor window. The results revealed that passers-by were 
more likely to look up as the number of confederates increased (see also: Gallup et al., 2012; 
Knowles & Bassett, 1976). Confirming their hypothesis, the authors argued that this increase 
in imitation was driven by the fact that a large number of people looking at the same thing are 
likely to be looking at something of interest. 
However, an alternative hypothesis is that large groups were imitated more often 
simply because they provided a stronger trigger to the motor system (Cracco & Brass, 2017; 
Cracco et al., 2015, 2016). Although there is some work on gaze processing in the context of 
groups (Capozzi, Bayliss, Elena, & Becchio, 2015; Capozzi, Becchio, Willemse, & Bayliss, 
2016), it is not yet known how sensorimotor processes develop beyond two agents (Cracco & 
Brass, 2017; Cracco et al., 2015, 2016). Therefore, to understand the role of these processes in 
social group contagion, the current study investigated the influence of group size on automatic 
imitation using a task in which shared motor activation was measured in the absence of 
interpretative processes (Cracco et al., 2018; Heyes, 2011). Specifically, participants had to 
abduct their right index or little finger in response to a letter while one, two, three, or four 
hands abducted the congruent or incongruent finger. Automatic imitation in this paradigm is 
operationalized as slower responses on incongruent trials than on congruent trials (Cracco et 
al., 2018; Heyes, 2011). This can be seen as a laboratory model of social imitation (Heyes, 
2011), and as such is well suited to investigate the sensorimotor mechanisms of social group 
contagion. 
If there is a sensorimotor basis to social group contagion, then automatic imitation 
should increase as the number of moving hands grows. However, it is also interesting to look 
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at how automatic imitation increases with group size. More specifically, research on social 
contagion has repeatedly demonstrated that the incremental effect of increasing group size 
diminishes as groups become larger (Darley & Latané, 1968; Gallup et al., 2012; Latane, 
1981; Milgram et al., 1969). In previous research, this asymptote has typically been explained 
in terms of social cognitive processes (Bond, 2005; Latane, 1981; MacCoun, 2012). In 
contrast, the current study investigated the role of sensorimotor processes. That is, from a 
sensorimotor perspective, at least three mechanisms can explain why automatic imitation 
stabilizes as group size increases. A first hypothesis is that motor activation saturates as input 
to the motor system increases (“input saturation hypothesis”). That is, motor activation may 
saturate as a result of nonlinear neural response functions (Peirce, 2007) or as a result of 
limited processing capacity (Gao, Bentin, & Shen, 2015; J. N. Wood, 2007). A second 
hypothesis argues that it is not motor activation as such but rather its influence on response 
speed that saturates (“output saturation hypothesis”). Indeed, response speed is restrained by 
physical bounds. Therefore, responses may become less sensitive to increases in motor 
activation as they approach their upper or lower bound.  
Finally, a third hypothesis proposes that strategic control mechanisms cause automatic 
imitation to saturate (“strategic control hypothesis”). That is, imitative tendencies have to be 
inhibited in order to prevent overt imitation (Bien, Roebroeck, Goebel, & Sack, 2009; Brass, 
Derrfuss, & von Cramon, 2005; Brass, Zysset, & von Cramon, 2001). However, if motor 
activation increases with group size, more imitative control is needed as groups become 
larger. As a result, imitative control may be driven by a strategic mechanism that exerts more 
or less control on each trial depending on the number of observed movements. Importantly, 
such a mechanism assumes that cognitive control is a fast process. Although this goes against 
the traditional view that control processes operate between trials (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, 
Carter, & Cohen, 2001), recent work has shown that they can operate within trials as well 
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(Janssens, De Loof, Boehler, Pourtois, & Verguts, 2017; Janssens, De Loof, Pourtois, & 
Verguts, 2016). 
 
Experiment 1 
 
Method 
 
Participants. For all experiments, we will report how we determined our sample size, 
all data exclusions (if any), all manipulations, and all measures (Simmons, Nelson, & 
Simonsohn, 2011, 2012). In line with our previous work on automatic imitation (Cracco et al., 
2015), we aimed to test 40 participants in Experiment 1. This provided us with good power to 
detect realistic effect sizes (Brysbaert & Stevens, 2018). Although the eventual sample 
included 42 participants (33 female, Mage = 22.50, SDage = 3.60), none of the statistical 
conclusions changed when the last two participants were discarded from the analysis. To 
remove outliers, we excluded participants whose overall reaction time (RT) or error rate (ER) 
exceeded the sample mean by more than 3 SD. This resulted in the loss of one participant with 
an ER of 24.22%. As a consequence, the final sample consisted of 41 participants (32 female, 
Mage = 22.54, SDage = 3.63). All participants were right-handed and had good or corrected 
vision. A reward of 5 euro was given in return for participation. All experiments were 
approved by the local ethical committee and all procedures were performed in accordance 
with the 1964 Helsinki Declaration. 
Stimuli, Task, and Apparatus. The experiment was programmed in C with Tscope5 
(Stevens, Lammertyn, Verbruggen, & Vandierendonck, 2006). The stimuli showed four 
identical female hands arranged in a rectangle (Figure 1). The stimuli contained 972 x 996 
pixels printed on a black background. An illusion of movement was created by overwriting a 
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picture of the hands in neutral position with a picture of the hands in final position. Each hand 
could abduct the index finger, abduct the little finger, or not move. The number of hands 
making a movement varied randomly from one to four hands but the moving hands always 
made the same movement. Participants responded to a letter that appeared in the center of the 
screen together with the stimulus movement(s). When W (“wijsvinger”) was presented, the 
right index finger had to be abducted. When P was presented, the right little finger (“pink”) 
had to be abducted. The required response could be congruent (C) or incongruent (IC) with 
respect to the observed movement. Importantly, all combinations of stimulus movement and 
response occurred equally often in each block of the experiment. The response box was an 
optical sensor box with four sensors organized from left to right. Participants were asked to 
place their right index finger on the second sensor and their right little finger on the fourth 
sensor. A response was recorded when the participant moved his/her finger from the sensor. 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of the stimuli used in (a) Experiment 1, 3, 5, and 7, (b) Experiment 2 and 6, (c) Experiment 4. 
In Experiments 1-6, participants were asked to respond to the letter in the center of the screen. At the same time 
they saw one, two, three, or four hands performing an identical movement. In Experiment 7, the symbolic cue 
was replaced by an X and participants were instructed to imitate the stimulus movements to respond. 
 
Procedure. The experiment took about 20 minutes and consisted of 384 trials. 
Instructions appeared on the screen before the experiment and asked participants to respond as 
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fast as possible without making errors. The experiment started with a practice phase of 16 
trials in which accuracy feedback was provided. Participants then completed four blocks of 96 
trials each without feedback. All conditions of the number (one, two, three, or four) x 
congruency (C or IC) design occurred 12 times in each block. All possible hand 
configurations within each condition occurred equally often every two blocks. After each 
block, participants had the opportunity to take a self-paced break. Trials were presented 
randomly with the restriction that the same imperative cue could not appear more than four 
times in a row. At the end of the experiment, participants were asked to complete the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983). The questionnaire data was collected for the 
purpose of a meta-analysis and will not be reported here. However, note that none of the four 
scales correlated with the congruency effect (IC - C), all r ≤ .23, all p ≥ .156. Each trial in the 
experiment started with a picture of the four hands in their neutral position for 500 ms, and a 
fixation cross in the center of the screen. This picture was then overwritten by a picture of the 
hands in their final position, together with the imperative cue replacing the fixation cross for a 
maximum of 2,000 ms or until the response. This was followed by a black screen for 1,000 
ms to indicate the end of the trial. 
Data Analysis. To explore whether automatic imitation increased with the number of 
observed movements, we fitted a linear mixed effects model with a continuous predictor for 
number and a factor for congruency (Bates, Machler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). The random 
effects structure was determined with a backward selection procedure (Matuschek, Kliegl, 
Vasishth, Baayen, & Bates, 2017), resulting in a random intercept and a random congruency 
slope. P-values were calculated on the basis of Satterthwaite approximated degrees of 
freedom. 
Next, to find the curve of the relation between the number of observed movements and 
automatic imitation, we used a curve fitting procedure. That is, we fitted an additive model 
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with a parametric term for congruency and a smooth term for number that interacted with 
congruency (S. N. Wood, 2006). Smooth terms are nonparametric functions that have to be 
estimated from the data. In the current study, smooth terms were estimated using an iterative 
procedure that repeatedly varied the model’s smoothing parameter to minimize the 
generalized cross-validation score (GCV) of the model. The GCV is a fit index measuring 
how well the model can predict non-fitted data points, with lower values indicating better 
model fit (S. N. Wood, 2006). Since model fit is based on prediction, this procedure offers 
protection against overfitting (S. N. Wood, 2006). Moreover, because cross-validation 
performance is maximized during estimation, the estimated model will outperform both less 
complex models (i.e., less curved) and more complex models (i.e., more curved). In other 
words, the estimation of additive models can be thought of as an implicit model selection 
procedure that compares a wide range of models to find the model that optimizes prediction. 
Smooth functions in the current study were constructed from a thin plate regression spline 
basis (S. N. Wood, 2006). The use of a repeated-measures design was taken into account by 
including a random intercept in the additive model (S. N. Wood, 2006). 
All analyses were performed in R with the lme4 (Bates et al., 2014) and mgcv 
packages (S. N. Wood, 2006). Trials were excluded if no response was recorded (0.04%), if 
the RT was faster than 100 ms (0.05%), if the response was incorrect (4.14%), or if the RT 
deviated from the participant’s mean RT by more than 3 SD (1.31%)2. The second criterion 
was used to remove action slips from the data. The fourth criterion was used to reduce the 
influence of outliers. Errors were not analyzed because there were insufficient incorrect 
responses to accurately model the curve of the relation between the number of observed 
movements and automatic imitation. Figures that describe the ER data are provided in 
                                                 
2
 Due to a technical error in the generation of the output files, the data of the last 50 trials (13%) of 12 
participants was not saved. However, note that excluding these participants from the analyses did not change the 
data pattern or statistical conclusions. 
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Supplementary Material (Figure S1). Importantly, there was no indication of a speed-
accuracy trade-off in the data.  
Beta coefficients β and their 95% confidence interval (CI) will be provided as effect 
size measures. Unstandardized coefficients are reported because these coefficients can be 
readily interpreted as the estimated change in RT. For example, the congruency beta 
coefficient shows the estimated difference from the marginal mean. Likewise, the number 
beta coefficient shows the expected change in RT when number is increased. The data, 
analyses, stimuli, and experimental programs of all experiments are available at the Open 
Science Framework: https://osf.io/5yvnb. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
 The hypothesis that automatic imitation increases with group size was investigated 
with a linear mixed effects model. This revealed a significant main effect of congruency, 
t(259) = -3.03, β = -5.61, CI 95% = [-9.24, -1.98], p = .003, no main effect of number, t(14232) 
= -0.36, β = -0.21, CI 95% = [-1.34, 0.93], p = .721, and a significant number x congruency 
interaction, t(14232) = -3.21, β = -1.86, CI 95% = [-3.00, -0.73], p = .001. The main effect of 
congruency showed that responses were faster on congruent trials than on incongruent 
trials. Furthermore, the number x congruency interaction indicated that response speed 
decreased on congruent trials, t(14237) = -2.55, β = -2.07, CI 95% = [-3.66, -0.48], p = .011, 
and increased on incongruent trials, t(14237) = 2.00, β = 1.66, CI 95% = [0.03, 3.28], p = .046, 
as the number of observed movements grew. To explore the curve of the relation between 
number and congruency, an additive model was estimated. As shown in Figure 2, this 
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revealed that the influence of number on RT was best described by an asymptotic decrease 
on congruent trials and a linear increase on incongruent trials. 
 
 
Figure 2. RT results (ms) of Experiment 1. The fit line shows the model fit of the additive model. The error bars 
depict 95% confidence intervals corrected for within-subject designs according to Morey (2008). C: congruent; 
IC: incongruent. 
 
Before discussing the implications of these results, we first attempted to replicate 
them in Experiment 2. Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1, except that the white 
border between the four stimulus hands was removed. This adjustment was based on 
research showing that automatic imitation is stronger when spatial attention is directed to 
the stimulus movements (Bach, Peatfield, & Tipper, 2007; Cracco et al., 2018). In particular, 
it was reasoned that the adjusted setup would result in more automatic imitation because it 
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places the stimulus hands closer to the imperative cue, and that this would in turn make it 
more likely that the results of Experiment 1 could be replicated.  
 
Experiment 2 
 
Method 
 
Participants. The sampling goal was adjusted from 40 to 50 participants to maximize 
statistical power
3
. This sampling goal was also used in all following experiments, but the 
planned sample size could not always be obtained due to participant cancellations. The 
sample of Experiment 2 consisted of 50 participants (42 female, Mage = 22.40, SDage = 4.24). 
Participants were excluded if their overall RT or ER exceeded the sample mean by more than 
3 SD. This resulted in the exclusion of one participant with a RT of 644 ms and another 
participant with an ER of 16.93%. The final sample therefore consisted of 48 participants (40 
female, Mage = 22.48, SDage = 4.28). All participants were right-handed and had good or 
corrected vision. A reward of 5 euro was given in return for participation. 
Stimuli, Task, Apparatus, and Procedure. The method of Experiment 2 was 
identical to the method of Experiment 1, except that we removed the white border between 
the four stimulus hands (Figure 1b). 
Data Analysis. The data analysis of Experiment 2 was conducted following the 
procedure outlined in Experiment 1. The random effects structure of the linear mixed effects 
model consisted of a random intercept and a random slope for congruency. Prior to analysis, 
we removed trials without a response (0.03%), trials with a RT faster than 100 ms (0.02%), 
                                                 
3
 The actual order in which the experiments were conducted was Experiment 1, Experiment 3, Experiment 5, 
Experiment 2, Experiment 6, Experiment 7, and Experiment 4. The experiments are described in a different 
order for logical consistency. This means that the sampling goal was first adjusted in Experiment 3 to ensure that 
we had sufficient statistical power to detect a potential asymptotic curve when we only included congruent trials. 
The adjusted sampling goal was then also used for all experiments that followed. 
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error trials (4.88%), and trials where the RT deviated from the participant’s mean by more 
than 3 SD (1.35%). The error data was not analyzed but is displayed in Supplementary 
Material (Figure S1). There was no sign of a speed-accuracy trade-off. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
 The linear mixed effects model revealed a significant main effect of congruency, 
t(178) = -2.73, β = -5.44, CI 95% = [-9.34, -1.54], p = .007, no main effect of number, t(17186) 
= 1.53, β = 0.85, CI 95% = [-0.24, 1.95], p = .126, and a significant number x congruency 
interaction, t(17186) = -6.03, β = -3.37, CI 95% = [-4.46, -2.71], p < .001. The main effect of 
congruency showed that RTs were faster on congruent trials than on incongruent trials. The 
interaction effect further indicated that response speed decreased on congruent trials, 
t(17190) = -3.23, β = -2.51, CI 95% = [-4.04, -0.99], p = .001, but increased on incongruent 
trials, t(17191) = 5.27, β = 4.22, CI 95% = [2.65, 5.79], p < .001, as the number of observed 
movements grew. Similar to Experiment 1, the additive model revealed that the number x 
congruency interaction was best described by an asymptotic decrease on congruent trials and 
a linear increase on incongruent trials (Figure 3). 
In summary, Experiments 1 and 2 both showed that automatic imitation increased 
with group size according to an asymptotic curve on congruent trials and a linear curve on 
incongruent trials. Since interpretative processes were minimized, this supports the 
hypothesis that sensorimotor processes contribute to social group contagion. In line with 
this view, similar asymptotic relations have also been reported in social imitation research 
(Bond, 2005; Gallup et al., 2012; MacCoun, 2012; Milgram et al., 1969). Interestingly, 
however, only congruent trials reached an asymptote. Relating back to our three process 
hypotheses, this speaks against the input saturation hypothesis because the saturation of motor 
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activation should be visible on incongruent trials as well. Instead, it is more consistent with 
the two other hypotheses. First, in terms of output saturation, the selective asymptote on 
congruent trials can be explained by a response speed boundary that prevents participants 
from speeding up. Second, in terms of strategic control, it can be explained by a mechanism 
that regulates the response threshold on each trial based on the number of moving hands. 
That is, if automatic imitation increases with group size, then responses should become 
faster on congruent trials and slower on incongruent trials as the number of observed 
movements increases. However, if the response threshold increases with group size as well, 
then this will counteract the response speed decrease on congruent trials and strengthen 
the response speed increase on incongruent trials because a heightened response threshold 
equals slower responses. This, in turn, can explain why RTs reached an asymptote on 
congruent trials but not on incongruent trials. 
To distinguish between these two alternative hypotheses, we conducted a third 
experiment in which all trials were congruent. If the asymptote on congruent trials was 
caused by a response speed boundary, then the same pattern should be observed regardless 
of whether incongruent trials were included in the experiment or not. In contrast, a 
proportional RT decrease should be observed if the saturating response was caused by a 
strategic control mechanism because it is not only unnecessary but also counterproductive 
to exert imitative control when the observed movements always match the required 
response. 
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Figure 3. RT results (ms) of Experiment 2. The fit line shows the model fit of the additive model. The error bars 
depict confidence intervals corrected for within-subject designs according to Morey (2008). C: congruent; IC: 
incongruent. 
 
Experiment 3 
 
Method 
 
Participants. The sample of Experiment 3 consisted of 48 participants (38 female, 
Mage = 23.58, SDage = 5.04). There were no participants with an RT or ER that exceeded the 
sample mean by more than 3 SD. All participants were right-handed and had good or 
corrected vision. A reward of 5 euro was given in return for participation. 
Stimuli, Task, Apparatus, and Procedure. The method of Experiment 3 was 
identical to the method of Experiment 1, except that only congruent trials were included. The 
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experiment took about 10 minutes and contained 192 trials. The practice phase consisted of 8 
trials. 
Data Analysis. The data analysis of Experiment 3 followed the procedure described in 
Experiment 1. However, the models no longer contained a factor for congruency. Instead, the 
linear mixed effects model now consisted of a single predictor for number and the additive 
model of a single smooth term for number. The random effects structure of the linear mixed 
effects model consisted of a random intercept together with a random number slope. Trials 
without a response (0.02%), trials with a RT faster than 100 ms (0.05%), error trials (3.80%), 
and trials with a RT exceeding the participant’s mean by more than 3 SD (1.40%) were 
excluded from the analyses. The error data was not analyzed but is presented in 
Supplementary Material (Figure S2). There was no evidence for a speed-accuracy trade-off. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
The linear mixed effects model revealed a significant main effect of number, t(46.91) 
= -4.96, β = -4.06, CI 95% = [-5.66, -2.45], p < .001, indicating that RTs decreased as the 
number of congruent observed movements increased. Furthermore, in contrast to 
Experiments 1-2, the additive model showed that the influence of number on RTs was 
characterized by a linear curve (Figure 4). As response speed in Experiment 3 was also 
significantly faster than congruent response speed in Experiment 1, t(85.76) = 4.10, p < .001, 
d = 0.86, this suggests that a response speed boundary cannot explain why congruent 
responses reached an asymptote in Experiments 1-2. Instead, the data of Experiment 3 are 
more consistent with the hypothesis that congruent RTs saturated because strategic control 
mechanisms modulated the response threshold on each trial depending on the number of 
moving hands. From this perspective, the linear RT decrease in Experiment 3 can be 
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explained by the fact that no imitative control is needed when the observed movements 
always match the required response. A strategic control mechanism should adapt to this 
situation and should thus no longer exert imitative control, which should in turn lead to a 
proportional increase of automatic imitation as a function of the number of observed 
movements. 
 
 
Figure 4. RT results (ms) of Experiment 3. The fit line shows the model fit of the additive model. The error bars 
depict 95% confidence intervals corrected for within-subject designs according to Morey (2008). 
 
Nevertheless, an alternative explanation could be that participants in Experiment 3 
used a different response strategy than participants in Experiments 1-2. For example, 
participants in Experiment 3 may have allocated attention to a random stimulus hand on each 
trial in order to maximize performance. While random attentional allocation would have 
impaired performance in Experiments 1-2 due to the presence of both congruent and 
incongruent trials, the absence of incongruent trials in Experiment 3 removed this constraint. 
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If only the attended hand was processed, a random attentional allocation strategy would have 
caused participants to sometimes process a moving hand and sometimes a non-moving hand. 
As the probability to sample a moving hand from the combined pool of stimulus hands 
increased linearly with the number observed movements, this account can explain why the RT 
curve on congruent trials was linear in Experiment 3 but asymptotic in Experiments 1-2. To 
rule out this explanation, we conducted a fourth experiment that replicated Experiment 3 with 
the exception that only those stimulus hands that would also make a movement appeared on 
the screen. This setup made it clear to participants which location should be attended to 
optimize performance. As a result, it was no longer possible that participants who used an 
attentional allocation strategy sometimes represented a non-moving hand. If participants only 
represented the attended hand, the number of observed movements should therefore no longer 
have an influence on RTs. However, if participants did not use this strategy or processed all 
stimulus movements in spite of using this strategy, then the number of observed movements 
should again have a proportional influence on RTs. 
 
Experiment 4 
 
Method 
 
Participants. The sample of Experiment 4 consisted of 50 participants (34 female, 
Mage = 20.36, SDage = 2.59). There were no participants with a RT or ER that exceeded the 
sample mean by more than 3 SD. All participants were right-handed and had good or 
corrected vision. A reward of 5 euro or partial course credit was given in return for 
participation. 
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Stimuli, Task, Apparatus, and Procedure. The method of Experiment 4 was 
identical to Experiment 3, except that only the stimulus hands that were about to make a 
movement were presented. For example, on a trial where one hand would make a movement, 
we first presented a neutral hand at one location and no hands at the other three locations. We 
then replaced the picture of the neutral hand with a picture of the moving hand together with 
the presentation of the imperative cue (Figure 1c). 
Data Analysis. The data analysis of Experiment 4 was identical to the data analysis of 
Experiment 3. The random structure of the linear mixed effects model consisted of a random 
intercept. Trials without a response (0.01%), trials with a RT faster than 100 ms (0.03%), 
error trials (2.98%), and trials where the RT deviated from the participant’s mean by more 
than 3 SD (1.34%) were excluded from analysis. The error data was not analyzed but is 
provided in Supplementary Material (Figure S2). There was no indication of a speed-accuracy 
trade-off. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
The linear mixed effects model revealed a significant effect of number, t(9126) = -
7.00, β = -5.45, 95% CI = [-6.98, -3.93], p < .001, indicating that RTs decreased as the number 
of congruent observed movements increased. The additive model further indicated that 
response speed decreased consistently with the number of observed movements (Figure 5). 
In other words, the results of Experiment 4 replicated the results of Experiment 3 even though 
participants in Experiment 4 could see which stimulus hands were about to make a movement. 
This suggests that the proportional decrease in RT as a function of group size observed in 
Experiment 3 cannot be explained by a random attentional allocation strategy. Instead, it is 
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better explained by a strategic mechanism that no longer exerts control when the observed 
movements always match the required response. 
 
 
Figure 5. RT results (ms) of Experiment 4. The fit line shows the model fit of the additive model. The error bars 
depict 95% confidence intervals corrected for within-subject designs according to Morey (2008). 
 
Nevertheless, another alternative explanation could be that participants in Experiments 
1-2 responded to the imperative cue, whereas participants in Experiments 3-4 instead 
responded by imitating the stimulus hands. That is, previous work has shown that responses 
are faster when the task is to imitate than when the task is to respond to a symbolic cue 
(Bertenthal, Longo, & Kosobud, 2006; Brass et al., 2000; Cracco & Brass, 2017). As a result, 
it is possible that participants in Experiments 3-4 used an imitation strategy to maximize 
performance. Importantly, the same strategy could not be implemented in Experiments 1-2 
because it would result in erroneous responses on incongruent trials. The use of an imitation 
strategy in Experiments 3-4 but not in Experiments 1-2 could therefore explain why the 
Chapter 5 
165 
 
relation between group size and automatic imitation followed a different curve in these two 
sets of experiments. To address this issue, we conducted a fifth experiment in which 
participants were encouraged to respond to the cue by adding catch trials in which no 
movements were presented. Since the observed movements could no longer be used as a 
reliable response cue in this experiment, a proportional RT decrease would support the notion 
that group size has a consistent influence on automatic imitation when no imitative control is 
required. 
 
Experiment 5 
 
Method 
 
Participants. A new sample of 47 participants was recruited for Experiment 5 (40 
female, Mage = 21.17, SDage = 2.03). Participants were discarded if their overall RT or ER 
exceeded the sample mean by more than 3 SD. As a result, one participant with an ER of 
23.11% was excluded. The final sample therefore consisted of 46 participants (39 female, 
Mage = 21.20, SDage = 2.04). All participants were right-handed and had good or corrected 
vision. A reward of 5 euro was given in return for participation.  
Stimuli, Task, Apparatus, and Procedure. The method of Experiment 5 was 
identical to that of Experiment 3 except that catch trials were included in which none of the 
hands made a movement. The experiment took about 12 minutes and contained 240 trials of 
which 48 were catch trials. The practice phase consisted of 10 trials. 
Data Analysis. The analysis of Experiment 5 was identical to the analysis of 
Experiment 3. The random effect structure of the linear mixed effects model consisted of a 
random intercept. We did not include catch trials in the analysis (MRT = 424, SDRT = 38.63, 
Sensorimotor Processes in Social Contagion 
166 
 
MERR = 5.53%). Furthermore, we excluded trials without a response (0.01%), trials with a RT 
faster than 100 ms (0.05%), error trials (3.90%), and trials with a RT that deviated from the 
participant’s mean by more than 3 SD (1.41%). The error data was not analyzed but is 
presented in Supplementary Material (Figure S2). There was no indication of a speed-
accuracy trade-off in the data. 
 
 
Figure 6. RT results (ms) of Experiment 5. The fit line shows the model fit of the additive model. The error bars 
depict 95% confidence intervals corrected for within-subject designs according to Morey (2008). 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
The linear mixed effects model revealed a significant main effect of number, t(8385) = 
-4.69, β = -3.11, 95% CI = [-4.41, -1.81], p < .001, indicating that RTs decreased as the number 
of congruent movements increased. In line with Experiment 3, the additive model further 
showed that group size had a linear influence on RTs (Figure 6). This supports the hypothesis 
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that participants in Experiments 3 and 4 did not use the observed hand movements as a 
response cue but instead responded to the symbolic cue. That is, there were no stimulus 
movements to respond to in 20% of the trials. Furthermore, even in the other trials, it could 
not be predicted which hand would make a movement. These factors made the hand 
movements an unreliable response cue and therefore made it unlikely that participants used an 
imitation strategy. In Experiment 6, we aimed to replicate Experiment 5 using the same 
stimulus setup as Experiment 2. That is, we replicated Experiment 5 with a setup in which the 
white border between the four hands was removed. 
 
Experiment 6 
 
Method 
 
Participants. The sample of Experiment 6 consisted of 50 participants (38 female, 
Mage = 20.78, SDage = 4.10). Participants were discarded if their RT or ER exceeded the 
sample mean by more than 3 SD. As a consequence, one participant with an ER of 30.38% 
and another participant with an ER of 21.55% were excluded from the analyses. This resulted 
in a final sample of 48 participants (36 female, Mage = 20.83, SDage = 4.16). All participants 
were right-handed and had good or corrected vision. A reward of 5 euro or partial course 
credit was given in return for participation. 
Stimuli, Task, Apparatus, and Procedure. The method of Experiment 6 was 
identical to the method of Experiment 4, except that we removed the white border between 
the four stimulus hands as in Experiment 2 (Figure 1b). 
Data Analysis. The analysis of Experiment 6 was identical to Experiment 3. As in 
Experiment 5, catch trials were not included in the analysis (MRT = 420, SDRT = 39.49, MERR 
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= 7.58%). Furthermore, we excluded trials without a response (0.25%), trials with a RT faster 
than 100 ms (0.15%), error trials (4.38%), and trials with a RT that deviated from the 
participant’s mean by more than 3 SD (1.37%). The error data was not analyzed but is 
displayed in Supplementary Material (Figure S2). There was no indication of a speed-
accuracy trade-off. 
 
Results and Discussion 
  
The linear mixed effects model yielded a significant main effect of number, t(8695) = -
6.28, β = -4.56, 95% CI = [-5.98, -3.14], p < .001, indicating that RTs decreased as the number 
of congruent observed movements increased. The additive model furthermore revealed a 
consistent decrease in RTs as a function of group size (Figure 7). In line with Experiment 5, 
Experiment 6 thus suggests that the linear RT curve obtained in Experiments 3 and 4 was not 
attributable to an imitation strategy because Experiments 5 and 6 found a similar curve 
when this strategy was discouraged with the inclusion of catch trials. Nevertheless, it remains 
possible that catch trials did not suffice to discourage the adoption of an imitation strategy. 
Importantly, this hypothesis assumes that the use of an imitation strategy should result in a 
data pattern that is similar to the pattern observed in Experiment 3. To address this possibility, 
we conducted a seventh experiment in which participants responded by imitating the moving 
hands. If this experiment yields a different pattern of results, this would provide strong 
evidence against the hypothesis that participants used an imitation strategy when no 
incongruent trials were included. 
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Figure 7. RT results (ms) of Experiment 6. The fit line shows the model fit of the additive model. The error bars 
depict 95% confidence intervals corrected for within-subject designs according to Morey (2008). 
 
Experiment 7 
 
Method 
 
Participants. A sample of 49 participants was recruited for Experiment 7 (34 female, 
Mage = 18.78, SDage = 1.26). Participants were excluded if their RT or ER exceeded the sample 
mean by more than 3 SD. One participant with a RT of 681 ms and another participant with an 
ER of 19.64% were excluded from the analyses. As a result, the final sample consisted of 47 
participants (34 female, Mage = 18.75, SDage = 1.28). All participants were right-handed and 
had good or corrected vision. Partial course credit was given in return for participation.  
Stimuli, Task, Apparatus, and Procedure. The method of Experiment 7 was 
identical to the method of Experiment 3, except that the letter X was presented on each trial 
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instead of the letter W or P. Participants were instructed to ignore the X and to imitate the 
observed hand movements instead. 
Data Analysis. The analysis of Experiment 7 was identical to the analysis of 
Experiment 3. The random effects structure of the linear mixed effects model consisted of a 
random intercept and a random number slope. To compare Experiments 3 and 7, we fitted a 
linear mixed effects model with a predictor for number and a between-subject factor for 
experiment. The random structure of this model consisted of a random intercept and a random 
number slope. Note that we compared Experiment 7 with Experiment 3 because these two 
experiments used the same stimuli. Trials without a response (0.06%), trials with a RT faster 
than 100 ms (0.22%), error trials (3.91%), and trials with a RT that deviated from the 
participant’s mean by more than 3 SD (1.60%) were excluded. The error data was not 
analyzed but is presented in Supplementary Material (Figure S3). There was no indication of a 
speed-accuracy trade-off. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Similar to Experiment 3, the linear mixed effects model revealed a significant effect of 
number, t(45.72) = -18.65, β = -21.34, CI 95% = [-23.58, -19.09], p < .001, indicating that RTs 
decreased as the number of observed movements increased. However, the number slope of 
Experiment 7 was much stronger than the number slope of Experiment 3. This was 
confirmed by adding experiment as a between-subject factor to the linear mixed effects 
model. More specifically, this model revealed a highly significant number x experiment 
interaction, t(92.45) = 12.34, β = 8.65, CI 95% = [7.27, 10.02], p < .001, indicating that the 
number slope was stronger in Experiment 7, t(92.78) = -21.41, β = -21.35, CI 95% = [-23.30, -
19.39], p < .001, than in Experiment 3, t(92.12) = -4.12, β = -4.05, CI 95% = [-5.98, -2.12], p < 
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.001. We then fitted an additive model, which revealed that RTs decreased according to an 
asymptotic curve as number increased (Figure 8). Taken together, the results of Experiment 7 
thus indicate that intentional imitation of the stimulus movements resulted in a RT curve that 
was not only stronger but also qualitatively different than the curve produced in Experiments 
3-6. As a result, it is highly unlikely that participants in Experiments 3-6 used an imitation 
strategy. 
 
 
Figure 8. RT results (ms) of Experiment 7. The fit line shows the model fit of the additive model. The error bars 
depict 95% confidence intervals corrected for within-subject designs according to Morey (2008). 
 
However, it is also important to consider why group size had an asymptotic influence 
when participants were instructed to imitate the observed movements. It seems unlikely 
that a strategic regulation of the response threshold was responsible for this pattern 
because there is no reason to regulate imitation when the task requires an imitative 
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response. However, saturating response functions are often found in visual search 
paradigms when the number of distractors (Motter & Simoni, 2007; Palmer, 1995; Palmer, 
Ames, & Lindsey, 1993) or the number of targets (Becker, Anderson, Mortensen, Neufeld, & 
Neel, 2011) is manipulated. From this perspective, the asymptotic curve reported here could 
be explained by a visual search strategy in which participants sample one hand after the 
other in a series until a moving hand is detected (Treisman & Gelade, 1980). For instance, 
assume that 100 ms is needed to sample one hand. In this case, a serial search strategy 
would result in an asymptotic response function with an average search time of 250 ms 
when one movement is shown and an average search time of respectively 167, 125, and 100 
ms when two to four movements are shown4. To conclude, a steeper and saturating RT 
curve was obtained when participants had to imitate the observed movements. This is 
consistent with previous work on visual search and indicates that participants did not use an 
imitation strategy in Experiments 3-6 when all hands were congruent. 
 
Aggregated Results 
 
 Finally, to make optimal use of the large number of experiments presented here, we 
also analyzed the aggregated results of Experiments 1-2 (N = 89) and Experiments 3-6 (N = 
192). To analyze the results of Experiments 1-2, we first fitted a linear mixed effects model 
with a continuous predictor for number, a within-subjects factor for congruency, and a 
between-subject factor for experiment. The random effects structure consisted of a random 
intercept, a random number slope, a random congruency slope, and a random number x 
                                                 
4
 When two hands make a movement, there is a 
1
2
 probability to detect a target after sampling one hand, a 
1
2
×
2
3
=
1
3
 probability to detect a target after sampling two hands, and a 
1
2
×
1
3
× 1 =
1
6
 to detect a target after 
sampling three hands. As a result, the expected search time in this condition is 100 ×
1
2
+ 200 ×
1
3
+ 300 ×
1
6
=
167. The same reasoning can be applied to calculate the expected search time in the other conditions. 
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congruency slope. The results revealed a significant main effect of congruency, t(125.46) = -
4.53, β = -5.48, CI 95% = [-7.85, -3.11], p < .001, with slower responses on incongruent trials 
than on congruent trials, but no main effect of number, t(189.97) = 0.91, β = 0.39, CI 95% = [-
0.45, 1.23], p = .363. The number x congruency interaction was also significant, t(113.32) = -
5.67, β = -2.69, CI 95% = [-3.63, -1.76], p < .001, showing that RTs on congruent trials 
decreased, t(223.45) = -7.38, β = -3.59, CI 95% = [-4.54, -2.63], p < .001, and RTs on 
incongruent trials increased, t(97.80) = 7.70, β = 4.70, CI 95% = [3.51, 5.90], p < .001, as the 
number of observed movements increased. To explore the shape of the relation between 
group size and automatic imitation, we then fitted an additive model with a parametric term 
for congruency, a parametric term for experiment, and a smooth term for number that 
interacted with congruency. This revealed that RTs followed an asymptotic curve on 
congruent trials but a linear curve on incongruent trials (Figure 9). 
 To analyze the results of Experiments 3-6, we first fitted a linear mixed effects model 
with a continuous predictor for number and a between-subject factor for experiment. The 
random effects structure consisted of a random intercept and a random number slope. The 
linear mixed effects model produced a significant effect of number, t(191.46) = -11.09, β = -
4.32, CI 95% = [-5.08, -3.55], p < .001, which indicated that RTs decreased as the number of 
congruent observed movements increased. To investigate how RT decreased with group 
size, we then fitted an additive model with a parametric term for experiment and a smooth 
term for number. This model revealed a consistent decrease in RT as a function of group size 
(Figure 10). 
 
Sensorimotor Processes in Social Contagion 
174 
 
 
Figure 9. RT results (ms) of Experiment 1 and 2 combined. The fit line shows the model fit of the additive 
model. The error bars depict 95% confidence intervals corrected for within-subject designs according to Morey 
(2008). C: congruent; IC: incongruent. 
 
However, to convincingly demonstrate that the congruent RT curve differed between 
Experiments 1-2 and Experiments 3-6, it has to be shown that these two curves can be 
distinguished from each other. To this end, we fitted two additive models including only the 
congruent trials. More specifically, we first fitted an additive model that distinguished 
between Experiments 1–2 and Experiments 3–6 ("design"), and then compared this model to 
an additive model that did not distinguish between these two sets of experiments. In other 
words, we compared a number × design additive model with a number + design additive 
model. Model fit was quantified with the GCV and the Aikake Information Criterion (AIC). 
The GCV measures cross-validation performance. The AIC evaluates model likelihood while 
penalizing model complexity (S. N. Wood, 2006). Similar to the GCV, the AIC protects against 
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overfitting complex models to the data. For both statistics, the model with the lowest score 
is preferred over the other model (S. N. Wood, 2006). For completeness, we will also report 
p-values. However, these p-values are rough approximations and should be interpreted with 
caution (S. N. Wood, 2006). The comparison of the two additive models revealed that the 
number × design model provided a better fit than the number + design model (ΔGCV = 1.59, 
ΔAIC = 14.35, p < .001). This shows that there was a qualitative difference between the 
congruent RT curves of Experiments 1-2 and Experiments 3-6. Moreover, a subsequent 
response speed comparison confirmed that responses on congruent trials were significantly 
faster in Experiments 3-6 than in Experiments 1-2, t(184.42) = 3.21, p = .002, d = 0.41. Taken 
together, this strongly suggests that the asymptote observed in Experiments 1-2 is better 
explained in terms of strategic control than in terms of a response speed boundary. 
 
 
Figure 10. RT results (ms) of Experiment 3 to 6 combined. The fit line shows the model fit of the additive 
model. The error bars depict confidence intervals corrected for within-subject designs according to Morey 
(2008). 
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Spatial Compatiblity 
 
Finally, an important question is whether our results can be explained in terms of 
spatial processing. Specifically, it could be argued that the index finger movements primed 
index finger responses because both were leftward movements and that the little finger 
movements primed little finger responses because both were rightward movements (Catmur & 
Heyes, 2011; Cracco et al., 2018; Jansson, Wilson, Williams, & Mon-Williams, 2007). To 
address this question, we made use of the Simon task embedded in our paradigm (Hommel, 
2011). That is, our stimulus display included two hands on the left side of the screen and two 
hands on the right side of the screen (Figure 1). As in the Simon task, this introduces a spatial 
component, and this component is independent from the imitation component. For example, 
consider a trial in which participants have to abduct their index finger while the upper left 
hand abducts its little finger. Such a trial would be spatially congruent (i.e., see left hand, 
move left finger) but imitatively incongruent (i.e., see little finger, move index finger). By 
comparing trials in which two hands on the same side of the screen made a movement with 
trials in which a single hand made a movement, our paradigm can be used to investigate 
whether spatial compatibility depended on the number of unilateral stimuli. 
To test this hypothesis, we conducted an experiment (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6) x spatial 
congruency (C or IC) x number (1 or 2) repeated measures MANOVA. Experiment 7 was not 
included because this experiment used a different task. The results revealed a strong main 
effect of spatial congruency, F(1, 275) = 204.05, p < .001, dz = 0.84, but no interaction 
between spatial congruency and number, F(1, 275) = 1.96, p = .163, dz = 0.09, or between 
experiment, spatial congruency, and number, F(5, 275) = 1.79, p = .115, ηp
2
 = 0.03 (Figure 
11). This indicates that the spatial effect did not increase when two hands on the same side 
made a movement compared to when one hand made a movement. This was confirmed by a 
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Bayesian analysis showing that the data was 4.75 times more likely under the model without 
the spatial congruency x number interaction than under the model with the spatial congruency 
x number interaction. Together, this provides strong evidence against the hypothesis that 
spatial processes can explain the relation between group size and automatic imitation. 
 
 
Figure 11. RT results (ms) of the spatial congruency x number analysis across Experiments 3-6. The error bars 
depict confidence intervals corrected for within-subject designs according to Morey (2008). C: spatially 
congruent; IC: spatially incongruent. 
 
General Discussion 
 
It is well known from social psychology that larger groups are more contagious 
(Darley & Latané, 1968; Fischer et al., 2011; Freedman & Birsky, 1980; Gallup et al., 2012; 
Herrmann et al., 2013; Knowles & Bassett, 1976; Mann, 1977; Milgram et al., 1969) and that 
the influence of group size on social contagion follows an asymptotic curve (Darley & Latané, 
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1968; Gallup et al., 2012; Latane, 1981; Milgram et al., 1969). However, the relation between 
group size and social contagion has so far mainly been approached from a social cognitive 
perspective (Bond, 2005; MacCoun, 2012). In contrast, the aim of the current study was to 
investigate the role of sensorimotor processes in social group contagion. In particular, we 
explored the hypothesis that groups are more contagious simply because their actions provide 
a stronger trigger to the corresponding motor representation (Cracco & Brass, 2017; Cracco et 
al., 2015, 2016). To this end, we used a well-established lab-based automatic imitation task 
that is known to measure shared motor activation with minimal interference from 
interpretative processes (Cracco et al., 2018; Heyes, 2011). If social contagion has a 
sensorimotor basis, then automatic imitation should increase with the number of observed 
agents. Moreover, if sensorimotor processes contribute to the emergence of an asymptote, 
then automatic imitation should reach an asymptote as well. 
Experiments 1 and 2 showed that the relation between group size and automatic 
imitation was asymptotic on congruent trials but linear on incongruent trials. In contrast, 
automatic imitation on congruent trials increased proportionally with group size in the 
absence of incongruent trials (Experiments 3-6), and this could not be explained in terms of 
different response strategies (Experiments 4-7). In line with social contagion research, these 
results show that automatic imitation saturated as the number of observed agents increased. 
Furthermore, the finding that automatic imitation no longer saturated when imitative 
responses facilitated task performance suggests that the asymptote could not be explained by 
saturating motor activation (“input saturation hypothesis”) or by a response speed boundary 
(“output saturation hypothesis”). Instead, our results point towards a strategic control 
mechanism that regulates automatic imitation by lowering or raising the response threshold on 
each trial depending on the number of observed movements. 
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More specifically, if motor activation increases with group size, then the response 
threshold has to be adjusted accordingly to prevent premature imitative responses. Because a 
heightened response threshold leads to slower responses, such a mechanism masks decreases 
in response speed on congruent trials but strengthens increases in response speed on 
incongruent trials. This, then, explains why congruent but not incongruent responses reached 
an asymptote. Moreover, since it is counterproductive to regulate imitative responses when 
imitation improves task performance, this mechanism can also explain why the relation 
between group size and automatic imitation no longer saturated when only congruent trials 
were included. In sum, the combined evidence across seven experiments indicates that 
automatic imitation increased with group size and that a strategic control mechanism caused 
imitative responses to saturate when imitation occasionally impaired task performance 
(Experiments 1 and 2) but not when it always facilitated task performance (Experiments 3 to 
7). 
 
Mechanisms of Group Imitation 
 
The finding that automatic imitation increases with group size is consistent with 
ideomotor theory, which argues that observed movements are represented in the same format 
as planned movements and for that reason have direct access to the relevant motor programs 
(Brass et al., 2000; Brass, Bekkering, et al., 2001; Cracco et al., 2018; Prinz, 1997). In 
particular, it suggests that individuals are able to simultaneously represent the actions of 
multiple agents in their motor system and that identical actions are mapped onto the same 
motor representation, leading to stronger motor responses (Cracco & Brass, 2017; Cracco et 
al., 2015, 2016). Importantly, this mechanism implies that the relation between group size and 
automatic imitation should depend on whether multiple identical or multiple different 
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movements were observed. In particular, it assumes that each separate movement activates a 
distinct motor representation. This means that, in contrast to multiple identical movements, 
multiple different movements should not cause an increase in automatic imitation. In line with 
this hypothesis, we have shown in previous work that seeing two different movements does 
not produce a discernable imitation effect (Cracco et al., 2015). Given that the condition with 
two different movements was a condition in which participants observed one congruent and 
one incongruent movement, this suggests that motor simulation of both movements caused a 
concurrent facilitation and interference effect that cancelled out each other. 
Nevertheless, a potential alternative explanation could be that the influence of group 
size was established over the course of many trials rather than within the context of a single 
trial. That is, if participants randomly represented one moving or one non-moving hand on 
each trial, then automatic imitation is expected to increase with the number stimulus 
movements because the likelihood to sample a moving hand from the combined pool of 
moving and non-moving hands also increases with the number of stimulus movements. 
However, we recently addressed this hypothesis in a study where we measured automatic 
imitation of two hands while participants attended to, in one experiment, or imitated, in a 
second experiment, the actions of one of the two hands (Cracco & Brass, 2017). The results 
showed that responses were influenced by the actions of the non-attended or non-imitated 
hand even though the motor system was already occupied with processing the actions of the 
target hand. This indicates, in other words, that multiple observed actions can be represented 
at the same time in the motor system. 
Furthermore, the random sampling account is inconsistent with the pattern of results 
obtained throughout the different experiments. For example, it cannot explain why group size 
in Experiments 1 and 2 had a saturating influence on congruent trials but a linear influence on 
incongruent trials. Although it could be argued that the asymptote on congruent trials was 
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caused by a response speed boundary, this cannot explain why the asymptote disappeared 
when only congruent trials were included. Indeed, there is no need for a strategic control 
mechanism if participants are unable to process multiple movements at the same time. 
Moreover, it is difficult to see from a random sampling perspective why automatic imitation 
also increased with group size in Experiment 4 when the hands were always congruent and 
participants could predict which hand would make a movement. That is, it seems unlikely that 
participants also sampled locations where no movement could occur in this situation. Thus, 
taken together, a likelihood mechanism is inconsistent with both previous research and with 
the results of the current study. Instead, the data support the hypothesis that participants 
simulated multiple observed actions at the same time in their motor system. 
Another concern could be that all hands were oriented in the same direction. In 
contrast, in naturalistic situations, different agents tend to be oriented in different directions. 
However, recent meta-analytic work has revealed that orientation does not modulate 
automatic imitation (Cracco et al., 2018), which is presumably caused by extensive exposure 
to the actions of others from various viewpoints (Cracco et al., 2018), and is consistent with 
evidence that object representations are orientation invariant as well (Harris & Dux, 2005). 
The notion that orientation does not influence the relation between group size and automatic 
imitation is further supported by previous work in which two identical observed actions were 
found to produce a stronger motor trigger than a single observed action regardless of whether 
the actions were presented in a third- (Cracco et al., 2015) or first-person perspective (Cracco 
et al., 2016). 
Finally, it is interesting to discuss how automatic imitation might develop when the 
group grows beyond four individuals. Although there was no sign of a floor or ceiling effect 
in the current study, response speed inevitably has to reach an asymptote also when no 
imitative control is required. As a result, automatic imitation can be expected to saturate on 
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both congruent and incongruent trials when the number of agents is increased further. 
However, it is also possible that automatic imitation of large groups involves different 
processes than automatic imitation of small groups. For example, research on face perception 
has shown that observers do not process each individual face when they see a group of faces 
but instead compute the average face across all faces (Haberman & Whitney, 2007, 2009). In 
the same vein, it was recently demonstrated that observers can rapidly extract the ratio of 
males to females from a set of faces (Alt, Goodale, Lick, & Johnson, 2017). Albeit 
speculative, similar sampling mechanisms might also be involved in action perception when 
the number of observed actions exceeds the processing capacity of the system. From this 
perspective, automatic imitation of small groups could be stronger than automatic imitation of 
large groups because observers no longer represent each individual action but instead 
represent the average action. 
 
Mechanisms of Strategic Response Threshold Regulation 
 
Apart from the mechanisms involved in the imitation of multiple agents, an important 
question is also what mechanisms caused automatic imitation to saturate on congruent trials 
but not on incongruent trials. As stated above, our data suggests that strategic regulation of the 
response threshold was responsible for this pattern. The ability to lower and raise the response 
threshold is considered a hallmark of cognitive control because it allows individuals to delay 
action selection so that premature responses can be overruled by more deliberate responses 
(Bogacz, Wagenmakers, Forstmann, & Nieuwenhuis, 2010; Frank, 2006; Munakata et al., 
2011; Wiecki & Frank, 2013). Furthermore, it is well known that cognitive control is sensitive 
to contextual demands such as time pressure (Forstmann et al., 2008; van Veen, Krug, & 
Carter, 2008) and the proportion of congruent relative to incongruent trials (Bugg & Crump, 
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2012; Ridderinkhof, 2002). As such, a strategic control mechanism can explain not only why 
responses reached an asymptote on congruent trials but also why this asymptote disappeared 
in the absence of incongruent trials. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that a trial-by-trial strategic regulation mechanism 
rests on two important assumptions. A first assumption is that cognitive control can modulate 
responses within the context of a single trial. While this goes against traditional “slow” 
accounts of cognitive control (Botvinick et al., 2001), recent studies indicate that control is 
implemented not only between but also within trials (Janssens et al., 2017, 2016). For 
example, one study found that reward cues presented together with the target stimulus can 
modulate responses to that stimulus by increasing cognitive control (Janssens et al., 2016). A 
second assumption is that the number of stimulus movements can quickly be extracted before 
a response is initiated. This is supported by evidence that individuals immediately get a sense 
of numerosity when looking at visual displays (Anobile, Cicchini, & Burr, 2016; Burr & 
Ross, 2008; Harvey & Dumoulin, 2017; Harvey, Klein, Petridou, & Dumoulin, 2013; Piazza, 
Izard, Pinel, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 2004). Therefore, based on this, we propose that 
participants in the current experiments rapidly estimated the number of stimulus movements 
and then used this information to regulate their response threshold before a response was 
initiated. 
 
Implications for Social Group Contagion 
 
The results of the current study show that automatic imitation increases with group 
size, and that this relation follows an asymptotic curve on congruent trials. This pattern 
closely matches previous research on social imitation (Darley & Latané, 1968; Gallup et al., 
2012; Latane, 1981; Milgram et al., 1969), thus supporting the hypothesis that not only social 
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cognitive but also sensorimotor processes contribute to social group contagion (Cracco & 
Brass, 2017; Cracco et al., 2015, 2016; Raafat et al., 2009). For example, the current study 
suggests that pedestrians in the study of Milgram et al. (1969) might have been more likely to 
imitate larger groups of confederates because larger groups provided a stronger motor trigger 
than smaller groups. Likewise, but more speculative, the asymptote in the relation between 
group size and social contagion could be explained by strategic regulation of the response 
threshold. Interestingly, this interpretation fits well with the notion that interpretative 
processes may serve a role in social imitation at later stages of processing (Cracco et al., 2015, 
2016). In particular, a heightened response threshold stops premature responses and therefore 
allows cognitive processes to influence whether or not to act on external triggers (Bogacz et 
al., 2010; Frank, 2006; Munakata et al., 2011; Wiecki & Frank, 2013). From this view, social 
group contagion is best explained as an interaction between sensorimotor and interpretative 
processes that determine whether or not we align our behavior with others.  
Finally, it is important to note that not all social group processes can be explained in 
terms of shared motor activation. For example, research on bystander apathy has shown that 
individuals are less likely to help a person in distress when the number of passive bystanders 
increases (Darley & Latané, 1968; Fischer et al., 2011). Likewise, research on emotional 
contagion suggests that emotional states spread more widely in large groups than in small 
groups (Du, Fan, & Feng, 2014). Since there is often not much to imitate in these situations, it 
is not clear how shared motor activation could explain these effects. However, it is important 
to note in this respect that shared representations have also been reported outside of the 
sensorimotor domain (Keysers & Gazzola, 2006). In particular, it has been argued that the 
brain uses these representations to mirror the behavior and feelings of others as a first step to 
understand their mental state (Gallese, 2007; Gallese et al., 2004; Keysers & Gazzola, 2006). 
If shared mental representations are more strongly activated when multiple persons behave 
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similarly, then mental state contagion could explain why individuals are less inclined to help 
when the number of passive bystanders increases. In support, recent neuroimaging work on 
the bystander effect found that motor cortex activity decreased as the number of passive 
bystanders increased even though participants were not able to intervene themselves 
(Hortensius & De Gelder, 2014). This suggests that participants automatically embodied the 
bystanders’ mental state, causing them to inhibit motor responses.  
 
Conclusion 
 
To conclude, the present study investigated the role of sensorimotor processes in social 
group contagion with an automatic imitation task that minimized the involvement of 
interpretative processes. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that group size had an asymptotic 
influence on congruent trials but a linear influence on incongruent trials. Experiments 3 to 7 
then showed that the effect of group size on congruent trials no longer reached an asymptote 
when no imitative control was needed, namely in the absence of incongruent trials. This 
suggests that the congruent asymptote was caused by strategic control mechanisms that 
regulated the response threshold on each trial based on the number of observed movements. 
Furthermore, the presence of an asymptotic relation between group size and automatic 
imitation closely matches previous research on social imitation (Darley & Latané, 1968; 
Gallup et al., 2012; Latane, 1981; Milgram et al., 1969). Together, this indicates that 
sensorimotor processes contribute to the relation between group size and social contagion. 
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Supplementary Material 
 
 
Figure S1. Error rate results (%) of Experiments 1 and 2. The error bars depict 95% confidence intervals 
corrected for within-subject designs according to Morey (2008). C: congruent; IC: incongruent. 
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Figure S2. Error rate results (%) of Experiments 3 to 6. The error bars depict 95% confidence intervals corrected 
for within-subject designs according to Morey (2008). 
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Figure S3. Error rate results (%) of Experiment 7. The error bars depict 95% confidence intervals corrected for 
within-subject designs according to Morey (2008). 
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Motor Simulation of Multiple Observed Actions
1
 
 
 
Research has shown that observed actions are represented in the motor system, leading to 
automatic imitative responses. However, in social life, we often see multiple persons acting 
together. Here, we explore whether these interactions can be represented in the motor system. 
In particular, to represent interactions, the motor system has to simultaneously represent 
multiple observed actions. The current study investigated this possibility using an automatic 
imitation paradigm with four hands. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed weaker automatic imitation 
when one hand performed a different action than the other three hands, compared with when 
three or four hands all performed the same action. Experiment 3 replicated this effect with 
mutually exclusive actions. These results show that multiple observed actions can be 
represented simultaneously in the motor system, even when they cannot be executed together. 
This suggests that motor simulation contributes to the representation of social interaction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
Cracco, E., & Brass, M. (submitted). Motor Simulation of Multiple Observed Actions. 
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Introduction 
  
Social cognition crucially requires us to interpret and respond to the actions of others. 
However, it is often difficult to predict from visual input alone how an action will unfold 
(Brass & Heyes, 2005). Therefore, it has been proposed that we represent observed actions by 
simulating them in our own motor system (Prinz, 1997), and that this allows us to predict the 
course and outcome of those actions (Wilson & Knoblich, 2005). Supporting motor 
simulation, there is now strong evidence that people tend to imitate each other (Chartrand & 
Lakin, 2013; Cracco et al., 2018). For example, research on automatic imitation has 
demonstrated that responses to symbolic stimuli are facilitated by congruent and impeded by 
incongruent observed actions (Brass et al., 2000; Stürmer, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2000). 
Similarly, neuroscientific research has shown that action observation and action execution 
share activation in the motor system of the brain (Gazzola & Keysers, 2009; Molenberghs, 
Cunnington, & Mattingley, 2012). 
However, social cognition requires us not only to represent isolated actions but also to 
represent social interactions between two or more persons. Recently, it was proposed that 
social interactions might be represented by simultaneously simulating multiple observed 
actions in the motor system (Quadflieg & Koldewyn, 2017; Quadflieg & Penton-Voak, 2017). 
Yet, this hypothesis is currently speculative because previous research has largely focused on 
situations involving a single agent. Therefore, to address this issue, recent work has started to 
explore motor simulation in multi-agent settings (Cracco & Brass, 2017, 2018, Cracco, De 
Coster, Andres, & Brass, 2015, 2016; Ramenzoni, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2014; Tsai, Sebanz, 
& Knoblich, 2011). In particular, this work has shown that two hands performing the same 
action produce stronger automatic imitation (Cracco & Brass, 2017, 2018; Cracco et al., 2015) 
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and corticospinal excitability (Cracco et al., 2016) than one hand performing a single action, 
indicating that both actions were represented at the same time in the motor system. 
Nevertheless, two identical observed actions might still be represented as a single 
action. Therefore, a fundamental question is whether the motor system can also represent two 
different observed actions. Indeed, interacting individuals tend to perform different actions, 
and these actions might even be mutually exclusive in terms of motor execution. As a result, 
interaction simulation crucially requires observers to simultaneously represent multiple 
different actions in their motor system (Quadflieg & Koldewyn, 2017; Quadflieg & Penton-
Voak, 2017). To date, only one study has looked at motor simulation of different actions 
(Cracco et al., 2015). The results revealed that two hands performing two different actions did 
not produce any automatic imitation. Because this corresponded to a condition with one 
congruent and one incongruent observed action, it was argued that both observed actions were 
represented simultaneously, and that this led to a concurrent facilitation and interference 
effect that canceled out each other. However, a likely alternative interpretation could also be 
that neither action was represented when the hands performed two different actions. 
Therefore, to better understand the role of motor simulation in interaction 
representation, the current study aimed to investigate whether two different observed actions 
can be simulated at the same time in the motor system, and whether this depends on the extent 
to which these actions violate motor constraints. To this end, three experiments measured 
automatic imitation while participants observed three hands performing one action 
(“THREE”), four hands performing one action (“FOUR”), or three hands performing one 
action and one hand performing a different action (“THREE-ONE”). Previous research has 
revealed that up to four identical actions can be represented using this paradigm (Cracco & 
Brass, 2018). If two different actions can be represented as well, automatic imitation should 
be reduced in the THREE-ONE condition compared with the THREE and FOUR conditions 
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because the fourth hand then counteracts the other three hands. To explore the role of motor 
constraints, Experiments 1 and 2 used two actions that could be executed at the same time 
(“mutually compatible”), whereas Experiment 3 used two actions that could not be executed 
at the same time (“mutually exclusive”). If motor simulation of different actions is restricted 
by motor constraints, the same pattern should not be observed when the hands perform 
mutually exclusive actions. 
 
Experiment 1 
 
Participants 
 
Experiments 1 and 2 aimed to test 50 participants, based on our previous research 
(Cracco & Brass, 2017, 2018). A sample of 50 participants provides us with 93% power to 
detect medium-sized effects of dz = 0.50. However, due to cancellations, Experiment 1 
contained 48 individuals who were paid 5 euro in exchange for participation. Three 
participants with a reaction time (RT) or error rate (ER) exceeding the sample mean by more 
than 3 SD were excluded. The final sample thus consisted of 45 participants (36 female, Mage 
= 23.67, SDage = 5.16). Participants in all experiments were right-handed, had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, and signed an informed consent before the start of the experiment. 
 
Method 
 
The experiment started with a practice phase of 12 trials, followed by an experimental 
phase of 240 trials divided into four blocks. Stimuli consisted of four hands abducting the 
index finger, abducting the little finger, or not moving (Figure 1a). In the “THREE” 
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condition, three hands moved the same finger and one hand did not move. In the “FOUR” 
condition, all four hands moved the same finger. Finally, in the “THREE-ONE” condition, 
three hands moved one finger and the fourth hand moved the other finger. 
An illusion of movement was created by presenting a sequence of two pictures. That 
is, each trial started with a picture of the hands in their neutral position together with a 
fixation cross in the center of the screen. After 500 ms, this picture was replaced by a picture 
of the hands in their final position and a letter indicating the expected response. Participants 
had to abduct their right index finger when W was presented and their right little finger when 
P was presented. The observed movements could be congruent or incongruent with respect to 
the instructed response. Automatic imitation in this paradigm is operationalized as a 
congruency effect with slower responses on incongruent trials than on congruent trials. In the 
THREE-ONE condition, a trial was coded as congruent when the majority of the hands were 
congruent and as incongruent when the majority of the hands were incongruent. Participants 
had 2,000 ms to respond following the presentation of the imperative cue. Responses were 
registered with an optical sensor box and were followed by a black screen for 1,000 ms. 
All trials of the number (THREE, FOUR, or THREE-FOUR) x congruency (congruent 
or incongruent) design were presented randomly with the restriction that the same cue could 
not appear more than four times in a row. The RT data was analyzed with a repeated measures 
MANOVA. Prior to analysis, we removed trials without a response (0.10%), trials with an RT 
faster than 100 ms (0.02%), error trials (3.98%), and trials with an RT deviating more than 3 
SD from the participant’s mean (1.35%). The ER data will not be reported, but there was no 
sign of a speed-accuracy trade-off. This is supported by the presence of a positive correlation 
between the RT and ER congruency effect, r = .37, p = .012. The stimuli, code, data, and 
analyses from all experiments are available at the Open Science Framework: 
https://osf.io/8xpc2/?view_only=bcdda96a9b4f4165a572c9867fbb26df. 
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Figure 1. Examples of the stimuli used in (a) Experiment 1, (b) Experiment 2, and (c) Experiment 3. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
The results revealed a main effect of congruency, F(1, 44) = 56.07, p < .001, dz = 
1.12, with faster RTs on congruent trials than on incongruent trials, but no main effect of 
number, F(2, 43) = 0.30, p = .741, ηp
2
 = .01. As predicted, there was a number x congruency 
interaction, F(2, 43) = 3.47, p = .042, ηp
2
 = .14. Planned comparisons showed that the 
congruency effect was smaller in the THREE-ONE condition than in the THREE, t(44) = -
2.10, p = .041, dz = 0.31, and FOUR, t(44) = -2.56, p = .014, dz = 0.38, conditions. However, 
there was no significant difference between the THREE and FOUR condition, t(44) = -0.65, p 
= .520, dz = 0.10 (Figure 2). 
In sum, Experiment 1 found reduced automatic imitation in the THREE-ONE 
condition compared with the THREE or FOUR condition. This indicates that at least two 
different observed actions can be represented at the same time in the motor system. However, 
because the number x congruency interaction was only just significant, we decided to 
replicate Experiment 1. Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 with the exception that 
we removed the white border between the four stimulus hands. Previous research has shown 
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that automatic imitation is stronger when the imperative cue is located close to the stimulus 
movements (Bach, Peatfield, & Tipper, 2007; Cracco et al., 2018; Cracco & Brass, 2017). 
Therefore, we reasoned that the adjusted setup would lead to stronger automatic imitation, and 
that this would increase the likelihood to replicate Experiment 1 (see also Cracco & Brass, 
2018). 
 
 
Figure 2. Results of the number x congruency analysis of Experiment 1. Error bars are standard errors of the 
mean (SEMs) corrected for within-subject designs (Morey, 2008). C: congruent trials; IC: incongruent trials. 
 
Experiment 2 
 
Participants 
 
 Similar to Experiment 1, 50 subjects participated in Experiment 2. However, we 
removed three participants with an RT or ER exceeding the sample mean by more than 3 SD. 
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As a result, the final sample consisted of 47 participants (36 female, Mage = 20.77, SDage = 
4.10). 
 
Method 
 
The method of Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1, except that there was no 
longer a white border between the four hands (Figure 1b). Prior to analysis, we removed trials 
without a response (0.04%), trials with an RT faster than 100 ms (0.05%), error trials (4.44%), 
and trials with an RT deviating more than 3 SD from the participant’s mean (1.28%). The ER 
data will not be reported, but there was no sign of a speed-accuracy trade-off. Instead, there 
was a positive correlation between the RT and ER congruency effect, r = .33, p = .024. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
 In line with Experiment 1, the results revealed a main effect of congruency, F(1, 46) = 
67.37, p < .001, dz = 1.20, with faster responses on congruent trials than on incongruent trials, 
but no main effect of number, F(2, 45) = 0.58, p = .562, ηp
2
 = .03. Importantly, the number x 
congruency interaction was again significant, F(2, 45) = 5.76, p = .006, ηp
2
 = .20. Planned 
comparisons showed that the congruency effect was smaller in the THREE-ONE condition 
than in the THREE, t(46) = -2.97, p = .005, dz = 0.43, and FOUR, t(46) = -3.32, p = .002, dz = 
0.48, conditions. However, there was no difference between the congruency effect of the 
THREE and FOUR conditions, t(46) = 0.37, p = .711, dz = 0.05 (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Results of the number x congruency analysis of Experiment 2. Error bars are SEMs corrected for 
within-subject designs (Morey, 2008). C: congruent trials; IC: incongruent trials. 
 
In sum, Experiment 2 thus replicated Experiment 1. This further strengthens the 
hypothesis that individuals can simulate multiple different observed actions in parallel. 
However, is this still true when the observed actions cannot be executed together? That is, it 
could be that the motor system can only represent two observed actions when they can be 
combined into a single action. For instance, one hand abducting the index finger and one hand 
abducting the little finger could be represented as a single hand abducting both the index and 
little finger. To explore this hypothesis, Experiment 3 used mutually exclusive actions. That 
is, four hands moved their index finger either to the left or to the right. Because it is 
impossible to move the same finger in two directions at the same time, this allows us to 
investigate the degree to which motor simulation of multiple different actions is bound by 
motor constraints. 
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Experiment 3 
 
Participants 
 
Experiment 3 tested 70 participants. The sample size was increased because we 
expected the effects to be smaller for mutually exclusive actions. To determine the sample 
size, we conducted an a-priori power analysis. This indicated that 70 participants were needed 
to detect small effects (i.e., dz = 0.30) at α = 0.05 with reasonable statistical power (i.e., 70%). 
However, we removed one participant with an ER exceeding the sample mean by more than 3 
SD. The final sample thus consisted of 69 participants (58 female, Mage = 22.12, SDage = 4.38). 
 
Method 
 
The stimuli in Experiment 3 consisted of four hands moving their index finger either 
to the left or to the right (Figure 1c). Because it is impossible to move the same finger in two 
directions at the same time, these movements are mutually exclusive. The visual display
2
 and 
experimental procedure were identical to Experiment 1, except that responses were now 
recorded using a Mac keyboard. More specifically, participants held down the down arrow 
key until a response cue (L or R) instructed them to release this key and to press either the left 
(L) or right (R) arrow key. The RT was the time needed to press the correct key. Prior to 
analysis, we removed trials without a response (0.00%), trials with an RT faster than 100 ms 
(0.08%), error trials (4.15%), and trials with an RT deviating more than 3 SD from the 
participant’s mean (0.83%). The ER data will not be reported, but there was no sign of a 
                                                 
2
 The reason why we used the display of Experiment 1 and not Experiment 2 is that, in reality, Experiment 3 was 
conducted before Experiment 2. The order of the experiments was changed for logical consistency. However, it 
is notable that removing the white border in Experiment 2 did not increase automatic imitation, suggesting that it 
did not have an effect. 
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speed-accuracy trade-off. Instead, there was a positive correlation between the RT and ER 
congruency effect, r = .22, p = .072. 
 
 
Figure 4. Results of the number x congruency analysis of Experiment 3. Error bars are SEMs corrected for 
within-subject designs (Morey, 2008). C: congruent trials; IC: incongruent trials. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
The results revealed a main effect of congruency, F(1, 68) = 126.47, p < .001, dz = 
1.35, with faster RTs on congruent trials than on incongruent trials, but no main effect of 
number, F(2, 67) = 1.09, p = .340, ηp
2
 = .03. In line with Experiments 1-2, the interaction 
between number and congruency was significant as well, F(2, 67) = 6.95, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .17. 
Planned comparisons showed that the congruency effect was smaller in the THREE-ONE 
condition than in the THREE, t(68) = -2.12, p = .037, dz = 0.26, and FOUR, t(68) = -3.70, p < 
.001, dz = 0.45, conditions. However, the congruency effect did not differ between the 
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THREE and FOUR conditions, t(68) = -0.86, p = .394,  dz = 0.10 (Figure 4). In sum, 
Experiment 3 replicated the results of Experiments 1-2 even though the observed actions were 
mutually exclusive in terms of motor execution. This indicates that motor simulation of 
multiple observed actions is not restricted by motor constraints. 
 
General Discussion 
 
Motor simulation allows individuals to represent others’ actions in their motor system 
(Wilson & Knoblich, 2005). However, in social life, we have to represent not only the actions 
but also the interactions of others. Recently, it was argued that observers might represent 
interactions between two persons by simulating the actions of both persons in their motor 
system (Quadflieg & Koldewyn, 2017; Quadflieg & Penton-Voak, 2017). Supporting this 
hypothesis, previous research has shown that multiple identical observed actions can be 
simulated at the same time (Cracco & Brass, 2017, 2018, Cracco et al., 2015, 2016). 
However, identical actions might still be represented as a single action. Therefore, the current 
study investigated whether two different actions could be simulated as well, and whether this 
was bound by motor constraints. Using automatic imitation, Experiments 1-2 showed that 
four hands performing two different actions were simulated simultaneously. Experiment 3 
replicated this finding when the two actions were mutually exclusive in terms of motor 
execution. This indicates that multiple observed actions can be simulated together, even when 
they cannot be executed together. 
Nevertheless, it could also be argued that participants randomly represented one moving 
or non-moving hand on each trial. In the THREE-ONE condition, this would cause them to 
imitate the majority of the hands in 75% of the trials and the minority of the hands in 25% of 
the trials. This, in turn, would likewise result in weaker automatic imitation than in the 
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THREE or FOUR condition. However, we have recently ruled out random sampling in the 
context of two agents. More specifically, in a paradigm where we measured automatic 
imitation of two hands, it was found that directing participants’ attention to the movements of 
a target hand or instructing participants to imitate that hand did not preclude automatic 
imitation of the non-target hand, showing that automatic imitation was modulated by the 
number of agents even when at least one action was processed on each trial (Cracco & Brass, 
2017). Likewise, using the same stimuli as in the current study, we have shown that automatic 
imitation increased with the number of identical observed movements even when we only 
presented the hands making a movement (Cracco & Brass, 2018). Because the random 
sampling account rests on the assumption that only one action can be represented at a time 
(Cracco & Brass, 2017), these results provide strong evidence against random sampling and 
instead point towards simultaneous representation. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that automatic imitation in the FOUR condition was 
not stronger than automatic imitation in the THREE condition. This is consistent with recent 
work in which we investigated how automatic imitation developed as the number of observed 
actions increased (Cracco & Brass, 2018). In particular, this study showed that automatic 
imitation initially increased but then reached an asymptote when there were more than two 
observed actions. Interestingly, further experiments revealed that this pattern was the result of 
a strategic control mechanism regulating response inhibition based on the number of observed 
actions in order to prevent overt imitation. 
Finally, the current study crucially extends motor simulation research from action 
representation to interaction representation. In particular, it suggests that motor simulation is 
involved not only in decoding actions (Wilson & Knoblich, 2005) but also in decoding 
interactions (Quadflieg & Koldewyn, 2017; Quadflieg & Penton-Voak, 2017). The fact that 
motor simulation was not bound by bodily constraints furthermore indicates that this 
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mechanism can be used across a wide range of social situations. However, it also raises the 
question how two actions can be simulated together when they cannot even be executed 
together. One possibility is that individuals extend their body schema with supernumerary 
limbs when having to simulate two or more mutually exclusive actions. Supporting this 
hypothesis, research has shown that people can be made to experience the illusion of owning 
an additional limb (e.g., Ehrsson, 2009). Lastly, the present study has important implications 
for joint action (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006). Indeed, it is well-known that motor 
simulation facilitates interpersonal coordination in joint action tasks with two agents (Colling, 
Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2013; Kourtis, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2013). In extension, our results 
suggest that individuals might also use this mechanism to coordinate their actions with 
multiple co-actors at once, such as when ensemble musicians have to tune their performance 
to one another (Volpe, D’Ausilio, Badino, Camurri, & Fadiga, 2016). 
To conclude, the current study shows that multiple observed actions can be represented 
at the same time in the motor system, even when this violates bodily constraints. These results 
suggest that motor simulation might contribute to the representation of social interaction, and 
provides novel insight into the mechanisms underlying interpersonal coordination in joint 
action tasks that extend beyond the dyad. 
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Chapter 7 
 
 
Representing Multiple Observed Actions in the 
Motor System
1
 
 
 
There is now converging evidence that others’ actions are represented in the motor system. 
However, social cognition requires us not only to represent the actions but also the 
interactions of others. Therefore, a fundamental question is whether social interactions can be 
represented in the motor system. To represent interactions, the motor system has to process 
multiple observed actions at the same time. The current fMRI study investigated this 
possibility by measuring brain activity from 29 participants while they observed two right 
hands performing sign language gestures. Three key results were obtained. First, activation in 
premotor and parietal motor regions was stronger when two hands performed two different 
gestures than when a single hand performed one gesture. Second, the two individual observed 
gestures could be decoded simultaneously from activation in both motor regions. Third, 
observing two different gestures compared with two identical gestures activated brain areas 
associated with motor conflict, and this activation was correlated with activation in the 
parietal motor region. Together, these results show that multiple observed actions can be 
represented at the same time in the motor system. This suggests that mirror processes might 
contribute to the representation of social interaction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
Cracco, E., Keysers, C, Clauwaert, A., & Brass, M. (submitted). Representing Multiple Observed Actions in the 
Motor System. 
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Introduction 
  
There is accumulating evidence that action observation triggers a corresponding motor 
representation in the observer (Cracco et al., 2018; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010, 2016). For 
example, animal research has uncovered a subset of motor neurons in the premotor and 
parietal cortex that fire both when an action is executed and when the same action is observed 
(Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Kilner & Lemon, 2013; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, 
Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996). This is supported by human research, in which the contribution of 
motor processes to action observation has been demonstrated across a wide range of methods, 
including fMRI (Gazzola & Keysers, 2009; Molenberghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 2012), 
TMS (Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995; Naish, Houston-Price, Bremner, & 
Holmes, 2014), M/EEG (Arnstein, Cui, Keysers, Maurits, & Gazzola, 2011; Fox et al., 2016), 
and intracranial recording (Babiloni et al., 2016; Mukamel, Ekstrom, Kaplan, Iacoboni, & 
Fried, 2010). Moreover, this research has revealed that mirror activation is not restricted to 
seeing actions, but also occurs when hearing action-related sounds (Gazzola, Aziz-Zadeh, & 
Keysers, 2006; Kohler et al., 2002), or when seeing someone being touched (Keysers et al., 
2004), someone in pain (Singer et al., 2004), or someone expressing an emotion (Wicker et 
al., 2003). 
Together, these findings indicate that observers represent the actions, sensations, and 
emotions of others through simulation in shared neural circuits (Keysers & Gazzola, 2006). 
Motor simulation, in turn, has been argued to facilitate action perception (Rizzolatti & 
Sinigaglia, 2010, 2016). In support, neuromodulation and lesion studies have revealed that 
disrupting sensorimotor brain areas causes subtle yet significant impairments in recognizing 
and predicting observed actions (Avenanti, Candidi, & Urgesi, 2013; Urgesi, Candidi, & 
Avenanti, 2014). However, in social life, it is not only important to represent the actions but 
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also the interactions of others (Quadflieg & Koldewyn, 2017; Quadflieg & Penton-Voak, 
2017). This raises the fundamental question whether social interactions can be represented in 
the motor system. Critically, to represent interactions, the motor system has to simultaneously 
represent multiple observed actions (Quadflieg & Koldewyn, 2017; Quadflieg & Penton-
Voak, 2017). Yet, whether this is possible is currently unknown since research has focused 
almost exclusively on situations in which a single agent is observed. 
Preliminary evidence indicates that motor activation is stronger when observing an 
interaction between two persons than when observing a single person (Aihara, Yamamoto, 
Mori, Kushiro, & Uehara, 2015; Bucchioni, Cavallo, Ippolito, Marton, & Castiello, 2013; 
Iacoboni et al., 2004) or two independently acting persons (Centelles, Assaiante, Nazarian, 
Anton, & Schmitz, 2011; Georgescu et al., 2014). However, it does not necessarily follow 
from a non-specific increase in motor activation that observers simulated multiple actions. 
Instead, it has to be shown that the corresponding motor representations were simultaneously 
activated. To this end, in previous work, we have measured automatic imitation (Cracco & 
Brass, 2017, 2018; Cracco, De Coster, Andres, & Brass, 2015) and corticospinal excitability 
(Cracco, De Coster, Andres, & Brass, 2016) while participants observed either a single action 
or two identical actions. The results revealed action-specific increases in both measures when 
two identical actions were observed, indicating that both actions concurrently activated the 
same motor representation. Nevertheless, two identical actions might still be represented as a 
single action in the motor system. Therefore, a crucial question is whether the motor system 
can also represent two different actions. Indeed, when watching two interacting individuals, it 
is rarely the case that their actions can be represented as a single action. 
To investigate this, the current study recorded brain activity from 29 participants with 
fMRI while they performed an action observation task, followed by an action execution task. 
In the action observation task, participants watched short videos of (5 s) of two right hands 
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repeatedly (4 times) performing one out of three sign language gestures (see Figure 1a and 
Supplementary Videos). There were four conditions. In the Neutral Condition (N), both hands 
remained still for the entire duration of the video. In the One Hand Condition (1H), one hand 
performed a gesture while the other hand remained still. In the Two Hands Identical 
Condition (2H ID), both hands performed the same gesture. Finally, in the Two Hands 
Different Condition (2H DIFF), the two hands performed different gestures. To maintain 
attention, participants had to detect a glitch in the video appearing randomly in one out of 
seven trials on the left hand, on the right hand, or on both hands. The action observation task 
was followed by the action execution task. In this task, participants had to squeeze or not 
squeeze a ball with their left or right hand depending on the color and location of a circle 
presented on the screen (Figure 1b). The action execution task was included to localize shared 
voxels (sVx). Shared voxels are voxels that become activated both during action observation 
and during action execution, and will be used as a proxy for the human mirror neuron system 
in the current study (Arnstein et al., 2011; Gazzola & Keysers, 2009). 
The hypothesis that multiple observed actions can be mirrored in parallel was tested in 
three ways. First, we compare sVx activation in the 1H condition with sVx activation in the 
2H DIFF condition. If two different actions are mirrored simultaneously, this should be 
visible as stronger sVx activation in the 2H DIFF condition than in the 1H condition (Cracco 
& Brass, 2017, 2018, Cracco et al., 2015, 2016). Second, we test with multivariate analyses 
whether both gestures in the 2H DIFF condition can be decoded at the same time from 
activation in sVx. Finally, we explore the consequences of mirroring multiple different 
gestures. Specifically, representing two different gestures in the motor system should produce 
motor conflict because it is impossible to execute two gestures at the same time with a single 
hand. Importantly, while previous work has established that motor conflict can occur during 
motor preparation (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001), the current study is the 
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first to test whether passive action observation of conflicting actions is sufficient to generate 
motor conflict. That is, we predict stronger activation in brain areas associated with motor 
conflict when observing two mutually exclusive actions (2H DIFF) compared with observing 
two mutually compatible actions (2H ID). More precisely, we expect that this contrast will 
activate the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which is at the core of the conflict monitoring 
network (Botvinick et al., 2001; Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004; Braver, Barch, Gray, 
Molfese, & Snyder, 2001; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Examples of the stimuli used 
(a) in the action observation task and 
(b) in the action execution task. In the 
action observation task, participants 
watched short videos of two hands 
repeatedly performing one out of three 
possible gestures. The task of 
participants was to detect a glitch in the 
video appearing randomly in one out of 
seven trials. In the action execution 
task, participants had to either squeeze a 
bubble wrap ball or look at the screen 
depending on whether the color of the 
circle was, respectively, green or red. In 
case of a green circle, participants had 
to squeeze the ball each time the circle 
decreased in size with the hand that 
corresponded to the location of the 
circle on the screen. 
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Figure 2. The top panel shows the activation in the action observation task (Observation > Neutral). The middle 
panel shows the activation in the action execution task (Squeeze > No Squeeze). The bottom panel shows the 
activation overlap between both tasks. Unless otherwise specified, images were thresholded using a p < .05 
FWE-corrected threshold. In line with previous work, action execution data was thresholded at p < .001 to 
determine shared voxels (Arnstein et al., 2011). 
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Results 
 
Shared Voxel Localization 
 
Shared voxel activation was determined by measuring the overlap in brain activation 
between action observation and action execution. First, to find action execution activation, we 
calculated the contrast Squeeze > No Squeeze. As can be seen in Figure 2a, this revealed 
widespread activation in the sensorimotor system, which is similar to what has been found in 
previous research using this task (Arnstein et al., 2011). Next, to find action observation 
activation, we compared activation in the N condition with activation in the 1H, 2H ID, and 
2H DIFF conditions using the contrast Observation > Neutral (i.e. 0.33 x [1H + 2H ID + 2H 
DIFF] > N). As expected, action observation produced bilateral activation in the visual cortex 
around V5, as well as bilateral activation in the inferior parietal cortex, the superior parietal 
cortex, the postcentral gyrus, and the superior temporal gyrus, and lateralized activation in the 
left dorsal premotor cortex (Fig 2b). Finally, to localize sVx, we determined the overlap 
between both tasks. In line with meta-analyses on action observation (Caspers, Zilles, Laird, 
& Eickhoff, 2010; Molenberghs et al., 2012), this revealed sVx activation in the inferior 
parietal cortex, the superior parietal cortex, the postcentral gyrus, the superior temporal gyrus, 
and the dorsal premotor cortex, but not in the visual cortex. 
 
Representing Two Observed Actions Simultaneously 
 
Is There More Activation? To investigate whether two different gestures could be 
represented at the same time in both the visual and motor system, we analyzed activation in 
three core regions of the action observation network, namely the visual cortex (V5), the 
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parietal cortex (PAR), and the premotor cortex (PMC). To prevent biasing the analysis toward 
the 2H conditions, we constructed 5 mm bilateral spheres around the peak coordinate of the 
conjunction [1H > N] ∩ [2H ID > N] ∩ [2H DIFF > N] in each region and each participant. 
Furthermore, to secure statistical independence, we used a leave-one-out cross-validation 
procedure in which the regions-of-interest (ROIs) for each participant were calculated using 
the data of all participants except that one participant (Esterman, Tamber-Rosenau, Chiu, & 
Yantis, 2010). Importantly, in this process, we used the action execution activation (Squeeze 
> No Squeeze) as an exclusive mask to localize the V5 peak and as an inclusive mask to 
localize the PAR and PMC peaks. The ROI analyses were conducted by extracting the beta 
values for each ROI (Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & Poline, 2002), and then using these values 
to calculate the percent signal change relative to the N condition. 
To examine whether two observed actions could be represented in the three ROIs, we 
compared the relative signal change in the 1H condition with the relative signal change in the 
2H DIFF condition after averaging across the right and left hemisphere (but see Figures S1 
and S2 for the results of both hemispheres separately). That is, we conducted a region x 
condition repeated measures MANOVA. As predicted, this revealed a main effect of 
condition, F(1, 28) = 79.15, p < .001, indicating stronger activation in the 2H DIFF condition 
than in the 1H condition. However, the region x condition interaction was significant as well, 
F(2, 27) = 86.06, p < .001 (Fig 3). This showed that the effect of condition was stronger in V5 
than in both PAR, t(28) = 11.35, p < .001, and PMC, t(28) = 13.34, p < .001. Nevertheless, in 
addition to V5, F(1, 28) = 155.60, p < .001, the condition effect was also significant in PAR, 
F(1, 28) = 16.40, p < .001, and in PMC, F(1, 28) = 5.56, p = .026. In other words, these 
results indicate that activation in visual as well as motor areas was stronger when two 
different gestures were observed relative to when a single gesture was observed. This, in turn, 
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indicates that both 2H DIFF gestures were simultaneously represented in the sVx serving as a 
proxy for the mirror neuron system. 
 
 
Figure 3. Results of the ROI analyses testing whether activation is stronger in the 2H DIFF condition than in the 
1H condition. The y-axis shows the % signal change with respect to the N condition. Details on the % signal 
change calculation are provided in the methods. Post-hoc two-tailed t tests comparing 1H with 2H DIFF are 
displayed. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
 
Can We Decode Both Individual Actions? Next, to investigate whether both 
individual actions could be decoded from sVx activation, we performed a representational 
similarity analysis (RSA). RSA is a multivariate analysis technique that measures the 
similarity between the representations of two stimuli by calculating the spatial correlation 
between their activation patterns (Kriegeskorte, Mur, & Bandettini, 2008). Applied to the 
current study, we calculated the spatial correlation between the unsmoothed activation pattern 
in the 2H DIFF condition and the unsmoothed activation pattern in the 1H condition because 
this allowed us to compare three correlations, namely two correlations with gesture overlap 
and one correlation without gesture overlap. More precisely, as illustrated in Figure 4a, we 
can compare the activation pattern when seeing both gesture A and B with the activation 
pattern when seeing only gesture A (Overlap A), only gesture B (Overlap B), or only gesture 
C (No Overlap). 
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Figure 4. Results of the representational similarity analyses testing whether the two gestures observed in the 2H 
DIFF condition can be simultaneously decoded from brain activation in the three ROIs. Panel A is a visual 
representation of the analysis. In the Overlap A condition, gesture A overlaps. In the Overlap B condition, 
gesture B overlaps. In the No Overlap condition, neither of the two gestures overlaps. The analysis disregards the 
location of the gestures on the screen. Panel B shows the Fisher Z-transformed correlation coefficients in each of 
the three conditions separately for each ROI. Post-hoc two-tailed t tests comparing the average of Overlap A and 
B with No Overlap are displayed. The difference between Overlap A and Overlap B was never significant. * p < 
.05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.  
 
If the two gestures observed in the 2H DIFF condition were represented 
simultaneously, spatial correlations should be stronger when there is gesture overlap than 
when there is no gesture overlap. To evaluate this hypothesis, we conducted a region x 
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overlap repeated measures MANOVA on the Fisher Z-transformed spatial correlations in the 
three ROIs (Fig. 4b). As predicted, this produced a main effect of overlap, F(2, 27) = 10.11, p 
< .001, revealing stronger spatial correlations in the Overlap A condition than in the No 
Overlap condition, t(28) = 3.21, p = .003, stronger correlations in the Overlap B condition 
than in the No Overlap condition, t(28) = 4.41, p < .001, but no difference between the 
Overlap A and Overlap B conditions, t(28) = -0.70, p = .491 (Fig 4b). There was no region x 
overlap interaction, F(4, 25) = 0.14, p = .966. Taken together, these results thus indicate that 
both 2H DIFF gestures could be decoded at the same time from activation in all three ROIs 
when the hands performed different gestures. 
 
Does Representing Multiple Observed Actions Produce Motor Conflict? 
 
Finally, if both 2H DIFF gestures were represented at the same time in the motor 
system, then this should have perceivable consequences in the brain. That is, the simultaneous 
representation of two mutually exclusive actions in the motor system should lead to motor 
conflict (Botvinick et al., 2001, 2004), which is known to activate the ACC (Botvinick et al., 
2001, 2004; Braver et al., 2001; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). The motor conflict hypothesis was 
tested by comparing whole brain activation in the 2H DIFF condition with whole brain 
activation in the 2H ID condition using the contrast 2H DIFF > 2H ID (Fig 5). Apart from 
activation in the action observation network, this revealed robust activation in the ACC, 
together with activation in the right AI (Table 1), which is known to co-activate with the ACC 
(Ullsperger, Danielmeier, & Jocham, 2014). Next, to further inform whether this activation 
pattern was consistent with motor conflict, we ran a Neurosynth meta-analysis using the 
search string “(Response* | Motor) & (Conflict* | Compet*)”. That is, we calculated reverse 
inference maps to identify brain regions that were associated selectively with motor conflict 
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by comparing studies using the term motor conflict with studies not using the term motor 
conflict (Yarkoni, Poldrack, Nichols, Van Essen, & Wager, 2011). As shown in Fig 5, this 
confirmed that both the ACC and AI were associated relatively selectively with motor 
conflict, and an overlap analysis revealed substantial overlap with the activation obtained in 
the current study. 
 
 
Figure 5. The top panel shows the univariate results of the 2H DIFF > 2H ID contrast in the action observation 
task. The bottom panel shows the overlap between the results of the current study and the results of a Neurosynth 
meta-analysis on motor conflict. Brain activation from the current study is thresholded at p < .05 using FWE 
correction. Brain activation from Neurosynth is thresholded at p < .01 using FDR correction. 
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Table 1 
Peak MNI Coordinates of the 2H DIFF > 2H ID contrast. 
Brain area Peak coordinates T-score Cluster size 
ACC, Pre-SMA 12, 20, 34 5.42 85 
 3, 11, 52 5.07  
 3, 17, 43 5.05  
Right AI 36, 20, -8 5.37 28 
 42, 17, -2 5.01  
 33, 23, 4 4.95  
Right IPG 30, -49, 46 5.07 7 
Left dPMC -33, -4, 52 5.06 8 
Right MTG 45, -70, 13 5.00 6 
Right SFG 12, 11, 64 4.89 4 
Right dPMC 36, -4, 55 4.82 8 
 42, 2, 58 4.77  
Note. ACC = Anterior Cingulate Cortex, pre-SMA = Pre-supplementary Motor Area, AI = Anterior 
Insula, IPG = Inferior Parietal Gyrus, dPMC = dorsal premotor cortex, MTG = middle temporal gyrus, 
SFG = superior frontal gyrus. All results are FWE-corrected at p < .05. 
 
Finally, if the ACC activation was indeed caused by motor conflict, then it should 
depend on the degree to which sVx were activated. That is, according to the response conflict 
model of cognitive control, the function of the ACC is to detect and signal the presence of 
motor conflict (Botvinick et al., 2001, 2004). In particular, this model argues that response 
conflict can be seen as the product of activation in two simultaneously active response nodes. 
As a result, if only one response is active, then there is no response conflict. In contrast, if two 
responses are active, then response conflict depends on the activation in the two response 
nodes. In the current study, two identical observed gestures should trigger the same 
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“response”, whereas two different observed gestures should trigger two different “responses”. 
Therefore, response conflict is expected in the 2H DIFF but not in the 2H ID condition, and 
response conflict in the 2H DIFF condition should depend on the strength of activation in the 
motor system. 
 
 
Figure 6. The top panel shows the PPI results of the 2H DIFF > 2H ID contrast in the action observation task. 
The displayed coordinates are the peak coordinates of the PPI analysis (t = 4.99, k = 20). Note that the PPI 
results are masked with the activation obtained in the action observation task (Observation > Neutral). The 
bottom panel shows the overlap between the activation obtained in the PPI analysis and the activation obtained 
in the action execution task (Squeeze > No Squeeze). There was no PPI activation that was not captured by the 
action execution activation. Unless otherwise specified, brain activation is thresholded with a small-volume 
FWE-corrected p < .05 threshold. In line with previous work, action execution data was thresholded at p < .001 
to determine activation overlap (Arnstein et al., 2011). 
 
To test this hypothesis, we calculated the psychophysiological interaction (PPI) of the 
2H DIFF > 2H ID contrast using the ACC as seed region and the action observation activation 
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(Observation > Neutral) as a small-volume corrected inclusive mask (Fig 6). In other words, 
PPI was used to identify voxels that were more strongly correlated with the ACC seed region 
in the 2H DIFF condition than in the 2H ID condition (McLaren, Ries, Xu, & Johnson, 2012; 
O’Reilly, Woolrich, Behrens, Smith, & Johansen-Berg, 2012). In line with the motor conflict 
hypothesis, the PPI analysis revealed activation in the inferior parietal cortex, and this 
activation completely overlapped with the activation observed in the action execution task 
(Squeeze > No Squeeze). In other words, the PPI analysis showed that activation in parietal 
sVx was more strongly associated with ACC activation in the 2H DIFF condition than in the 
2H ID condition. Consistent with the motor conflict hypothesis, this suggests that ACC 
activation reflected motor conflict produced by representing two mutually exclusive observed 
gestures in the motor system. 
 
Discussion 
 
The mirror mechanism is a fundamental neural mechanism that translates observed 
actions into motor programs (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010, 2016). It has been argued that this 
mechanism supports action representation through motor simulation (Avenanti et al., 2013; 
Urgesi et al., 2014). However, in contrast to representing actions, little is known about the 
role of mirror processes in representing interactions. To represent interactions, the motor 
system has to process multiple observed actions at the same time (Quadflieg & Koldewyn, 
2017; Quadflieg & Penton-Voak, 2017). In the current study, we investigated whether this is 
possible by asking participants to watch short videos of two right hands performing sign 
language gestures. Three key results were obtained. First, the motor system was activated 
more strongly when two different gestures were observed compared with when a single 
gesture was observed. Second, both individual gestures could be decoded simultaneously 
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from activation in the motor system. Third, observing two different gestures relative to 
observing two identical gestures produced motor conflict related activation in the ACC, and 
this activation was correlated more strongly with parietal sVx in the former condition than in 
the latter condition. Together, these results indicate that multiple observed actions can be 
represented at the same time in the motor system, even when it is not possible to 
simultaneously execute them. Instead, when the mirrored actions violate motor constraints, 
this is signaled in the form of motor conflict. 
Nevertheless, an alternative explanation could be that participants did not represent 
both gestures simultaneously but instead randomly represented one gesture on each trial. In 
particular, this assumes that the left gesture was represented in one half of the trials and that 
the right gesture was represented in the other half of the trials. In this case, the activation 
pattern over trials should combine the activation pattern of the two individual gestures, which 
would likewise make it possible to decode both gestures from the average brain activation. 
However, a random sampling mechanism seems unlikely considering that the attentional task 
required participants to simultaneously monitor both hands. Indeed, performance on this task 
(i.e., 85%) was well above chance (i.e., 50%). Moreover, a random sampling mechanism is 
difficult to reconcile with the other two main results, namely that observing two different 
gestures produced stronger motor responses and led to motor conflict. That is, if only one 
gesture was represented on each trial, then motor activation should not be stronger when two 
gestures were observed, nor should there be any motor conflict. Finally, a random sampling 
account is inconsistent with evidence that non-attended observed actions modulate automatic 
imitation even when another observed action is being attended or imitated (Cracco & Brass, 
2017). 
Yet, in addition to the above, one might also object to our interpretation of ACC 
activation as motor conflict. For example, an alternative explanation could be that this 
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activation was driven by stimulus conflict rather than motor conflict. Stimulus conflict is 
similar to motor conflict but occurs already at the visual level (Verbruggen, Notebaert, 
Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2006). As such, it does not require both observed gestures to 
be represented simultaneously in the motor system. Importantly, however, an explanation in 
terms of stimulus conflict is inconsistent with previous research on the neural substrates of 
conflict processing. In particular, this work has demonstrated that the ACC is sensitive to 
motor conflict but not to stimulus conflict (Liston, Matalon, Hare, Davidson, & Casey, 2006; 
Liu, Banich, Jacobson, & Tanabe, 2004; Mayer et al., 2012; Milham et al., 2001; van Veen, 
Cohen, Botvinick, Stenger, & Carter, 2001; Wendelken, Ditterich, Bunge, & Carter, 2009). 
Furthermore, stimulus conflict cannot easily explain why ACC activation was correlated with 
parietal motor activation but not with purely visual activation. That is, if the ACC coded 
stimulus conflict, it should co-activate with the visual cortex (Botvinick et al., 2001). More 
generally, alternative explanations are not credible unless they are able to explain why ACC 
activation was correlated with motor activation, and why this correlation was stronger when 
the hands performed different gestures than when they performed identical gestures. Since 
this pattern was derived directly from conflict monitoring theories (Botvinick et al., 2001, 
2004), it strongly favors the motor conflict hypothesis. 
Thus, taken together, the current study indicates that at least two observed actions can 
be represented at the same time in the motor system. These results critically extend the 
literature on mirror processes from action representation (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010, 2016) 
to interaction representation (Quadflieg & Koldewyn, 2017; Quadflieg & Penton-Voak, 
2017). That is, in contrast to what might be expected, our results show that motor simulation 
does not break down when observing multiple actions. Instead, in that case, multiple actions 
are simulated in parallel. This, in turn, implies that motor simulation might not only be 
involved in decoding observed actions (Avenanti et al., 2013; Urgesi et al., 2014) but also in 
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decoding observed interactions (Quadflieg & Koldewyn, 2017; Quadflieg & Penton-Voak, 
2017). From this view, a key challenge for future research will be to determine how exactly 
how motor simulation contributes to interaction representation. 
Moreover, in addition to interaction representation, the current study also has 
important implications for joint action. That is, previous research has shown that motor 
simulation facilitates interpersonal coordination in tasks where two persons have to cooperate 
(Colling, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2013; Kourtis, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2013). For example, a 
recent study found that musicians’ ability to tune their own actions to those of another 
musician in a musical duet was impaired when the dorsal premotor cortex was disturbed 
(Hadley, Novembre, Keller, & Pickering, 2015). However, some social tasks extend beyond 
the dyad (Tsai, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2011). For instance, musicians in a musical ensemble 
have to coordinate their actions not with one but with multiple co-musicians (Volpe, 
D’Ausilio, Badino, Camurri, & Fadiga, 2016). The results of the present study suggest that 
this may likewise rely on motor simulation. In particular, it suggests that mirror processes can 
be used to simultaneously predict the action outcomes of several co-actors (Aglioti, Cesari, 
Romani, & Urgesi, 2008; Hamilton & Grafton, 2008) to achieve interpersonal coordination in 
multi-agent settings (Colling et al., 2013; Kourtis et al., 2013). 
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, the current study is the first demonstration that 
motor conflict is not restricted to action planning (Botvinick et al., 2001, 2004), but can also 
occur during action observation. This has important implications for theories of cognitive 
control. For instance, a prominent view is that motor conflict signals the need to increase 
attentional control (Botvinick et al., 2001, 2004). From this view, when observers experience 
motor conflict, this might trigger compensatory mechanisms that increase attention toward the 
observed actions, and this might then facilitate social processes such as interaction 
understanding (Quadflieg & Koldewyn, 2017; Quadflieg & Penton-Voak, 2017) or 
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interpersonal coordination (Colling et al., 2013; Kourtis et al., 2013). To conclude, the present 
work shows that multiple observed actions can be represented simultaneously in the motor 
system. This has important implications for interaction representation as well as joint action, 
and opens up new hypotheses on the role of motor conflict in action observation. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 
Thirty volunteers participated in the experiment in exchange for 30 euro (17 female, 
Mage = 22.67, SDage = 2.48, rangeage = 18 - 28), but one participant was excluded due to 
excessive head motion. This resulted in a sample of twenty-nine participants (17 female, Mage 
= 22.76, SDage = 2.47, rangeage = 18 - 28). However, the action execution data of three 
participants could not be used. That is, for one participant, a technical error prevented the 
randomization from being saved. Furthermore, for two participants, there was excessive head 
motion between the action observation and action execution phase, which led to missing data 
in the occipital lobe as a consequence of realignment. In other words, the action observation 
analyses were conducted on 29 participants and the action execution analyses on 26 
participants. All participants were right-handed according to the Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory (Oldfield, 1971), could not speak sign language, had no history of neurological or 
psychiatric disorder, and gave written informed consent. The study was approved by the 
Medical Ethic Review Board of the Ghent University Hospital. 
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Method 
 
Experimental Design. The experiment was structured in three phases. The first phase 
took place outside of the scanner. In this phase, participants were familiarized with the two 
experimental tasks, namely the action observation task and the action execution task. 
Moreover, to ensure that participants were able to execute the three gestures presented in the 
action observation task, the familiarization phase included an imitation task in which each 
gesture was presented 10 times. Participants had to imitate the gesture with their right hand 
and then press the space bar to continue. Performance on this task was monitored by the 
experimenter and mistakes were corrected. Following the familiarization phase, participants 
were put into the scanner for the second and third phase of the experiment. In the second 
phase, participants performed the action observation task. In the third phase, they performed 
the action execution task. 
Action Observation Task. In the action observation task, participants watched short 
videos (5 s) of two right hands repeatedly (4 times) performing one out of three sign language 
gestures (Fig 1). The gestures were chosen on the basis of a pilot study in which 40 
participants used a 5-point Likert scale to rate eight sign language gestures on whether the 
gesture was familiar, whether they had seen the gesture before, whether the gesture was 
clearly visible, whether the gesture was difficult to execute, and whether the gesture had a 
meaning. For each gesture, participants were furthermore asked to guess its meaning. Based 
on the results of the pilot study, we chose three gestures that were clearly visible, not difficult 
to execute, and with unknown meaning. The videos were presented as a sequence of 28 
frames (see Supplementary Videos). The first frame depicted the hands in rest position and 
was presented for 300 ms. Next, all 28 frames were presented for 33 ms each. Finally, the last 
frame remained on the screen for another 300 ms before the 28 frames were presented again 
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for 33 ms each. This was repeated for four cycles so that each video had a total duration of 
5196 ms (300 ms + 4 x 28 x 33 ms + 4 x 300 ms). 
To ensure that attention was maintained throughout the experiment, participants had to 
detect glitches in the videos. A glitch was presented randomly in one out of seven trials at a 
random point during the video on the left hand, on the right hand, or on both hands. To 
implement the glitch, we replaced 1 of the 28 frames with a blue frame. This resulted in a 
brief flicker (33 ms) that was easily missed unless attention was divided between the two 
hands. In other words, the detection task required participants to allocate attention to both 
hands at the same time. After each glitch trial, two questions were presented on the screen. 
The first question required participants to indicate the gesture(s) on which the glitch had 
appeared. More specifically, a series of four pictures was presented showing the neutral hand 
followed by the three gestures. Participants had to indicate for each picture whether a glitch 
had appeared on the presented gesture or not. The second question asked participants whether 
the glitch had appeared on one hand or on both hands. Accuracy was 75% on the first 
question and 85% on the second question, indicating that the task was challenging but not too 
difficult. All participants scored above chance level on both questions. Trials with a glitch 
were not included in the analyses. 
The action observation task comprised two runs consisting of 126 trials each. Trials 
were presented randomly with the restriction that all 18 gesture combinations occurred 
equally often in both runs. The following gesture combinations were included in the 
experiment: nG1/nG1, nG2/nG2, nG3/nG3, nG1/G1, G1/nG1, nG2/G2, G2/nG2, nG3/G3, 
G3/nG3, G1/G1, G2/G2, G3/G3, G1/G2, G2/G1, G1/G3, G3/G1, G2/G3, G3/G2, with G1, 
G2, and G3 representing the three gestures and nG1, nG2, and nG3 representing the 
corresponding neutral hand. For example, G2/G3 means that gesture 2 was presented left and 
that gesture 3 was presented right. The 18 gesture combinations were combined to form four 
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conditions. In the Neutral condition (N), neither hand performed a gesture. In the One Hand 
condition (1H), one hand performed a gesture. In the Two Hand Identical condition (2H ID), 
both hands performed the same gesture. Finally, in the Two Hand Different condition (2H 
DIFF), the two hands each performed a different gesture. All trials were separated by a black 
screen that was presented for a jittered duration drawn from a pseudo-logarithmic distribution 
with 50% short durations (200, 800, 1400, or 2000 ms), 33.3% intermediate durations (2600, 
3200, 3800, or 4400 ms), and  16.7% long durations (5000, 5600, 6200, or 6800 ms). 
Action Execution Task. Immediately after the action observation task, participants 
performed the action execution task. In this task, a green or red circle was presented on the 
left or right side of the screen. The circle then decreased in size every second until it 
disappeared after four seconds. During the action execution task, participants wore gloves 
with a ball made of bubble wrap attached to the palm. When a green circle was presented, 
participants had to squeeze the ball each time the circle decreased in size using the hand that 
corresponded to the location of the circle on the screen. For example, when a green circle 
appeared on the left side, participants had to squeeze the ball using their left hand. In contrast, 
when a red circle was presented, participants simply had to watch the screen. The action 
execution task consisted of 60 trials that were randomly subdivided into 20 squeeze left trials, 
20 squeeze right trials, and 20 watch trials. Trials were separated by a black screen that was 
presented for a jittered duration of 4000, 5000, 6000, 7000, or 8000 ms. The action execution 
task was based on the task used by Arnstein et al. (2011). In particular, these authors found 
that a simple squeeze task like the one used in the current study activated a network very 
similar to the network activated by a more complex object manipulation task. 
 fMRI Parameters. MRI images were acquired with a 3T Siemens Trio scanner using 
a 32-channel radiofrequency head coil. Participants entered the scanner head first and supine. 
The scanning procedure started with an anatomical scan in which 176 high-resolution 
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anatomical images were acquired using a T1-weighted 3D MPRAGE sequence [repetition 
time (TR) = 2250 ms, echo time (TE) = 4.18 ms, image matrix = 256 x 256, field of view 
(FOV) = 256 x 256 mm, flip angle = 9°, voxel size = 1.00 x 1.00 x 1.00 mm]. This was 
followed by two action observation runs and one action execution run in which whole-brain 
functional images were obtained. These functional images were acquired using a T2*-
weighted echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence, sensitive to BOLD contrast (TR = 2000 ms, 
TE = 28 ms, image matrix = 64 x 64, FOV = 224 mm, flip angle = 80°, distance factor = 17%, 
voxel size 3.5 x 3.5 x 3.0 mm, 34 axial slices). 
fMRI Preprocessing. All fMRI data was processed with SPM8 (Wellcome 
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, UCL, London, U.K.; www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). To 
account for T1 relaxation effects, the first four scans of all runs were dummy scans. The data 
of all three runs were preprocessed together. First, the functional images were spatially 
realigned using a rigid body transformation. Second, the realigned images were slice-time 
corrected with respect to the middle acquired slice. Third, the structural image of each subject 
was co-registered with its mean functional image. Fourth, the anatomical images were 
segmented according to the SPM8 tissue probability maps and the resulting parameters were 
used to normalize the functional images to standard MNI space. Finally, the images were 
resampled into 3 mm
3
 voxels and spatially smoothed with an 8 mm Gaussian kernel (full-
width at half maximum). Importantly, the representational similarity analyses were performed 
on the unsmoothed data. 
 
Analyses 
  
Univariate Analyses. The data was filtered using a high-pass filter of 128 Hz. First 
level analyses were conducted by fitting a general linear model in SPM8. The action 
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observation model consisted of 10 regressors per run, namely one regressor for each condition 
(N, 1H, 2H ID, and 2H DIFF) and six regressors representing the realignment parameters. The 
signal was modeled over the entire duration of the videos and was convolved with the 
canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). The action execution model also consisted 
of 10 regressors, with one regressor for each condition (Watch Left, Watch Right, Squeeze 
Left, Squeeze Right) and six regressors representing the realignment parameters. The entire 
duration of the trial, from the moment the circle appeared until the moment it disappeared, 
was modeled and convolved with the canonical HRF. The second level analyses of both tasks 
were performed using a within-subject one-way ANOVA with equal variances. Unless 
otherwise specified, all results are thresholded at the peak level using a p < .05 FWE-
corrected threshold. The Observation > Neutral contrast used to find action observation 
activation was calculated as 0.33 x [1H + 2H ID + 2H DIFF] > N. The Squeeze > No Squeeze 
contrast used to find action execution activation was calculated as [Squeeze Left + Squeeze 
Right] > [Watch Left + Watch Right]. 
Region of Interest Analyses. The regions of interest (ROIs) were constructed from 
brain activation in action observation task. To ensure that the ROIs were not biased towards 
the 2H conditions, we calculated the conjunction [1H > N] ∩ [2H ID > N] ∩ [2H DIFF > N] 
(Figure S1). Furthermore, to secure statistical independence, we used a leave-one-out cross-
validation procedure in which the ROIs for each participant were calculated using the data of 
all participants except that one participant (Esterman et al., 2010). That is, for each 
participant, we performed the specified conjunction analysis on the data of all the other 
participants. We then defined the ROIs by constructing 5 mm spheres around the peak 
coordinates in the left and right visual cortex (V5), the left and right parietal cortex (PAR), 
and the left premotor cortex (PMC). The right PMC was not consistently activated. Therefore, 
to obtain a bilateral PMC ROI, we mirrored the left PMC sphere onto the right hemisphere. 
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Importantly, the activation pattern was highly similar in the left and right PMC (Figures S2-
S3).  
The V5 peak coordinates were determined using the Squeeze > No Squeeze action 
execution activation as an exclusive mask (p < .001, uncorrected). Conversely, the PAR and 
PMC peak coordinates were determined using the Squeeze > No Squeeze action execution 
activation as an inclusive mask (p < .001, uncorrected). The use of an uncorrected p < .001 
thresholds for the masks was based on previous work (Arnstein et al., 2011). Finally, we 
intersected the obtained spheres with a grey matter mask to ensure that the ROIs were within 
the boundaries of the brain. The peak coordinates used to construct the ROIs are reported 
separately for each participant in Table S1. To perform the ROI analyses, we extracted the 
beta values using the MARSBAR package in SPM8 (Brett et al., 2002), and then used these 
values to calculate the percent signal change with respect to the N condition. More 
specifically, we first added the intercept to each beta value before calculating the relative 
signal change in the 1H and 2H DIFF conditions as 100 ×
(1𝐻−𝑁)
𝑁
 and 100 ×
(2𝐻 𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹−𝑁)
𝑁
 .  
Representational Similarity Analysis. The representational similarity analyses were 
performed on the unsmoothed data. First level analyses were conducted by fitting a general 
linear model in SPM8. The action observation model consisted of 24 regressors per run, 
namely one regressor for each of the 18 gesture combinations and six regressors for the 
realignment parameters. The signal was modeled over the entire duration of the videos and 
was convolved with the canonical HRF. Next, for every voxel in each of the three ROIs, we 
extracted the beta values corresponding to the 18 gesture combinations and computed 
pairwise correlations between the different gesture combinations across voxels so that we 
obtained an 18 x 18 correlation matrix per run per ROI. We then applied Fisher’s z-
transformation to the correlation coefficients to make them normally distributed, and these z-
scores were used in the analyses. 
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To investigate whether the two gestures in the 2H DIFF condition could be decoded 
simultaneously from brain activation, we calculated the spatial correlation between the 
activation patterns in the 2H DIFF and 1H conditions separately for each ROI because this 
allowed us to compare three correlations, namely two correlations with gesture overlap and 
one correlation without gesture overlap. For example, the activation pattern when seeing both 
gesture A and B can be compared with the activation pattern when seeing only gesture A 
(Overlap A), only gesture B (Overlap B), or only gesture C (No Overlap) (Fig 4a). 
Importantly, this analysis was conducted without considering the location of the gestures on 
the screen. For example, in A/B trials, Overlap A was the mean of r(A/B, nA/A) and r(A/B, 
A/nA), Overlap B was the mean of r(A/B, nB/B) and r(A/B, A/nB), and No Overlap was the 
mean of r(A/B, nC/C) and r(A/B, C/nC). These correlations were calculated separately for the 
six possible gesture combinations in the 2H DIFF condition, and were then averaged per 
condition over these gesture combinations. 
Psychophysiological Interaction Analysis. The psychophysiological interaction 
(PPI) analysis was performed using the gPPI toolbox in SPM8 (McLaren et al., 2012). The 
ACC seed region was the cluster identified with the 2H DIFF > 2H ID contrast in the action 
observation task. PPI regressors were calculated at the first level for all four conditions (N, 
1H, 2H ID, and 2H DIFF) and were then analyzed with a within-subject one-way ANOVA 
with equal variances at the second level. Because we were only interested in connections with 
the action observation network, the PPI analysis was restricted to voxels that were significant 
in the action observation task (Observation > Neutral) at an uncorrected p < .001 threshold. 
Within this volume, the PPI results were thresholded at FWE-corrected p < .05 peak 
threshold. 
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Supplementary Information 
 
Table S1 
Center MNI coordinates for the three ROIs per participant. 
 Left V5 Right V5 Left PAR Right PAR Left PMC Right PMC 
Subject 1 -51, -76, -2 51, -70, -2 -30, -43, 52 30, -40, 46 -42, -4, 58 42, -4, 58 
Subject 2 -51, -73, 1 51, -70, -2 -33, -43, 55 30, -40, 49 -42, -7, 58 42, -7, 58 
Subject 3 -51, -76, -2 51, -70, -2 -30, -43, 52 30, -40, 46 -42, -4, 58 42, -4, 58 
Subject 4 -51, -76, -2 51, -67, -2 -30, -43, 52 30, -40, 46 -42, -4, 58 42, -4, 58 
Subject 5 -51, -76, -2 51, -70, 2 -33, -43, 55 30, -43, 52 -42, -4, 58 42, -4, 58 
Subject 6 -51, -76, -2 51, -70, -2 -30, -46, 52 30, -40, 46 -42, -4, 58 42, -4, 58 
Subject 7 -51, -76, -2 51, -67, -2 -30, -43, 52 30, -37, 46 -42, -4, 58 42, -4, 58 
Subject 8 -51, -76, -2 51, -70, -2 -30, -46, 52 30, -43, 49 -42, -4, 58 42, -4, 58 
Subject 9 -51, -76, -2 51, -70, -2 -33, -43, 55 30, -43, 49 -42, -4, 58 42, -4, 58 
Subject 10 -51, -76, -2 51, -70, -2 -33, -43, 55 30, -43, 49 -42, -4, 58 42, -4, 58 
Subject 11 -51, -76, -2 51, -70, -2 -30, -46, 52 30, -43, 49 -42, -4, 58 42, -4, 58 
Subject 12 -51, -76, -2 51, -70, -2 -30, -43, 52 30, -43, 52 -42, -4, 58 42, -4, 58 
Subject 13 -51, -76, -2 51, -72, -2 -30, -46, 52 30, -40, 49 -42, -4, 58 42, -4, 58 
Subject 14 -48, -67, 4 51, -70, -2 -30, -43, 52 30, -43, 52 -42, -4, 58 42, -4, 58 
Subject 15 -51, -76, -2 51, -70, -2 -30, -43, 52 30, -40, 46 -42, -4, 58 42, -4, 58 
Subject 16 -51, -76, -2 51, -70, -2 -30, -46, 52 30, -43, 49 -42, -4, 58 42, -4, 58 
Subject 17 -51, -76, -2 51, -70, -2 -30, -43, 52 30, -40, 46 -42, -7, 58 42, -7, 58 
Subject 18 -51, -76, -2 51, -70, -2 -30, -43, 52 30, -43, 49 -42, -4, 58 42, -4, 58 
Subject 20 -51, -73, -2 51, -70, -2 -30, -43, 52 30, -40, 49 -42, -4, 58 42, -4, 58 
Subject 21 -51, -76, -2 51, -70, -2 -30, -43, 52 30, -43, 49 -42, -4, 58 42, -4, 58 
Subject 22 -51, -76, -2 51, -70, -2 -30, -43, 52 30, -43, 52 -42, -4, 58 42, -4, 58 
Subject 23 -51, -76, -2 51, -70, -2 -30, -43, 52 30, -43, 49 -42, -4, 58 42, -4, 58 
Subject 24 -48, -73, -2 51, -70, -2 -30, -43, 52 30, -43, 52 -42, -4, 58 42, -4, 58 
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 Left V5 Right V5 Left PAR Right PAR Left PMC Right PMC 
Subject 25 -51, -76, -2 51, -70, -2 -30, -43, 52 30, -43, 49 -42, -4, 58 42, -4, 58 
Subject 26 -51, -76, -2 51, -70, -2 -30, -43, 52 30, -40, 46 -42, -4, 58 42, -4, 58 
Subject 27 -51, -76, -2 51, -70, -2 -30, -46, 52 30, -43, 52 -42, -4, 58 42, -4, 58 
Subject 28 -51, -76, -2 51, -70, -2 -30, -43, 52 30, -43, 52 -42, -4, 58 42, -4, 58 
Subject 29 -51, -76, -2 51, -70, -2 -30, -46, 52 30, -43, 49 -42, -4, 58 42, -4, 58 
Subject 30 -51, -76, -2 51, -70, -2 -30, -43, 52 30, -43, 52 -42, -4, 58 42, -4, 58 
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Figure S1. Brain activation in each of the action observation conditions compared with the neutral condition. 
The bottom right figure shows the conjunction of the other three contrasts. Images were thresholded using a p < 
.05 FWE-corrected threshold. Left premotor activation was also present in the conjunction analysis at an 
uncorrected threshold of p < .001. 
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Figure S2. Results of the ROI analyses testing whether activation is stronger in the 2H DIFF condition than in 
the 1H condition separately for the left and right hemisphere. The y-axis shows the % signal change with respect 
to the N condition. Details on the % signal change calculation are provided in the methods. Post-hoc two-tailed t 
tests comparing 1H with 2H DIFF are displayed. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
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Figure S3. Results of the representational similarity analyses testing whether the two observed gestures in the 2H 
DIFF condition can be decoded from brain activation in the three ROIs separately for the left and right 
hemisphere. Post-hoc two-tailed t tests comparing the average of Overlap A and B with No Overlap are 
displayed. The difference between Overlap A and Overlap B was never significant. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < 
.001. 
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In the current dissertation, I set out to investigate whether it is possible to 
simultaneously represent the actions of multiple observed agents in the motor system. To this 
end, I studied both identical and different observed actions, and did so using behavioral as 
well as neuroscientific methods. In Chapters 2, 4, 5, and 6, I used automatic imitation, which 
is the finding that action execution is facilitated by compatible and impeded by incompatible 
observed actions (Cracco, Bardi, et al., 2018; Heyes, 2011). In Chapters 3 and 7, I then 
measured motor activation during passive action observation. More specifically, Chapter 3 
measured corticospinal excitability by stimulating the primary motor cortex with TMS (Naish, 
Houston-Price, Bremner, & Holmes, 2014) and Chapter 7 measured BOLD activation in the 
motor system of the brain using fMRI (Molenberghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 2012). The 
results across these six chapters provided converging evidence for the hypothesis that 
observers can simultaneously represent the actions of multiple agents in their motor system. 
The current discussion will summarize these results, explain them in a computational model, 
and discuss their theoretical impact, implications, and limitations. 
 
Overview of the Results 
 
Representing Multiple Identical Observed Actions 
 
The question whether multiple identical observed actions can be represented in the 
motor system was investigated with automatic imitation and TMS. In Chapter 2, I measured 
automatic imitation while participants observed two hands of which either one hand 
performed an action or both hands performed the same action. The results revealed stronger 
automatic imitation when two identical actions were observed, indicating that both actions 
were represented in the motor system. Interestingly, the same additive effect could not be 
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observed for non-human agents, which rules out that it was driven by differences in 
attentional processing. Instead, for non-human agents, there was an additive effect on slow 
but not on fast responses. Together, these results suggest the presence of an initial attentional 
boost in early processing stages that disappeared in later stages. Next, in Chapter 3, I used 
TMS to obtain a more direct measure of motor activation. That is, I measured corticospinal 
excitability in a passive observation task with similar stimuli as the ones used in Chapter 2. 
The results confirmed the results of Chapter 2, with stronger MEPs when two identical actions 
were observed compared with when a single action was observed. Importantly, this was true 
even though MEPs were measured at longer delays where attentional processes were unlikely 
to still contribute (Cracco, De Coster, Andres, & Brass, 2015; Klein, 2000; Samuel & Kat, 
2003). 
Chapter 4 addressed an alternative explanation for the results of the previous two 
chapters. That is, it investigated whether participants, instead of representing two hands, 
randomly represented one hand on each trial. This would cause the probability to represent a 
moving hand to be 100% when both hands made a movement but only 50% when one hand 
made a movement. In other words, random sampling would result in an additive effect across 
trials rather than within trials. To rule out this account, Chapter 4 ensured that the actions of at 
least one hand were represented on every trial. More specifically, it used a stimulus setup that 
positioned the two hands close together (Experiments 1-4), and requested participants to 
either attend to (Experiment 3) or imitate (Experiment 4) the actions performed by one of the 
two hands. The results revealed an additive imitation effect even though task requirements 
made it highly unlikely that participants sometimes represented only the non-moving hand. 
This speaks against a random sampling mechanism and instead suggests that participants 
simultaneously represented multiple observed actions in their motor system. 
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Finally, Chapter 5 extended the number of hands from two to four. In Experiments 1-
2, reaction times were found to decrease with group size according to an asymptotic curve on 
congruent trials and to increase with group size according to a linear curve on incongruent 
trials. Importantly, however, the asymptotic relation on congruent trials became linear when 
no imitative control was needed, namely in the absence of incongruent trials (Experiments 3-
7). This indicates that strategic control processes caused congruent responses to saturate. 
Indeed, if larger groups provide a stronger motor trigger, then imitative control has to be 
adjusted accordingly to prevent unwanted imitative responses. The selective asymptote on 
congruent trials indicates that this was achieved by regulating the response threshold based on 
the number of observed movements. That is, because a heightened response threshold leads to 
slower responses, such a mechanism masks decreases in response speed on congruent trials 
while strengthening increases in response speed on incongruent trials. Interestingly, the 
finding of an asymptotic relation between group size and automatic imitation closely 
corresponds to the literature on social contagion in social psychology (e.g., Gallup et al., 
2012; Knowles & Bassett, 1976; Milgram, Bickman, & Berkowitz, 1969). However, this 
literature has mainly explained social contagion in terms of interpretative processes. In 
contrast, Chapter 5 used a task that minimized the role of interpretation. As a consequence, it 
supports the hypothesis that social contagion has a sensorimotor basis. 
 
Representing Multiple Different Observed Actions  
 
The second question, whether the motor system can also represent multiple different 
observed actions, was investigated with automatic imitation and fMRI. First, Chapter 2 used 
automatic imitation to compare responses in a condition where two stimulus hands performed 
different actions with responses in a condition where neither stimulus hand performed an 
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action. The results revealed that performance in these two conditions could not be 
distinguished. Given that seeing two different actions in this paradigm corresponds to seeing 
one congruent action and one incongruent action, these results indicate that both actions were 
represented at the same time in the motor system, and that this produced a concurrent 
facilitation and interference effect that cancelled out each other. However, another 
explanation could also be that participants represented neither action in this condition. 
Therefore, to address this issue, Chapter 6 extended the number of stimulus hands from two 
to four. This, then, allowed me to compare two conditions in which three or four hands 
performed the same action with a condition in which three hands performed one action and a 
fourth hand performed a different action. The results revealed weaker automatic imitation in 
the third condition than in the other two conditions, indicating that the actions of the four 
hands were represented together in the motor system even when they performed different 
actions. 
Finally, in Chapter 7 I directly measured motor activation during passive observation 
using fMRI. In this study, participants observed two right hands performing sign language 
gestures. Three key results were obtained. First, the motor system was activated more strongly 
when two different gestures were observed compared with when a single gesture was 
observed. Second, both individual gestures could be decoded simultaneously from activation 
in the motor system using multivariate analysis techniques. Third, observing two different 
compared with two identical gestures activated brain areas associated with motor conflict, and 
this activation was correlated with activation in the motor system. Together, these results 
show that two different observed actions can be represented at the same time in the motor 
system. 
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A Formal Theory of Representing Multiple Observed Actions
1
 
 
To understand the relation between perception and action in multi-agent settings, it is 
important not only to show that the actions of multiple persons can be represented 
simultaneously in the motor system, but also to provide a formal account of how this can be 
achieved. Therefore, the current section will describe a computational model of the automatic 
imitation studies conducted in Chapters 2, 5, and 6. Figure 1 shows the model representing the 
Chapter 2 task. That is, it shows a dual-route model (Cooper, Catmur, & Heyes, 2013) based 
on the associative sequence learning theory of automatic imitation (Heyes, 2011). The main 
assumption of the model is that the imperative cue and stimulus movement influence the 
motor system via separate routes. In particular, it assumes that the imperative cue activates a 
response via short-term intentional stimulus-response associations established solely for the 
purpose of the task, while the stimulus movement activates a response via long-term 
automatic stimulus-response associations established as a consequence of genetic disposition 
or learning experience (Heyes, 2011). When both routes converge on the correct response, 
there is an increase in motor activation, and this causes response facilitation. In contrast, when 
the automatic route activates the incorrect response, response inhibition is required, and this 
causes response interference instead. 
The current model extends an existing model by Cooper et al. (2013). In this model, it 
was shown that automatic imitation – also known as imitative compatibility – and spatial 
compatibility can be modeled using the same dual-route mechanism, and that differences in 
the time course of these two effects (Catmur & Heyes, 2011) can be explained as variations in 
the processing time of finger location (spatial compatibility) and finger identity (imitative 
compatibility). The model shown in Figure 1 follows the architecture of the Cooper et al. 
                                                     
1
 The computational model presented here is based on Cracco, E. & Cooper, R.P. (in prep). Automatic Imitation 
of Multiple Agents: A Computational Model. 
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(2013) model but includes an additional stimulus hand to mimic the experimental setup of 
Chapter 2, in which participants responded to an imperative cue (W or P) while one or two 
hands moved either the index finger or little finger. 
 
 
Figure 1. Model architecture used to simulate Chapter 2. The stimulus nodes encode the actions performed by 
the two stimulus hands. The imperative node encodes the imperative cue. The numerosity node encodes the 
number of hands performing an action. The stimulus nodes and imperative nodes are connected to the response 
nodes via excitatory connections (red). The numerosity node is connected to the response nodes via inhibitory 
connections (blue). Lateral inhibition is implemented at the motor level. The line thickness indicates the strength 
of the connection. 
 
The stimulus, imperative, and numerosity nodes are visual nodes processing 
respectively the stimulus movements, the imperative cue, and the number of hands making a 
movement. Stimulus and imperative node activation is propagated to the motor system via 
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excitatory connections. Imperative-to-motor connections are assumed to be stronger than 
stimulus-to-motor connections because this is necessary to select the correct response on 
incongruent trials. Activation in the numerosity node is propagated to the motor system via 
inhibitory connections. In particular, the numerosity node receives input for each hand 
making a movement, and then inhibits both motor nodes proportional to the amount of input. 
This node thus implements the strategic control mechanism proposed in Chapter 5. That is, if 
motor activation increases with the number of observed movements, imitative control should 
increase accordingly to prevent overt imitation. In the current model, imitative control was 
implemented by inhibiting both responses. This is equivalent to increasing the response 
threshold in the sense that it delays action selection so that premature responses can be be 
overruled by more deliberate responses (Bogacz, Wagenmakers, Forstmann, & Nieuwenhuis, 
2010; Frank, 2006; Munakata et al., 2011; Wiecki & Frank, 2013). 
Figure 2 shows the activation profile of the different nodes in a typical two hands 
incompatible trial. The model first settles for 500 cycles without input to obtain a stable 
activation level in all nodes. Next, the relevant imperative node is excited. This causes 
activation in this node to gradually increase until a response is provided after 295 cycles. The 
numerosity and stimulus nodes are excited respectively 20 cycles before and 80 cycles after 
the imperative node. The early excitation of the numerosity node was based on evidence that 
the brain can rapidly estimate the number of items in a visual display (Harvey, Klein, 
Petridou, & Dumoulin, 2013; Piazza, Izard, Pinel, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 2004). The late 
excitation of the stimulus nodes was taken from the Cooper et al. (2013) model. Similar to the 
imperative nodes, numerosity node activation increases gradually. In contrast, activation in 
the stimulus nodes is transitory, which corresponds to the transitory nature of the stimulus 
movements. The activation profile of the response nodes is displayed in the bottom right 
panel. Activation in the correct response node increases together with activation in the 
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imperative node, whereas activation in the incorrect response node increases together with 
activation in the stimulus nodes. After initially increasing, activation in the incorrect response 
node decreases due to a combination of lateral inhibition and activation decay in the stimulus 
nodes. The model registers a response when activation in one of the two response nodes 
exceeds the response threshold. 
 
 
Figure 2. Activation profiles of the different nodes in a typical two hands incompatible trial. The x-axis shows 
the time course (in cycles) and the y-axis shows the activation level. The activation functions and model 
parameters were taken from the Cooper et al. (2013) model, with exception of the stimulus node decay 
parameters and the numerosity node parameters. The stimulus node decay parameters were set so that an effect 
of 1 cycle roughly corresponded to an effect of 1 ms (see also Cooper et al., 2013). The numerosity node 
parameters were set so that the facilitation and interference effects were approximately the same size (Genschow 
et al., 2017). 
 
Figure 3 shows the empirical and simulation results of Chapter 2 Experiment 1. The 
top panel shows the analysis comparing the condition in which two identical movements were 
observed (“Two”) with the condition in which a single movement was observed (“One”). The 
bottom panel shows the analysis comparing the condition in which two different movements 
were observed (“C/IC”) with the condition in which no movements were observed (“N/N”). 
As can be seen, the simulation results closely captured the empirical results, indicating that 
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the dual-route model presented in Figure 1 can explain why automatic imitation increased 
when two identical movements were observed as well as why it disappeared when two 
different movements were observed. 
 
 
Figure 3. Empirical and simulation results of Chapter 2 Experiment 1. The top panel shows the analysis 
comparing the condition in which two identical movements were observed (“Two”) with the condition in which 
a single movement was observed (“One”). The bottom panel shows the analysis comparing the condition in 
which two different movements were observed (“C/IC”) with the condition in which no movements were 
observed (“N/N”). 
 
However, can it also explain why reaction times in Chapter 5 decreased with group 
size according to an asymptotic curve on congruent trials but increased with group size 
according to a linear curve on incongruent trials? To address this question, two more stimulus 
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hands were added to the model (Figure 4). Figure 5 shows the empirical and simulation 
results. The top panel describes the experiments in which compatible trials were mixed with 
incompatible trials (“mixed experiments”). As can be seen, the simulation results accurately 
described the empirical results. The reason for this is that motor inhibition from the 
numerosity node increased when more hands made a movement. This then led to an increase 
in response speed that worked against automatic imitation on congruent trials but together 
with automatic imitation on incongruent trials, explaining why congruent but not incongruent 
responses saturated. 
 
 
Figure 4. Model architecture used to simulate Chapter 5 and 6. The model is identical to the model presented in 
Figure 1, but contains four sets of stimulus nodes instead of two sets of stimulus nodes. 
 
The bottom panel shows the experiments in which only compatible trials were 
included (“non-mixed experiments”). In line with the assumption that imitation should no 
longer be inhibited when it facilitates task performance, the numerosity-to-motor connections 
were set to zero for these simulations. Similar to the empirical results, removing the strategic 
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regulation mechanism caused the asymptote to disappear. Thus, taken together, the simulation 
results support the hypothesis that the asymptote on congruent trials was caused by a strategic 
regulation mechanism that increased motor inhibition depending on the number of observed 
movements in order to prevent overt imitation. 
 
 
Figure 5. Simulation and empirical results of Chapter 5 using the model presented in Figure 4. The top panel 
shows the mixed experiments (Experiments 1-2). The bottom panel shows the non-mixed experiments 
(Experiments 3-6). 
 
Nevertheless, it could be argued that manually setting the numerosity-to-motor 
weights is reminiscent of a homunculus. Instead, a more mechanistic approach would be to 
make the model learn how to adjust the weights based on previous experience. Figure 6 
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presents a model that continuously adjusts the numerosity-to-motor weights on the basis of 
response conflict. More specifically, the model is identical to the previous model, except for 
two changes. First, the connections between the numerosity and response nodes now run via a 
control node. This implements the assumption that motor inhibition is implemented not by 
visual regions but by executive control regions (Bogacz et al., 2010; Wiecki & Frank, 2013). 
Second, similar to existing cognitive control models, the connections between the control and 
motor nodes are learned throughout the experiment on the basis of response conflict 
(Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). 
 
 
Figure 6. Model architecture used to simulate Chapter 5. The model is identical to the model presented in Figure 
4, but the numerosity node now inhibits the response nodes via a control node and the connections from the 
control node to the response nodes are learned on the basis of response conflict. 
 
In line with previous work, response conflict was modeled as the product of activation 
in the two response nodes (Botvinick et al., 2001). This means that response conflict is high 
on incompatible trials, when both response nodes are activated, but low on compatible trials, 
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when only one response node is activated. The control-to-response weights are initially set to 
zero but are updated on each trial based on the amount of response conflict experienced in the 
previous trial. That is, when response conflict is high, the weights become more negative. 
Instead, when response conflict is low, a decay parameter makes the weights tend towards 
zero (see also Botvinick et al., 2001). Therefore, in the mixed experiments, the control-to-
response weights become gradually more negative until they reach a state of equilibrium. In 
contrast, in the non-mixed experiments, the weights fluctuate around zero. 
 
 
Figure 7. Simulation and empirical results of Chapter 5 using the model presented in Figure 6. The top panel 
shows the mixed experiments (Experiments 1-2). The bottom panel shows the non-mixed experiments 
(Experiments 3-6). 
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Figure 7 shows the results obtained with the response conflict model. As can be seen, 
the simulation results closely match not only the empirical results but also the simulation 
results shown in Figure 5. This indicates that the strategic regulation mechanism proposed in 
Chapter 5 could have been implemented on the basis of response conflict. In other words, the 
response conflict model provides a mechanistic account of why congruent responses reached 
an asymptote in the mixed experiments but not in the non-mixed experiments. That is, in the 
mixed experiments, participants experienced response conflict, which caused them to inhibit 
motor activation based on the number of observed movements. In contrast, in the non-mixed 
experiments, participants did not experience response conflict, and no inhibitory control was 
exerted. 
 
 
Figure 8. Empirical and simulation results of Experiments 1-2 from Chapter 6. The graphs compare responses in 
the condition where three hands (“Three”) or four hands (“Four”) all make the same movement with the 
condition where three hands make the same movement while the fourth hand performs the other movement 
(“Three/One”). 
 
Finally, the Figure 4 model was used to simulate the results of Chapter 6, in which 
participants observed four hands of which three hands made the same movement (“Three”), 
four hands made the same movement (“Four”), or three hands made one movement while the 
fourth hand made a different movement (“Three/One”). Again, the model accurately captured 
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the behavioral pattern (Figure 8). That is, similar to the empirical results, the model predicted 
a smaller congruency effect in the Three/One condition than in both the Three condition and 
in the Four condition. 
To conclude, the simulations presented here show that the automatic imitation results 
of the current dissertation can be explained with a dual-route model that simultaneously codes 
the different stimulus hands and inhibits motor activation based on the number of observed 
movements. As such, this model successfully extends perception-action theories from single-
agent to multi-agent settings. However, the dual-route architecture is based on the associative 
sequence learning theory of automatic imitation (Cooper et al., 2013; Heyes, 2011). 
Therefore, an important question is whether the same results can also be modeled within the 
ideomotor framework (Brass et al., 2000; Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001; Brass & Heyes, 
2005). On first sight, there is no reason to assume that an ideomotor model would make 
different predictions. Indeed, it is likely that existing ideomotor models can be extended in a 
similar way as shown here to explain the results obtained in this dissertation (Haazebroek, 
Raffone, & Hommel, 2016).  
 
Representing Multiple Agents or Multiple Actions? 
 
While the results indicate that individuals can represent two actions performed by two 
or more agents in their motor system, it remains an open question whether this differs from 
representing two actions performed by a single agent. That is, in the present dissertation, there 
was always one agent for each action. As a consequence, it is not clear whether observers 
mirrored multiple actions or multiple agents. To address this question, it is interesting to 
compare the current results with research on bimanual action observation (Heitger, Mace, 
Jastorff, Swinnen, & Orban, 2012; Möttönen, Farmer, & Watkins, 2010). For example, 
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Heitger et al. (2012) measured brain activation while participants observed one person 
manipulating an object either with one hand or with both hands. The results revealed that 
bimanual observed actions did not produce stronger visual or motor activation than unimanual 
observed actions. Instead, brain activation in the bimanual condition was more bilateral than 
brain activation in the unimanual condition, which is similar to TMS research showing weak 
bilateral MEPs during the observation of bimanual gestures relative to a no-movement 
baseline (Möttönen et al., 2010). 
Taken together, it thus appears that seeing two agents performing one action 
modulates the strength of the motor response, whereas seeing one agent performing two 
actions modulates its laterality. This, in turn, indicates that individuals represent the same two 
actions differently depending on whether they are performed by one agent or by two agents. 
In the same vein, Chapters 6 and 7 revealed that not only mutually compatible but also 
mutually exclusive actions were represented in the motor system. This illustrates that the 
motor system can represent two observed actions even when those actions cannot be executed 
at the same time by a single person, and therefore that this system is sensitive to the number 
of agents performing the observed actions. From this perspective, an interesting question is 
what happens when the number of actions is increased further. That is, whereas some studies 
in the current dissertation presented more than two agents, they never presented more than 
two actions. Since it is not possible to execute more than two hand actions at the same time, 
this could provide further insights into how the actions of multiple agents are represented in 
the brain.  
In any case, to fully establish that two actions performed by two agents are represented 
differently than two actions performed by one agent, future work should compare these two 
conditions directly. When doing so, an important question is how the brain connects actions to 
agents. That is, social cognition not only requires us to represent others’ actions but also to 
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link each represented action to its corresponding agent. This, in turn, requires individuals to 
distinguish between multiple external representations (“other-other distinction”). A first 
hypothesis is that other-other distinction relies on the temporo-parietal junction, which is 
considered to be a core region in distinguishing between internal (“self) and external (“other”) 
representations (Brass, Derrfuss, & von Cramon, 2005; Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 2009; 
Sowden & Catmur, 2013). However, other-other distinction might also rely on visual areas 
that process person identity. Supporting this view, previous work has shown that the identity 
of someone grasping an object is encoded in the fusiform gyrus (Ramsey & Hamilton, 2010), 
a key region in face (Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997) and body perception (Downing, 
2001). 
 
The Limitations of Representing Multiple Observed Actions 
 
Another interesting question concerns the limitations of representing multiple 
observed actions. Chapter 5 revealed that automatic imitation increased consistently with 
group size up to four agents. However, what happens when the number of agents increases 
beyond this point? To address this question, we have to consider the boundaries of both the 
motor system and the visual system. Regarding the motor system, research has shown that 
working memory for observed actions relies on motor processes and is restricted to a 
maximum of three to four actions (Gao, Bentin, & Shen, 2015; Wood, 2007). This suggests, 
in other words, that capacity restrictions may prevent the motor system from representing 
more than four observed actions at a time. 
Similar restrictions also apply to the visual system. Indeed, a well-known finding from 
the numerical cognition literature is that individuals can process up to four items in parallel, 
but have to use serial counting processes when there are more than four items (Kaufman, 
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Lord, Reese, & Vokmann, 1949; Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994). This suggests that the visual 
system – like the motor system – is unable represent more than four actions. When this 
number is exceeded, encoding could instead rely on ensemble processing. In line with this 
view, it has been shown that individuals often do not represent individual faces but rather 
represent the average face across all faces (Haberman & Whitney, 2007, 2009). For instance, 
in one study, participants had to indicate if a test face was happier or sadder than a previously 
viewed set of four to sixteen faces (Haberman & Whitney, 2007). It was found that 
participants performed well on this task, but were unable to indicate whether or not they had 
seen the test face in the probe set. This suggests that the mean emotion across all probe faces 
was represented even though none of the individual faces were represented. Furthermore, 
recent work has shown that similar effects can be obtained when estimating the ratio of males 
to females (Alt, Goodale, Lick, & Johnson, 2017), and that ensemble processing requires only 
limited attention (Ji, Rossi, & Pourtois, 2018). 
Moving to action observation, ensemble processing could be implemented by forming 
“composite actions” (Cracco, Bardi, et al., 2018). For example, one hand lifting the index 
finger and another hand lifting the middle finger could be represented as a single hand lifting 
both the index and middle finger. In line with this hypothesis, meta-analytic evidence 
indicates that effector compatibility paradigms produce stronger automatic imitation than 
movement compatibility paradigms (Cracco, Bardi, et al., 2018). That is, an important 
distinction between these two paradigms is that effector incompatible trials trigger two actions 
that can be executed at the same time (e.g., lift index and middle finger), whereas movement 
incompatible trials trigger two actions that cannot be executed at the same time (e.g., lift and 
tap index finger). Therefore, on effector incompatible trials, the stimulus action (e.g., lift 
index finger) could be integrated with the response action (e.g., lift middle finger) into a 
composite action (e.g., lift both index and middle finger). This, in turn, would lead to stronger 
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automatic imitation because it requires participants to inhibit not only the stimulus action but 
also the composite action. Nevertheless, because direct evidence is currently lacking, further 
research will be needed to evaluate whether observed actions can be integrated into composite 
actions. 
Moreover, it is also important to consider that not all actions can be integrated into 
composite actions. For example, when one hand lifts its index finger and another hand taps its 
index finger, it is not possible to combine both actions into a composite action because they 
are mutually exclusive in terms of motor execution. Chapter 7 indicated that observing 
mutually exclusive actions produced motor conflict. However, because this was based on 
activation in the anterior cingulate cortex (Botvinick et al., 2001; Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 
2004), additional research is needed to circumvent the reverse inference problem (Poldrack, 
2006). A promising approach in this respect could be to look at the consequences of motor 
conflict. That is, research has shown that response speed is slower (Verguts, Notebaert, 
Kunde, & Wühr, 2011) and congruency effects smaller (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992) 
following incongruent trials than following congruent trials. According to a prominent theory, 
this is caused by compensatory mechanisms that modulate cognitive processing to optimize 
task performance following response conflict (Botvinick et al., 2001, 2004). In particular, it is 
argued that response conflict causes individuals to become more cautious, which increases 
response speed, and more focused, which decreases congruency effects, in order to prevent 
future errors. 
 
Implications 
 
Although previous work has shown that perception-action links play a crucial role in 
social cognition (Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004; Rizzolatti & Fabbri-Destro, 2008; 
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Sebanz, Knoblich, Prinz, & Wascher, 2006), little is known about its role in social situations 
involving more than one agent (Cracco & Brass, 2017, 2018; Cracco et al., 2015; Cracco, De 
Coster, Andres, & Brass, 2016). By showing that multiple observed actions can be 
represented simultaneously in the motor system, the current dissertation has important 
implications for our understanding of social interaction beyond the dyad. In particular, it 
provides insights into how individuals represent social interactions between two or more 
persons (Quadflieg & Koldewyn, 2017; Quadflieg & Penton-Voak, 2017) and provides a 
sensorimotor perspective on the relation between group size and social contagion (Gallup et 
al., 2012; Knowles & Bassett, 1976; Milgram et al., 1969).  
 
Interaction Representation 
 
To accurately represent our social environment, we not only have to represent others’ 
actions but also their interactions. However, in contrast to action representation, interaction 
representation has remained largely unexplored (Quadflieg & Koldewyn, 2017; Quadflieg & 
Penton-Voak, 2017). In a recent theoretical framework, it was argued that interaction 
representation is supported by three interdependent brain networks, namely the person-
perception network, the mentalizing network, and the action observation network (Quadflieg 
& Koldewyn, 2017). First, the person-perception network consists of visual brain areas in the 
occipitotemporal cortex involved in recognizing faces (Kanwisher et al., 1997) and bodies 
(Downing, 2001). Second, the mentalizing network revolves around the medial prefrontal 
cortex and the temporoparietal junction, and is reliably activated when reasoning about the 
mental state of others (Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014; Van Overwalle & 
Baetens, 2009). Finally, the action observation network is a network of high-level visual 
regions, like the superior temporal sulcus, and high-level motor regions, like the inferior 
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parietal lobe and the premotor cortex, that are activated when observing others’ actions 
(Caspers, Zilles, Laird, & Eickhoff, 2010; Molenberghs et al., 2012). While the results of the 
current dissertation have little to say about the person-perception and mentalizing networks, 
they have significant implications for the role of the action observation network in interaction 
representation. In particular, they suggest that individuals may represent observed interactions 
by simulating the actions of the involved agents in their own motor system (Quadflieg & 
Koldewyn, 2017; Quadflieg & Penton-Voak, 2017). 
Importantly, however, a motor simulation account of interaction representation relies 
on two crucial assumptions, namely that observers can simulate the actions of multiple agents 
at the same time and that this allows them to simulate not only their actions but also their 
interactions (Quadflieg & Koldewyn, 2017; Quadflieg & Penton-Voak, 2017). While the 
current thesis supports the first assumption, the second assumption remains to be investigated. 
That is, it is not because individuals can represent multiple observed actions that they can also 
represent social interactions. To further explore the role of motor processes in interaction 
representation, future research will have to investigate how motor simulation of multiple 
actions can lead to motor simulation of interactions. In particular, an interesting hypothesis is 
that the “composite actions” described earlier contribute to interaction representation because 
this would enable individuals to represent, for instance, a handshake not as two separate 
actions but as a single action in the motor system. 
 
Social Contagion 
 
In addition to interaction representation, the current study has important implications 
for social contagion. Social contagion is the propensity of persons to align their own behavior 
with the behavior of others (Raafat, Chater, & Frith, 2009). Previous work has shown that 
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social contagion increases with group size (e.g., Fischer et al., 2011; Freedman & Birsky, 
1980; Gallup et al., 2012; Milgram et al., 1969) according to an asymptotic curve (Bond, 
2005; Gallup et al., 2012; Latane, 1981; Milgram et al., 1969). However, the relation between 
group size and social contagion has mainly been explained in terms of interpretative 
processes. In Chapter 5, it was shown that automatic imitation increased with group size 
according to an asymptotic curve even when the role of interpretative processes was 
minimized. This supports the hypothesis that not only social cognitive but also sensorimotor 
processes contribute to social contagion (Raafat et al., 2009). In particular, it suggests that 
individuals are more likely to copy the behavior of larger groups because larger groups 
provide a stronger trigger to the motor system. 
The sensorimotor account of social contagion is consistent with evidence that motor 
inhibition increases with the number of bystanders ignoring a person in need even when 
participants are unable to intervene themselves (Hortensius & De Gelder, 2014). However, it 
is unlikely that only sensorimotor processes contribute to social contagion. Instead, social 
contagion is presumably best explained as an interaction between sensorimotor and 
interpretative processes. For example, when mirror processes trigger the urge to imitate, 
interpretative processes could be recruited to evaluate whether imitation is reasonable in the 
present context. From this view, interpretation might function as a gating mechanism that can 
decide to either inhibit or act on imitative triggers depending on whether or not they are 
deemed appropriate. In support of this view, neuroimaging has revealed that the conscious 
decision to imitate is associated with the gating of mirror activation (Bien, Roebroeck, 
Goebel, & Sack, 2009). Similarly, it has been shown that automatic imitation is inhibited 
when it would result in the execution of a taboo gesture, and this effect depended on the 
degree to which the gesture fitted the social context (Cracco, Genschow, Radkova, & Brass, 
2018). 
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Taken together, the current dissertation thus provides an important first step towards a 
sensorimotor theory of social contagion. Nevertheless, further development of this theory will 
require a better balance between ecological validity and experimental control. That is, while 
experimental control is needed to rule out interpretative processes, ecological validity is 
needed to compare the results to social psychological research on social contagion. A 
promising approach to balance both sides is to use virtual reality (Maister, Slater, Sanchez-
Vives, & Tsakiris, 2015; Sanchez-Vives & Slater, 2005; Slater, Spanlang, Sanchez-Vives, & 
Blanke, 2010). For example, virtual reality could be used to systematically manipulate the 
trade-off between experimental control and ecological validity to understand the complex 
interplay between low-level sensorimotor processes and high-level interpretative processes in 
social contagion. 
 
Beyond Actions 
 
Finally, while the current thesis shows that multiple observed actions can be 
represented at the same time in the motor system, social cognition not only requires us to 
represent the actions of others but also to share their tasks (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 
2006) and to represent their perspective (Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007; Samson, Apperly, 
Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010), mental states (Frith & Frith, 2006; Saxe & 
Kanwisher, 2003), and emotions (Bird & Viding, 2014; Singer et al., 2004). In other words, 
an important question is the extent to which the results obtained here can be extended to 
different domains. 
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Joint Action 
 
When interacting with others, we have to represent not only their actions but also their 
tasks (Sebanz, Bekkering, et al., 2006). In line with action representation, research indicates 
that individuals automatically represent their co-actors’ tasks (Atmaca, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 
2011; Eskenazi, Doerrfeld, Logan, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2013; Schmitz, Vesper, Sebanz, & 
Knoblich, 2017; Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003). For example, Sebanz et al. (2003) 
investigated whether the Simon effect could still be observed when two participants were each 
responsible for one response. More specifically, participants saw a hand on the screen 
pointing either to the left or to the right, but were instructed to ignore this event and to 
respond to the color of a ring around the hand’s index finger instead. Importantly, rather than 
responding to both colors, each participant responded to just one color so that one participant 
responded when the ring was green and the other participant when the ring was red. 
The results revealed that responses were faster when the hand pointed to the 
responding participant than when it pointed to the non-responding participant. However, the 
same spatial compatibility effect could not be observed when the task was performed alone, 
indicating that participants automatically represented each other’s task in the joint condition. 
Although this paradigm has been criticized because similar results can be obtained with non-
human co-actors such as pendulums (Dolk, Hommel, Prinz, & Liepelt, 2013), there is now 
converging evidence from various paradigms that individuals do indeed represent the task of 
their co-actors (e.g., Eskenazi et al., 2013; Schmitz et al., 2017). Therefore, an interesting 
question is whether task sharing – like action sharing – can be extended beyond the dyad, and 
whether this facilitates interpersonal coordination in multi-agent joint action tasks (Cracco & 
Brass, 2017; Cracco et al., 2015). 
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Perspective Taking and Mentalizing 
 
Moving even further away from actions, we sometimes also have to represent the 
perspective of multiple agents. An often-used paradigm to measure perspective taking is the 
task developed by Samson and colleagues (2010). In this task, participants see a room with an 
avatar looking at red discs on the walls. The participant always sees all discs. In the consistent 
condition, the avatar also sees all discs. In contrast, in the inconsistent condition, the avatar 
sees only a subset of the discs. When having to indicate the number of discs in the room, 
responses are typically slower in the inconsistent condition than in the consistent condition, 
indicating that participants automatically represented the perspective of the avatar 
(“altercentric intrusion effect”). 
In recent work, this task was extended to multiple avatars (Capozzi, Cavallo, 
Furlanetto, & Becchio, 2014). That is, participants observed two avatars looking either at the 
same discs or at different discs. Relative to a single avatar, altercentric intrusion did not 
increase when two avatars looked at the same disks and disappeared when two avatars looked 
at different disks. These results thus indicate that participants do not automatically track the 
perspective of multiple persons. However, related research suggests that a more nuanced 
conclusion might be in order (Capozzi, Bayliss, Elena, & Becchio, 2015). In this study, one or 
seven faces looked to the left or to the right before an object appeared on the cued side or on 
the non-cued side. When participants had to categorize the object as “kitchen tool” or “garage 
tool”, they were faster in the cued condition than in the non-cued condition, and this cuing 
effect did not depend on the number of faces. In contrast, when participants had to provide an 
affective evaluation of the presented object, they liked the cued objects more than the non-
cued objects, but only when the object was looked at by multiple faces. Together, the 
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evidence thus indicates that support for tracking multiple perspectives depends on the 
dependent measure under investigation. 
Importantly, perspective taking is often seen as an initial step towards understanding 
others’ mental states (Samson et al., 2010). However, whether individuals can represent 
multiple beliefs in parallel is currently unknown. An interesting study in this respect is the 
aforementioned study by Hortensius et al. (2014), in which motor inhibition was found to 
increase with the number of passive bystanders. That is, a plausible explanation for this 
finding is that participants embodied the bystanders’ mental state, causing them to inhibit 
motor responses more strongly as the bystanders increased in number (Cracco & Brass, 2018). 
Nevertheless, more research is needed to better understand multi-belief tracking, and this 
research should investigate not only identical but also different beliefs. 
 
Conclusion 
 
To conclude, the present dissertation demonstrated across six studies comprising 
eighteen experiments (N = 816) that observers can simultaneously represent the actions of 
multiple agents in their motor system, not only when these agents perform identical actions 
but also when they perform different actions. This provides important insights into the 
neurocognitive mechanisms supporting social interaction in multi-agent settings, and as such 
has important implications for research on interaction representation, joint action, and social 
contagion. However, additional research will be needed to investigate whether individuals 
represent multiple actions or multiple agents in their motor system, and to establish the limits 
of representing multiple observed actions. Finally, to obtain a more comprehensive 
understanding of social interaction beyond the dyad, future research will have to extend the 
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research presented in the current dissertation from actions to tasks, perspectives, and mental 
states. 
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The Perception-Action Link 
 
To understand social interaction, a fundamental question is how the actions of others 
are processed in the brain. While traditional views have emphasized the dissociable nature of 
perception and action (Hurley, 2001), it has become clear in the past two decades that both 
processes may be more closely connected than originally thought (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; 
Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009; Cracco et al., 2018; Heyes, 2011; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 
2010, 2016). More specifically, there are currently three research lines supporting a relation 
between perception and action, namely research on motor mimicry (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; 
Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009), research on automatic imitation (Cracco et al., 2018; Heyes, 
2011), and research on the mirror neuron system (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010, 2016). 
Motor mimicry is the observation that individuals tend to imitate each other during 
social encounters (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009). In one of the 
first studies, participants were asked to take turns in describing photographs with a 
confederate who was, unbeknownst to the participant, instructed to either rub his face or 
shake his foot and to either smile or not smile throughout the interaction (Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999). The results revealed that participants imitated the confederate without being aware of 
it. This has important social consequences because people who are being imitated experience 
social interactions to be smoother (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; Stel 
& Vonk, 2010) and behave in a more prosocial manner (van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, & 
van Knippenberg, 2004; van Baaren, Holland, Steenaert, & van Knippenberg, 2003). 
However, the fact that imitation can occur without awareness does not necessarily 
imply that it is an involuntary process (Moors & De Houwer, 2006). For example, social 
reward theories have argued that people use imitation – be it consciously or unconsciously – 
as a means to obtain positive social consequences (Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & Chartrand, 2003; 
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Stel, van Dijk, & van Baaren, 2016; Wang & Hamilton, 2012). Instead, a process is 
involuntary if it is beyond voluntary control (Moors & De Houwer, 2006). Evidence for the 
involuntary nature of imitation comes from research on automatic imitation. In particular, this 
research has shown that imitation occurs even when it impairs task performance (Cracco et 
al., 2018; Heyes, 2011). For instance, Brass et al. (2000) instructed participants to lift their 
index finger in response to the number “1” and their middle finger in response to the number 
“2”. At the same time, a hand on the screen also lifted its index finger, also lifted its middle 
finger, or did not move. The results showed that, compared to when the hand did not move 
(neutral trial), responses were faster and more accurate when the observed action matched the 
instructed response (congruent trial), but slower and less accurate when the observed action 
did not match the instructed response (incongruent trial). This finding has now been replicated 
across a multitude of studies, as was recently demonstrated in a meta-analysis of 226 
experiments conducted between 2000 and 2016 (Cracco et al., 2018). 
Finally, there is also evidence from neuroscience that perception and action are 
intimately connected. That is, research on the mirror neuron system has shown across fMRI 
(Gazzola & Keysers, 2009; Molenberghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 2012), TMS (Fadiga, 
Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995; Naish, Houston-Price, Bremner, & Holmes, 2014), and 
EEG (Fox et al., 2016; Muthukumaraswamy, Johnson, & McNair, 2004) studies that observed 
actions are processed not only in the visual but also in the motor areas of the brain (Rizzolatti 
& Sinigaglia, 2010, 2016). This is consistent with animal studies showing that a subset of 
neurons in the ventral premotor cortex (Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996), the 
inferior parietal lobe (Rozzi, Ferrari, Bonini, Rizzolatti, & Fogassi, 2008), and the 
intraparietal sulcus (Fujii, Hihara, & Iriki, 2007) fire both when an action is executed and 
when the same action is observed (Kilner & Lemon, 2013). 
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Perception-Action Theories 
 
In sum, the above research demonstrates that there is an intrinsic connection between 
perception and action. Theories regarding this perception-action link can be divided into 
specialist and generalist theories (Brass & Heyes, 2005). Specialist theories assume the 
presence of a special purpose mechanism that is uniquely dedicated to matching observed 
actions to motor representations (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Simpson, Murray, Paukner, & 
Ferrari, 2014). Importantly, this mechanism is often held to be inborn (e.g., Meltzoff & 
Moore, 1983, 1989), consistent with evidence that imitation occurs already at birth (e.g., 
Meltzoff & Moore, 1983, 1989). However, recent work has called the evidence supporting 
neonatal imitation into question (Oostenbroek et al., 2016). Together with evidence that both 
mirror activation (Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 2007; Heyes, 2010) and automatic imitation 
(Cracco et al., 2018; Heyes, Bird, Johnson, & Haggard, 2005) are sensitive to sensorimotor 
learning, this supports the view that connections between perception and action might be 
acquired rather than inborn (Cook, Bird, Catmur, Press, & Heyes, 2014; Heyes, 2010, 2016; 
Keysers & Perrett, 2004). 
The idea that perception-action links are learned is at the core of two related yet 
distinct generalist theories (Brass & Heyes, 2005). The first theory is the associative sequence 
learning (ASL) theory (Brass & Heyes, 2005; Cook et al., 2014; Heyes, 2010; Ray & Heyes, 
2011). This theory argues that the visual representation of an action is initially unconnected to 
its motor representations. Instead, it assumes that motor commands gradually become 
connected to their sensory consequences as a result of contingent co-activation. For example, 
when we grasp an object, we typically see how our hand grasps the object. Likewise, when we 
express an emotion, we tend to see the same emotion expressed on the face of others. These 
experiences lead to bidirectional connections between action perception and action execution. 
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This, in turn, causes mirror activation (Cook et al., 2014; Heyes, 2010) and therefore also 
imitation (Cracco et al., 2018; Heyes, 2011). 
The second theory, ideomotor theory (IM), extends ASL by assuming an additional 
mechanism (Brass & Heyes, 2005; Greenwald, 1970; Prinz, 1997; Shin, Proctor, & Capaldi, 
2010). Like ASL, IM posits that associative learning leads to connections between visual and 
motor representations. However, IM also predicts that this learning process culminates in the 
development of ideomotor representations that code actions in terms of their anticipated 
sensory consequences (Greenwald, 1970). Given that the visual image of an action is part of 
its sensory consequences, seeing an action primes the ideomotor representation controlling 
that action. Thus, according to IM, mirror neurons are the neurophysiological manifestations 
of ideomotor representations (Brass & Muhle-Karbe, 2014), and priming these representations 
leads to imitation (Brass et al., 2000; Cracco et al., 2018). In other words, IM and ASL differ 
in whether or not they assume ideomotor representations, but agree in their emphasis on the 
role of motor learning (Brass & Heyes, 2005). 
 
The Current Dissertation 
 
While there is already an extensive literature on the perception-action link in situations 
where a single person watches a single agent, virtually nothing is known about the perception-
action link in multi-agent settings. This is surprising because social interaction regularly 
exceeds a dyadic structure. Therefore, to understand social interaction, it is imperative to 
study action observation not only in the context of single agents but also in the context of 
multiple agents. Given the social function of the perception-action link, this could provide 
important insights into currently understudied social processes such as interaction 
representation (Quadflieg & Koldewyn, 2017; Quadflieg & Penton-Voak, 2017), group 
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interactions (Ramenzoni, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2014; Tsai, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2011), and 
social contagion (Gallup et al., 2012; Hortensius & De Gelder, 2014; Latane, 1981; Milgram, 
Bickman, & Berkowitz, 1969). 
To this end, the goal of the current dissertation was to investigate whether individuals 
are able to simultaneously represent the actions of multiple agents in their motor system. 
When two or more persons perform an action at the same time, they can perform either 
identical or different actions. The present dissertation looked at both situations, and did so 
using behavioral as well as neuroscientific methods. In Chapters 2, 4, 5, and 6, automatic 
imitation was used to measure motor co-representation (Cracco et al., 2018; Heyes, 2011). In 
Chapters 3 and 7, motor activation was measured during passive observation. In particular, 
Chapter 3 measured corticospinal excitability with TMS (Naish et al., 2014) and Chapter 7 
measured motor brain activation with fMRI (Molenberghs et al., 2012). 
 
Representing Multiple Identical Observed Actions 
 
The question whether multiple identical observed actions can be represented in the 
motor system was investigated with automatic imitation and TMS. In Chapter 2, I measured 
automatic imitation while participants observed two hands of which either one hand 
performed an action or both hands performed the same action. The results revealed stronger 
automatic imitation when two identical actions were observed, indicating that both actions 
were represented in the motor system. Interestingly, the same additive effect could not be 
observed for non-human agents, which rules out that it was driven by differences in 
attentional processing. Instead, for non-human agents, there was an additive effect on slow 
but not on fast responses. Together, these results thus suggest that attentional processes 
influenced the effect in early but not in late processing stages. Next, in Chapter 3, I used 
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TMS to obtain a more direct measure of motor activation. That is, I measured corticospinal 
excitability in a passive observation task with similar stimuli as the ones used in Chapter 2. 
The results confirmed the results of Chapter 2, with stronger motor responses when two 
identical actions were observed compared with when a single action was observed. 
Importantly, this was true even when corticospinal excitability was measured at longer delays 
where attentional processes no longer contributed (Cracco, De Coster, Andres, & Brass, 2015; 
Klein, 2000; Samuel & Kat, 2003). 
Chapter 4 addressed an alternative explanation for the results of the previous two 
chapters. That is, it investigated whether participants, instead of representing two hands, 
randomly represented one hand on each trial. This would cause the probability to represent a 
moving hand to be 100% when both hands made a movement but only 50% when one hand 
made a movement. In other words, random sampling would result in an additive effect across 
trials rather than within trials. To rule out this account, Chapter 4 ensured that the actions of at 
least one hand were represented on every trial. More specifically, it used a stimulus setup that 
positioned the two hands close together (Experiments 1-4), and requested participants to 
either attend to (Experiment 3) or imitate (Experiment 4) the actions performed by one of the 
two hands. The results revealed an additive imitation effect even though task requirements 
made it highly unlikely that participants sometimes represented only the non-moving hand. 
This speaks against a random sampling mechanism and instead suggests that participants 
simultaneously represented multiple observed actions in their motor system. 
Finally, Chapter 5 extended the number of hands from two to four. Experiments 1-2 
showed that the influence of group size on reaction times was characterized by an asymptotic 
decrease on congruent trials but by a linear increase on incongruent trials. Importantly, 
however, the asymptotic relation on congruent trials became linear when imitative control was 
no longer needed, namely in the absence of incongruent trials (Experiments 3-7). This 
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indicates that strategic control processes caused congruent responses to saturate. Indeed, if 
larger groups provide a stronger motor trigger, then imitative control has to be adjusted 
accordingly to prevent unwanted imitative responses. The selective asymptote on congruent 
trials indicates that this was achieved by regulating the response threshold based on the 
number of observed movements. That is, because a heightened response threshold leads to 
slower responses, such a mechanism masks decreases in response speed on congruent trials 
but strengthens increases in response speed on incongruent trials. Interestingly, the finding of 
an asymptotic relation between group size and automatic imitation closely corresponds to the 
literature on social contagion in social psychology (e.g., Gallup et al., 2012; Knowles & 
Bassett, 1976; Milgram, Bickman, & Berkowitz, 1969). This literature has mainly explained 
social contagion in terms of interpretative processes. In contrast, Chapter 5 used a task that 
minimized the role of interpretation. As a consequence, it supports the hypothesis that social 
contagion has a sensorimotor basis. 
 
Representing Multiple Different Observed Actions  
 
The second question, whether the motor system can also represent multiple different 
observed actions, was investigated with automatic imitation and fMRI. First, Chapter 2 used 
an automatic imitation paradigm comparing responses in a condition where two stimulus 
hands performed different actions with responses in a condition where neither stimulus hand 
performed an action. The results revealed that performance in these two conditions could not 
be distinguished. Given that seeing two different actions corresponded to seeing one 
congruent action and one incongruent action, this indicates that both actions were represented 
at the same time in the motor system, producing a concurrent facilitation and interference 
effect that cancelled out each other. However, another explanation could be that participants 
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represented neither action. Therefore, to address this issue, Chapter 6 extended the number of 
stimulus hands from two to four. This, then, allowed me to compare two conditions in which 
three or four hands performed the same action with a condition in which three hands 
performed one action and the fourth hand performed a different action. The results revealed 
weaker automatic imitation in the third condition than in the other two conditions, indicating 
that the actions of all four hands were represented together in the motor system even when 
they performed different actions. 
Finally, Chapter 7 directly measured motor activation during passive observation 
using fMRI. In this study, participants observed two right hands performing sign language 
gestures. Three key results were obtained. First, the motor system was activated more strongly 
when two different gestures were observed compared with when a single gesture was 
observed. Second, both individual gestures could be decoded simultaneously from activation 
in the motor system using multivariate analysis techniques. Third, observing two different 
compared with two identical gestures activated brain areas associated with motor conflict, and 
this activation was correlated with activation in the motor system. Together, these results 
show that two different observed actions can be represented at the same time in the motor 
system. 
 
Conclusion 
 
To conclude, the present dissertation showed across six studies comprising eighteen 
experiments (N = 816) that observers can simultaneously represent the actions of multiple 
agents in their motor system, not only when these agents perform identical actions but also 
when they perform different actions. This provides important insights into the neurocognitive 
mechanisms supporting social interaction in multi-agent settings, and as such has important 
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implications for research on interaction representation, joint action, and social contagion. 
However, additional research will be needed to investigate whether individuals represent 
multiple actions or multiple agents in their motor system, and to establish the limits of 
representing multiple observed actions. Finally, to obtain a more comprehensive 
understanding of social interaction beyond the dyad, future research will have to extend the 
research presented in the current dissertation from actions to tasks, perspectives, and mental 
states. 
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De Perceptie-Actie Link 
 
Om sociale interactie te begrijpen, is het essentieel om te weten hoe de acties van 
anderen verwerkt worden in onze hersenen. Hoewel perceptuele en motorische processen 
traditioneel als twee dissocieerbare processen werden gezien (Hurley, 2001), lijkt het er na 
twee decennia onderzoek steeds meer op dat ze in realiteit sterk met elkaar verweven zijn 
(Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009; Cracco et al., 2018; Heyes, 2011; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 
2010). Meer specifiek zijn er momenteel drie belangrijke onderzoekslijnen die een relatie 
tussen perceptie en actie ondersteunen, namelijk onderzoek naar motorische mimicry 
(Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009), onderzoek naar automatische 
imitatie (Cracco et al., 2018; Heyes, 2011), en onderzoek naar het spiegelneuronsysteem 
(Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010, 2016). 
Motorische mimicry is de neiging om elkaar te imiteren tijdens sociale interacties 
(Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009). In één van de eerste studies naar 
mimicry werd aan participanten gevraagd om foto’s te beschrijven aan een medewerker die 
zonder medeweten van de participant geïnstrueerd was om op regelmatige tijdstippen ofwel 
aan zijn gezicht te krabben ofwel zijn voet te schudden en om daarnaast ook al dan niet te 
glimlachen doorheen het experiment (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). De resultaten toonden aan 
dat participanten de medewerker imiteerden zonder dat ze zich hiervan bewust waren. Dit 
heeft belangrijke sociale gevolgen, aangezien mensen die geïmiteerd worden sociale 
interacties als aangenamer ervaren (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; Stel 
& Vonk, 2010) en zich prosocialer gaan gedragen (van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, & van 
Knippenberg, 2004; van Baaren, Holland, Steenaert, & van Knippenberg, 2003). 
Het feit dat imitatie zonder bewustzijn kan plaatsvinden betekent echter nog niet dat 
het ook onvrijwillig is (Moors & De Houwer, 2006). Zo wordt in sociale beloningstheorieën 
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beweerd dat we imitatie – zij het bewust of onbewust – als middel gebruiken om sociale 
voordelen te verkrijgen (Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & Chartrand, 2003; Stel, van Dijk, & van 
Baaren, 2016; Wang & Hamilton, 2012). Om uit te maken of een proces onvrijwillig is, moet 
onderzocht worden of het gecontroleerd kan worden (Moors & De Houwer, 2006). Evidentie 
voor het onvrijwillige karakter van imitatie komt voornamelijk uit onderzoek naar 
automatische imitatie (Cracco et al., 2018; Heyes, 2011). De hoofdbevinding van dit 
onderzoek is dat mensen elkaar imiteren zelfs wanneer dit taakprestaties belemmert. Zo 
moesten deelnemers in een studie van Brass en collega’s (2000) reageren op het nummer “1” 
door hun wijsvinger op te heffen en op het nummer “2” door hun middelvinger op te heffen. 
Tegelijkertijd hief ook een hand op het scherm de wijsvinger, de middelvinger, of geen enkele 
vinger op. De resultaten toonden aan dat deelnemers sneller en accurater reageerden wanneer 
de geobserveerde actie overeenkwam met de vereiste actie (congruente trial), maar trager en 
minder accuraat wanneer dit niet zo was (incongruente trial), vergeleken met wanneer de hand 
niet bewoog (neutrale trial). Bovendien is deze bevinding ondertussen reeds veelvuldig 
gerepliceerd, zoals recent werd aangetoond in een meta-analyse van 226 experimenten 
uitgevoerd tussen 2000 en 2016 (Cracco et al., 2018). 
Tot slot is er ook vanuit de neurowetenschappen evidentie dat perceptie en actie nauw 
met elkaar verbonden zijn. Meer specifiek heeft onderzoek naar het spiegelneuronsysteem aan 
de hand van fMRI (Gazzola & Keysers, 2009; Molenberghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 
2012), TMS (Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995; Naish, Houston-Price, Bremner, & 
Holmes, 2014), en EEG (Fox et al., 2016; Muthukumaraswamy, Johnson, & McNair, 2004) 
studies aangetoond dat geobserveerde acties niet enkel in visuele maar ook in motorische 
hersengebieden verwerkt worden (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010, 2016). Dit komt overeen met 
onderzoek bij dieren waarin werd gevonden dat bepaalde neuronen in de ventrale premotor 
cortex (Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996), inferieur pariëtale cortex (Rozzi, 
Nederlandstalige Samenvatting 
316 
 
Ferrari, Bonini, Rizzolatti, & Fogassi, 2008), en intrapariëtale sulcus (Fujii, Hihara, & Iriki, 
2007) zowel vuren tijdens het uitvoeren van een actie als tijdens het observeren van diezelfde 
actie (Kilner & Lemon, 2013). 
  
Perceptie-Actie Theorieën 
 
Samengevat toont bovenstaand onderzoek dus aan dat er een intrinsieke connectie is 
tussen perceptie en actie. Theorieën hieromtrent kunnen ruwweg opgedeeld worden in 
“specialist” en “generalist” theorieën (Brass & Heyes, 2005). De eerste categorie, met name 
de specialist theorieën, veronderstelt een gespecialiseerd mechanisme dat geobserveerde 
acties linkt aan hun motor representatie (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Simpson, Murray, 
Paukner, & Ferrari, 2014). Een belangrijke assumptie hierbij is bovendien dat dit een 
aangeboren mechanisme betreft (Meltzoff & Moore, 1983, 1989), in overeenstemming met 
evidentie dat imitatie reeds voorkomt bij pasgeboren baby’s (Meltzoff & Moore, 1983, 1989). 
Dit laatste is echter in twijfel getrokken door recenter onderzoek (Oostenbroek et al., 2016). 
Daarnaast hebben verscheidene studies aangetoond dat zowel spiegelneuronactivatie (Catmur, 
Walsh, & Heyes, 2007; Heyes, 2010) als automatische imitatie (Cracco et al., 2018; Heyes, 
Bird, Johnson, & Haggard, 2005) gevoelig zijn aan sensorimotorische training. 
Samengenomen lijkt het er dus steeds meer op dat het verband tussen perceptie en actie niet 
aangeboren is, maar zich in plaats daarvan ontwikkelt doorheen de levensloop (Cook, Bird, 
Catmur, Press, & Heyes, 2014; Heyes, 2010, 2016; Keysers & Perrett, 2004). 
De idee dat perceptie-actie connecties ontstaan ten gevolge van algemene 
leermechanismes ligt aan het hart van de generalist theorieën (Brass & Heyes, 2005). Een 
eerste belangrijke generalist theorie is de zogenaamde associatief sequentieleren (ASL) 
theorie (Brass & Heyes, 2005; Cook et al., 2014; Heyes, 2010; Ray & Heyes, 2011). Deze 
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theorie stelt dat visuele en motorische actierepresentaties initieel onafhankelijk zijn, maar 
vervolgens gradueel met elkaar verbonden raken als gevolg van contingente co-activatie. 
Bijvoorbeeld, wanneer we een object vastnemen, dan zien we meestal hoe onze hand dit 
object grijpt. Deze ervaringen leiden tot bidirectionele connecties tussen actie observatie en 
actie executie die spiegelneuronactiviteit (Cook et al., 2014; Heyes, 2010) en dus ook imitatie 
teweegbrengen (Cracco et al., 2018; Heyes, 2011). 
De tweede generalist theorie is de ideomotor (IM) theorie (Brass & Heyes, 2005; 
Greenwald, 1970; Shin, Proctor, & Capaldi, 2010). Net zoals ASL stelt IM dat associatief 
leren leidt tot bidirectionele connecties tussen visuele en motorische actierepresentaties. 
Daarnaast voorspelt IM echter ook dat dit leerproces uitmondt in het ontstaan van ideomotor 
representaties die acties coderen aan de hand van hun geanticipeerde sensorische uitkomsten 
(Greenwald, 1970). Aangezien actie observatie een gevolg is van actie executie, activeert 
volgens deze theorie het zien van een actie de ideomotor representatie die de geobserveerde 
actie controleert. Dit betekent dat spiegelneuronen binnen dit kader gezien kunnen worden als 
de neurofysiologische manifestaties van ideomotor representaties (Brass & Muhle-Karbe, 
2014) en dat het activeren van deze representaties leidt tot imitatie (Brass et al., 2000; Cracco 
et al., 2018). Samengevat zijn ASL en IM het dus eens over de rol van leren bij het 
ontwikkelen van perceptie-actie connecties, maar verschillen ze over de noodzaak van 
ideomotor representaties (Brass & Heyes, 2005). 
 
Het Huidige Proefschrift 
 
Hoewel er reeds een uitgebreide literatuur bestaat over de perceptie-actie link in 
situaties waarin één persoon een andere persoon observeert, is er tot dusver heel weinig 
geweten over de perceptie-actie link in multi-actor settings. Dit is verrassend, aangezien 
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sociale interactie regelmatig de samenwerking van meerdere personen vereist. Om sociale 
interactie te begrijpen is het daarom van essentieel belang om actie observatie niet alleen te 
bestuderen in de context van één enkele actor, maar ook in de context van meerdere actoren. 
Gezien de sociale functie van de perceptie-actie link kan dit immers belangrijke inzichten 
opleveren over voorlopig weinig begrepen sociale processen zoals interactie representatie 
(Quadflieg & Koldewyn, 2017; Quadflieg & Penton-Voak, 2017), groepsinteractie 
(Ramenzoni, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2014; Tsai, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2011), en sociale 
besmetting (Gallup et al., 2012; Hortensius & De Gelder, 2014; Latane, 1981; Milgram, 
Bickman, & Berkowitz, 1969). 
Het doel van het huidige proefschrift was om hieraan bij te dragen door te 
onderzoeken of individuen in staat zijn om meerdere geobserveerde acties tegelijk te 
representeren in hun motorisch systeem. Wanneer twee of meer personen tegelijk een actie 
uitvoeren, kunnen deze acties ofwel identiek ofwel verschillend zijn. In dit proefschrift 
werden beide situaties bestudeerd, en dit niet alleen met gedragsmatige, maar ook met 
neurowetenschappelijke methoden. In Hoofdstukken 2, 4, 5, en 6 werd motorische co-
representatie gemeten door middel van automatische imitatie (Cracco et al., 2018; Heyes, 
2011). In Hoofdstukken 3 en 7 werd vervolgens motorische activiteit gemeten tijdens passieve 
observatie. Meer specifiek werd in Hoofdstuk 3 de corticospinale exciteerbaarheid gemeten 
met TMS (Naish et al., 2014) en werd in Hoofdstuk 7 de motorische hersenactiviteit gemeten 
met fMRI (Molenberghs et al., 2012). 
 
Meerdere Identieke Geobserveerde Acties Representeren 
 
De vraag of meerdere identieke geobserveerde acties in het motorisch systeem kunnen 
gerepresenteerd worden, werd onderzocht aan de hand van automatische imitatie en TMS. 
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Hoofdstuk 2 keek naar automatische imitatie van twee handen waarvan ofwel één hand een 
actie uitvoerde ofwel beide handen dezelfde actie uitvoerden. De resultaten toonden aan dat 
twee identieke geobserveerde acties sterkere automatische imitatie teweegbrachten dan een 
enkele geobserveerde actie, wat erop wijst dat beide acties tegelijk in het motorisch systeem 
werden gerepresenteerd. Hetzelfde additief effect was echter niet aanwezig wanneer houten 
handen in plaats van menselijke handen werden gebruikt. Meer specifiek werd in deze 
conditie enkel een additief effect gevonden bij snelle, maar niet bij trage reacties. Dit wijst 
erop dat aandachtsprocessen het effect beïnvloedden in vroege verwerkingsstadia, maar 
daarna uitdoofden in latere stadia. Het bekomen additief effect werd vervolgens verder 
onderzocht in Hoofdstuk 3 door corticospinale exciteerbaarheid te meten met TMS tijdens 
een passieve observatietaak met gelijkaardige stimuli als in Hoofdstuk 2. De resultaten 
bevestigden de bevindingen van Hoofdstuk 2 in de zin dat twee identieke geobserveerde 
acties sterkere motorische resonantie uitlokten dan een enkele geobserveerde actie. Dit effect 
werd bovendien gevonden ondanks het feit dat TMS werd toegediend op latere tijdstippen 
waar aandachtsprocessen geen invloed meer kunnen uitoefenen (Cracco, De Coster, Andres, 
& Brass, 2015; Klein, 2000; Samuel & Kat, 2003). 
In Hoofdstuk 4 werd een alternatieve verklaring onderzocht voor de resultaten van de 
vorige twee hoofdstukken. Meer precies werd nagegaan of deelnemers, in plaats van beide 
handen tegelijk te representeren, mogelijk telkens één hand at random representeerden. Dit 
zou er immers voor zorgen dat de kans om een bewegende hand te representeren 100% was 
wanneer beide handen een actie uitvoerden, maar slechts 50% wanneer één hand een actie 
uitvoerde. Met andere woorden, deze theorie stelt dat het bovengenoemde additief effect niet 
binnen trials maar over trials tot stand kwam. Om dit uit te sluiten, werd er in Hoofdstuk 4 
voor gezorgd dat minstens één hand gerepresenteerd werd op elke trial. Dit gebeurde door een 
stimulusopzet te gebruiken waarbij de twee handen dicht bij elkaar gepositioneerd stonden 
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(Experimenten 1-4) en door aan participanten te vragen om hun aandacht te richten op de 
acties van één van de twee handen (Experiment 3) of om deze acties te imiteren (Experiment 
4). Er werd opnieuw een additief effect gevonden hoewel het nu niet langer waarschijnlijk 
was dat participanten soms enkel de niet-bewegende hand representeerden. Deze bevinding 
druist dus in tegen de random representatie theorie en wijst in plaats daarvan richting de 
simultane representatie theorie.  
Tot slot werd in Hoofdstuk 5 het aantal handen uitgebreid van twee naar vier. 
Experimenten 1-2 toonden aan dat de invloed van het aantal handen op reactietijden 
gekenmerkt werd door een asymptotische daling op congruente trials en door een lineaire 
stijging op incongruente trials. Wanneer geen imitatieve controle meer nodig was, met name 
in de afwezigheid van incongruente trials, werd echter gevonden dat de asymptotische daling 
op congruent trials veranderde in een min of meer lineaire daling (Experimenten 3-7). Dit 
doet vermoeden dat strategische controleprocessen ervoor zorgden dat congruente 
reactietijden een asymptoot bereikten. Als motorische activiteit stijgt naargelang het aantal 
geobserveerde acties, dan moet de uitgeoefende controle immers meestijgen om te voorkomen 
dat de handen ongewenst worden geïmiteerd. De selectieve asymptoot op congruente trials 
wijst erop dat dit gebeurde door de responsgrens te reguleren op basis van het aantal 
geobserveerde acties. Een verhoogde responsgrens zorgt namelijk voor tragere reactietijden 
en werkt dus tegen de reactietijddaling op congruente trials, maar samen met de 
reactietijdstijging op incongruente trials. Interessant hierbij is ook dat de geobserveerde 
asymptotische relatie sterke gelijkenissen vertoont met de literatuur omtrent sociale 
besmetting binnen de sociale psychologie (Gallup et al., 2012; Knowles & Bassett, 1976; 
Milgram et al., 1969). Deze literatuur heeft sociale besmetting echter voornamelijk verklaard 
aan de hand van interpretatieve processen. De bevindingen van Hoofdstuk 5 suggereren 
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daarentegen dat sociale besmetting ook een sensorimotorische basis heeft, aangezien de 
gebruikte taak weinig interpretatie toeliet.  
 
Meerdere Verschillende Geobserveerde Acties Representeren 
 
De tweede vraag, of het motorisch systeem ook meerdere verschillende geobserveerde 
acties kan representeren werd onderzocht aan de hand van automatische imitatie en fMRI. In 
Hoofdstuk 2 werd eerst een automatische imitatietaak gebruikt waarin reacties in een conditie 
waar twee handen verschillende acties uitvoerden werden vergeleken met reacties in een 
conditie waar twee handen geen enkele actie uitvoerden. De resultaten wezen uit dat er geen 
verschil was in reactietijden tussen deze twee condities. Aangezien de conditie met twee 
verschillende acties in deze taak overeenkomt met het zien van één congruente en één 
incongruente actie, is een mogelijke verklaring dat beide acties gerepresenteerd werden in het 
motorisch systeem en dat dit twee tegenstrijdige effecten teweegbracht die elkaar vervolgens 
teniet deden. Een tweede mogelijke verklaring is echter dat geen van beide acties verwerkt 
werd. Om deze verklaring uit te sluiten werd in Hoofdstuk 6 het aantal handen uitgebreid van 
twee naar vier. Dit maakte het mogelijk om twee condities waarin drie of vier handen 
dezelfde actie uitvoerden te vergelijken met een conditie waarin drie handen één actie 
uitvoerden en de vierde hand een andere actie uitvoerde. De resultaten toonden aan dat 
automatische imitatie minder sterk was in de derde conditie dan in de twee andere condities, 
wat erop wijst dat alle vier de handen tegelijk in het motorisch systeem gerepresenteerd 
werden zelfs wanneer ze verschillende acties uitvoerden. 
Tot slot gebruikte Hoofdstuk 7 fMRI om hersenactiviteit te meten tijdens een passieve 
observatietaak. In deze studie zagen de deelnemers twee rechterhanden die gelijktijdig 
gebaren uitvoerden uit de gebarentaal. Drie belangrijke resultaten werden bekomen. Het 
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eerste resultaat is dat het motorisch systeem sterker geactiveerd was wanneer twee 
verschillende gebaren geobserveerd werden dan wanneer een enkel gebaar geobserveerd 
werd. Het tweede resultaat is dat beide individuele gebaren tegelijk gedecodeerd konden 
worden uit de motorische hersenactivatie door middel van multivariate analysetechnieken. Tot 
slot is het derde resultaat dat het zien van twee verschillende gebaren ten opzichte van twee 
identieke gebaren zorgde voor activatie in hersengebieden die geassocieerd zijn met het 
verwerken van motorisch conflict. Samengevat betekent dit dus dat het motorische systeem 
niet alleen twee identieke, maar ook twee verschillende geobserveerde acties tegelijk kan 
verwerken.  
 
Conclusie 
 
Het huidige proefschrift toonde doorheen zes studies met in totaal achttien 
experimenten (N = 816) aan dat de acties van verschillende actoren tegelijk in het motorisch 
systeem kunnen gerepresenteerd worden, zowel wanneer de actoren identieke acties uitvoeren 
als wanneer ze verschillende acties uitvoeren. Dit biedt meer inzicht in de neurocognitieve 
mechanismen die sociale interactie ondersteunen in multi-actor settings en heeft daarom 
belangrijke implicaties voor onderzoek naar interactie representatie, groepsinteracties, en 
sociale besmetting. Er blijven echter ook een aantal belangrijke vragen over. Zo is het 
voorlopig niet duidelijk of het motorisch systeem meerdere actoren dan wel meerdere acties 
representeert, en is meer onderzoek nodig om de limieten van het representeren van meerdere 
acties na te gaan. Tot slot wordt een belangrijke taak voor verder onderzoek om niet alleen het 
representeren van meerdere acties, maar ook het representeren van meerdere taken, 
perspectieven, en gedachten te bestuderen. 
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  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail: 
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% Chapter 3 (Mirroring multiple agents: Motor resonance during action observation is modu-
lated by the number of agents) 
% Author: Emiel Cracco 
% Date: 19-02-2018 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
- name: Emiel Cracco 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000, Gent, Belgium 
- e-mail: emiel.cracco@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
- name: Marcel Brass 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000, Gent, Belgium 
- e-mail: marcel.brass@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an email to 
data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sci-
ences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: Cracco, E., De Coster, L., 
Andres, M., & Brass, M. (2016). Mirroring multiple agents: Motor resonance during action 
observation is modulated by the number of agents. Social Cognitive and Affective Neurosci-
ence, 11(9), 1422-1427. 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: all data 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [X] other (specify): Ugent share with supervisor + external hard drive 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
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  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
    
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: R analysis 
file 
  - [ ] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: ... 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: R analysis file 
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be inter-
preted. Specify: ... 
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
     
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [X] other: Ugent share with supervisor + external hard drive     
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail: 
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% Chapter 4 (Automatic Imitation of Multiple Agents: Simultaneous or Random Representa-
tion?) 
% Author: Emiel Cracco 
% Date: 19-02-2018 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
- name: Emiel Cracco 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000, Gent, Belgium 
- e-mail: emiel.cracco@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
- name: Marcel Brass 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000, Gent, Belgium 
- e-mail: marcel.brass@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an email to 
data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sci-
ences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: Cracco, E. & Brass, M. (in 
press). Automatic imitation of multiple agents: Simultaneous or random representation? Jour-
nal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance. 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: all data 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [X] other (specify): Ugent share with supervisor + external hard drive + OSF (osf.io/p3a
6w) 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
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  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [X] other (specify): everyone 
    
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: R analysis 
file 
  - [ ] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: ... 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: R analysis file 
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [X] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be inter-
preted. Specify: text file explaining all variables 
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
     
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [X] other: Ugent share with supervisor + external hard drive + OSF (osf.io/p3a6w) 
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [X] other (specify): everyone     
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail: 
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% Chapter 5 (The role of sensorimotor processes in social group contagion) 
% Author: Emiel Cracco 
% Date: 19-02-2018 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
- name: Emiel Cracco 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000, Gent, Belgium 
- e-mail: emiel.cracco@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
- name: Marcel Brass 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000, Gent, Belgium 
- e-mail: marcel.brass@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an email to 
data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sci-
ences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: Cracco, E., & Brass, M. (in 
press). The role of sensorimotor processes in social group contagion. Cognitive Psychology. 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: all data 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [X] other (specify): Ugent share with supervisor + external hard drive + OSF (osf.io/5yv
nb) 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
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  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [X] other (specify): everyone 
    
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: R analysis 
file 
  - [ ] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: ... 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: R analysis file 
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [X] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be inter-
preted. Specify: text file explaining all variables 
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
     
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [X] other: Ugent share with supervisor + external hard drive + OSF (osf.io/5yvnb) 
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [X] other (specify): everyone     
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail: 
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% Chapter 6 (Motor Simulation of Multiple Observed Actions) 
% Author: Emiel Cracco 
% Date: 19-02-2018 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
- name: Emiel Cracco 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000, Gent, Belgium 
- e-mail: emiel.cracco@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
- name: Marcel Brass 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000, Gent, Belgium 
- e-mail: marcel.brass@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an email to 
data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sci-
ences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: Cracco, E., & Brass, M. 
(submitted). Motor Simulation of Multiple Observed Actions. 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: all data 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [X] other (specify): Ugent share with supervisor + external hard drive + OSF (https://osf.io
/8xpc2/?view_only=bcdda96a9b4f4165a572c9867fbb26df) 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
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  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [X] other (specify): everyone with OSF link 
    
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: R analysis 
file 
  - [ ] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: ... 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: R analysis file 
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [X] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be inter-
preted. Specify: text file explaining all variables 
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
     
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [X] other: Ugent share with supervisor + external hard drive + OSF (https://osf.io/8xpc2
/?view_only=bcdda96a9b4f4165a572c9867fbb26df) 
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [X] other (specify): everyone with OSF link     
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail: 
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% Chapter 7 (Representing Multiple Observed Actions in the Motor System) 
% Author: Emiel Cracco 
% Date: 19-02-2018 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
- name: Emiel Cracco 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000, Gent, Belgium 
- e-mail: emiel.cracco@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
- name: Marcel Brass 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000, Gent, Belgium 
- e-mail: marcel.brass@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an email to 
data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sci-
ences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: Cracco, E., Keysers, C., 
Clauwaert, A., & Brass, M. (submitted). Representing Multiple Observed Actions in the Mo-
tor System. 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: all data 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [X] other (specify): external hard drive 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [ ] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
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  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
    
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: methods 
section, matlab files, and R files 
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: files stored on research group file server 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: matlab files and R files 
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be inter-
preted. Specify: ... 
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
     
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC (R files) 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [X] other: Ugent share with supervisor (R files) 
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP (R files) 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail: 
